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The accounting and finance literature views institutional investors, such as pensions 
and insurance companies, investment advisors and banks, hedge funds and mutual 
funds, as a heterogeneous class of shareholders with different incentives and abilities 
to monitor corporate management. Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the corporate 
governance role of one such shareholder type, namely foreign institutional investors. 
One view is that larger ownership levels by foreign institutions could lead companies 
to myopic decisions in order to boost short-term investment returns. The proponents 
of this view argue that foreign institutional investors could prompt corporate managers 
to prioritise short-term earnings over long-term growth, thereby leading companies to 
short-termist strategies. However, foreign institutions are arguably better positioned 
to act as efficient monitors of managerial decisions in their investee firms. Due to their 
independence, they can undertake a more effective monitoring activity since their ties 
with local business actors, such as managers, governmental authorities and 
communities, are likely lower relative to their domestic counterparts. In addition, their 
international expertise and higher degree of financial sophistication makes them better 
suited to understand growth opportunities of their portfolio firms.  
In chapter 2, I examine the effects of foreign institutional ownership on corporate 
tax planning using an international sample of more than 26,000 firms. If foreign 
institutions are pure profit-maximizers, they would forego the risks of reputational 
loss, payments of additional taxes, penalties and interests if a company’s tax strategy is 
later considered abusive and encourage the adoption of a more aggressive tax 
avoidance approach to boost short-term after-tax earnings. In contrast, I argue that 
foreign institutional investors favour a more balanced tax planning approach that 
trades off costs and benefits of tax avoidance. Results of chapter 2 are consistent with 
the latter hypothesis. They provide evidence that foreign institutions act as effective 
monitors by leading corporate management to select a tax avoidance level similar to 
the tax position of the company’s peers and therefore makes it less likely to attract 
regulatory and public scrutiny since it does not stand out from other firm peer levels. 
Results also show that this effect is more pronounced for larger companies, pointing 
to a political cost interpretation of my findings. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis focuses on the role played by index-tracking institutional 
investors in corporate governance and transparency. Indexed institutions are generally 
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characterized by passive trading strategies, based on an index-benchmarking activity, 
and low expenses. Some studies claim that this class of investors exert limited 
monitoring over corporate management because their portfolios include a large 
number of company stocks and their resources available for monitoring are scarce. In 
contrast, other studies show evidence consistent with indexed institutions operating as 
active owners. According to this stance, indexed institutional investors have the 
incentive to undertake active monitoring over managerial decisions due to their long-
term investment horizons linked to index reconstitutions. In chapter 3, I examine 
whether indexed institutional ownership is associated with greater transparency and 
information production related to companies’ geographic operations. I find that larger 
shares of ownership by indexed institutions are associated with greater geographic 
transparency only in companies that lead most of their operations in tax haven 
countries and have more entrenched corporate managers. This result is consistent with 
a view of indexed investors trading off costs and benefits of monitoring by more 
actively engaging, selectively, with those companies that are more exposed to 
information asymmetries and governance problems. 
Besides external sources of financing, companies can use internally generated funds 
to finance their activities. One way for companies to generate capital internally is by 
taking advantage of tax planning opportunities. Reducing tax payments leads to higher 
tax savings and, presumably, larger cash balances. Yet, companies engaging in tax 
avoidance incur the risks of reputational loss, additional payments of taxes, interests 
and penalties if the chosen tax strategy is later ruled improper. In chapter 4, I examine 
the relation between tax avoidance and firms’ labour investments. Consistent with the 
argument that risks and uncertainties related to tax avoidance make firms more 
cautious when investing, I provide evidence that firms with low effective tax rates, my 
proxy for tax avoidance, undertake sub-optimal labour investments relative to the level 
justified by the firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and industry medians. I find 
this effect using a quasi-natural experiment around Ireland’s statutory corporate tax 
cut of December 1997. More importantly, I find my result to be more pronounced in 
sub-samples of firms exposed to greater tax risks and uncertainties, which is consistent 
with the view of firms withholding their hiring decisions in response to potential 
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Ownership structures of publicly listed companies have experienced substantial 
changes over the last two decades. Dispersed and globalized ownership models, typical 
of companies of the Anglo-Saxon world, are progressively replacing concentrated 
ownership models, historically more common in continental Europe and Asia, where 
corporate control is in the hands of family members or states (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Ferreira and Matos 2008). Similarly, traditional shareholder 
engagement related to monitoring activities of corporate management is moving 
towards more passive, low-cost, index-tracking trading strategies in which the 
corporate governance role of shareholders is often limited to voting according to pre-
determined voting policies or recommendations issued by proxy advisory firms (Gillan 
and Starks 2000; Iliev and Lowry 2015). 
Institutional investors are agents of these changes. Institutions, such as pensions 
and insurance companies, investment advisors and banks, hedge funds and mutual 
funds, constitute an heterogeneous class of investors with portfolios built primarily 
around bonds and equities. With nearly $100 trillion of assets under management 
(AUM) as of 2013 (The World Bank 2015; OECD 2016), institutional investors 
represent an important source of capital and are among the largest shareholders of 
publicly listed companies in both developed and developing economies. 
Institutional investors also play a central role in corporate governance. Their active 
monitoring and their threat of exit can discipline corporate management to act in a 
way that maximizes shareholders’ value (Tirole 2001). For example, Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) present empirical evidence that companies targeted by 
hedge funds experience greater CEO turnover and increases in payouts and 
performance after the announcement of an active campaign (i.e. Schedule 13D filing). 
In contrast, a theoretical paper by Edmans (2009) shows that investors holding 
significant shares of ownership (i.e. blockholders) can improve firm value using the 
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threat of selling their shares to discipline self-interested or entrenched corporate 
managers. 
One view is that all institutional investors promote myopic investments in their 
portfolio firms to boost short-term investment returns. Following this stream of 
thought, regulators and policy makers have expressed concerns about the increasing 
stock ownership by active investors. For example, a report released by The World Bank 
(2015) shows that institutions, such as pensions and mutual funds, tend to invest in 
short-term assets, adopt herding behaviours and act pro-cyclically during crises. In one 
high profile case, the then President of France, Jacques Chirac, publicly complained 
that foreign mutual funds targeting French companies demanded substantial job cuts 
simply “to safeguard the investments benefits of Scottish widows and California 
pensioners” (The New York Times 2000). In Germany, the chairman of the Social 
Democratic Party, Franz Müntefering, compared the increasing stock ownership by 
short-term oriented, activist hedge funds and private equity firms to an invasion of 
“locusts” stripping targeted companies’ assets (The Economist 2007). 
However, the heterogeneity of institutional investors also reflects differences in 
their monitoring incentives and ability. For example, Bushee (1998) shows that while 
institutions with high stock turnover and momentum trading (i.e. transient institutions) 
are associated with a reduction of R&D expenses to reverse a decline in earnings, 
institutional investors with lower turnover (i.e. dedicated and quasi-indexed 
institutions) are less likely to adopt such a myopic behaviour. Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2005) split institutions according to their investment horizon based on stock 
turnover and find that companies with larger short-term institutional ownership are 
associated with lower acquisition premiums and lower abnormal returns at the merger 
announcement and thereafter. In contrast, companies held by institutions with long-
term investment horizons receive higher premiums and generate higher abnormal 
returns following the merger announcement. 
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) examine the effects of domestic and 
foreign institutional investors. They provide evidence that institutional ownership is 
overall positively associated with shareholder-centric corporate governance 
mechanisms and that, foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong 
investor protection export good governance practices in their investee firms. Further, 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) find that, unlike domestic institutions, monitoring by foreign 
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institutions is value enhancing. On a similar note, Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires 
(2017) show that companies with larger foreign institutional ownership document 
greater long-term investments in tangible, intangible and human capital and experience 
also increases in innovation output. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the 
corporate governance role of foreign institutional investors with respect to firms’ tax 
planning policies. If foreign institutions are profit-maximizers, they would forego the 
risks of reputational loss, payments of additional taxes, penalties and interests if the 
tax strategy is later ruled improper and adopt a more aggressive tax avoidance approach 
to boost short-term after-tax earnings. In contrast, foreign institutional investors may 
favour a more balanced tax planning approach that trades-off costs and benefits of tax 
avoidance. Results of chapter 2 are consistent with the latter hypothesis. They provide 
evidence that foreign institutions act as effective monitors by leading corporate 
management to select a tax avoidance level that is similar to the tax position of their 
company’s peers and is less likely to attract regulatory and public scrutiny because it 
does not stand out from peer levels. This effect is more pronounced for investors with 
a long-term investment horizon. Finally, results hold for larger companies only, 
pointing to a political cost interpretation of my findings. 
I find these effects using an international sample of more than 26,000 publicly listed 
companies from forty-eight countries between the years 2000 and 2016. To mitigate 
endogeneity concerns, I use two approaches to identify the impact of foreign 
institutional investors on corporate tax planning policies. First, I take advantage of the 
elimination of investing limits to Norway’s pension funds and insurance companies 
occurred in 2008 using a quasi-experimental design. Second, I exploit the plausibly 
exogenous variations of foreign institutional ownership that follows a company’s 
inclusion (and exclusion) into the Morgan Stanley Capital International – All Country 
World Index (MSCI ACWI) using both instrumental variable (IV) and regression 
discontinuity (RDD) analyses. 
Chapter 3 classifies institutional investors as active or passive based on their trading 
strategy. Active institutions are characterized by a more direct involvement in 
monitoring corporate management. They accumulate shares to influence managerial 
decisions or sell their shares when managers perform poorly. In contrast, passive 
institutional investors do not buy and sell stocks to prompt corporate changes. Their 
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trading strategy aims to deliver the returns of a market index (i.e. S&P 500) and is, 
therefore, characterized by low turnover, diversified holdings and minimal expenses. 
For this reason, passive institutions are traditionally associated with lower monitoring 
incentives when investing; raising questions about how effectively managerial activity 
in the investee firms is being monitored (Bloomberg 2018). 
A number of studies suggest that passive investors act as ineffective corporate 
monitors. On this spirit, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) present evidence that larger 
shares of ownership by passive, index-tracking investors are associated with increases 
in CEO power and fewer appointments of new independent directors. Moreover, 
companies experience lower announcement returns from M&A activities and director 
appointments following an increase in passive ownership. On a similar stance, Iliev et 
al. (2019) find that passive investors undertake low governance-related research, 
measured by the number of views of a company’s SEC filings by investor type, and 
Bebchuk and Hirst (2019) show that the three largest U.S. passive investors (namely, 
BlackRock, State Street Global Advisor (SSGA) and Vanguard) tend to avoid 
involvement in corporate reforms in their portfolios.  
Other studies lend support to the hypothesis that passive institutional investors are 
not “passive owners”. For example, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) present 
evidence that passive institutions improve corporate governance in their investee 
firms, in that their stockholdings are positively associated with independent director 
appointments, removal of takeover defences, more equal voting rights and long-term 
value creation. Similarly, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016) show that companies 
with larger passive institutional ownership document more generous payout policies, 
consistent with a disciplinary effect over corporate management. Finally, Boone and 
White (2015) find that companies generate more information, in the form of 
management forecasts, and are more transparent, as proxied by the number of analysts’ 
forecasts and liquidity, after an increase in passive, index-tracking, institutional 
ownership. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether indexed institutional ownership is associated with 
greater transparency and information production related to companies’ geographic 
operations. Results indicate that larger shares of ownership by indexed institutions are 
associated with greater transparency only in companies that lead the majority of their 
operations in tax haven countries and have more entrenched corporate managers. This 
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finding lends supports to the view of indexed investors trading off costs and benefits 
of monitoring by acting as effective, though selective, monitors in those companies 
that are more exposed to information asymmetries and governance problems. 
I conduct the analysis in chapter 3 using a sample of more than 4,400 U.S. publicly 
listed companies between the years 1998 and 2016. I use two approaches to provide 
causal support to my findings. First, I take advantage of the elimination of investing 
limits in iShares Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) of 2003 to implement a difference-
in-differences (DID) test for the impact of indexed institutional investors on 
geographic segment disclosure. Second, I exploit the plausibly exogenous variation of 
indexed institutional ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 inclusion cutoff using 
both instrumental variable (IV) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) analyses. 
Besides external sources of financing, companies can use internally generated funds 
to finance their activities. One way for companies to generate capital internally is by 
taking advantage of tax planning opportunities. Reducing tax payments leads to higher 
tax savings and, presumably, to larger cash balances. Yet, companies engaging in tax 
avoidance incur the risk of reputational loss, additional payments of taxes, interests 
and penalties if the chosen tax strategy is later considered abusive1. For example, in 
2016, Alphabet reached a settlement with the British tax authorities to pay additional 
taxes of £130 million on revenues earned between 2005 and 2014 and in the same year, 
the European Commission demanded additional taxes from Apple of €13 billion for 
its aggressive tax planning (Financial Times 2016).  
In a review of the tax literature, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggest that further 
research should investigate the consequences of tax avoidance on corporate decision-
making and address the question of what companies do with the extra cash generated 
by tax avoidance activities. One view is that companies use the extra cash to increase 
investments in tangible, intangible and human capital. Taking this stance, a recent study 
by Shevlin, Shivakumar, and Urcan (2018) shows that firms engaging in tax avoidance 
are associated with higher capital expenditures and net hiring. At a macro-economic 
level, this effect partially leads to higher GDP and employment growth. 
A different view is that tax avoidance acts as a friction to the investment preferences 
of corporate management by leading to sub-optimal investment decisions. De Simone, 
                                                          
1 The OECD (2013) estimates that the loss of global tax revenues from tax planning activities aimed at 
aggressively avoiding corporate taxes ranges from $100 and $240 billion per year. 
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Klassen, and Seidman (2018) find that income shifting aimed at avoiding taxes is 
positively associated with the level of affiliate investments in tangible, intangible and 
human capital but, negatively associated with the efficiency of affiliate investments. 
Similarly, Blouin and Krull (2009) present evidence that companies repatriating their 
foreign earnings under the American Job Creation Act of 2004 document fewer 
investment opportunities than non-repatriating companies, but larger cash balances 
and payouts to shareholders. 
Based on the above discussion, chapter 4 examines the relation between tax 
avoidance and firms’ labour investments. Consistent with risks and uncertainties from 
tax avoidance making firms more cautious when investing, chapter 4 provides evidence 
that firms with low effective tax rates, a proxy for tax avoidance, undertake sub-optimal 
labour investments relative to the level justified by the firms’ underlying economic 
fundamentals and industry medians. Chapter 4 shows this effect using a quasi-natural 
experiment around Ireland’s statutory corporate tax cut of December 1997. More 
importantly, results are more pronounced in sub-samples of firms exposed to greater 
tax risks and uncertainties, which is consistent with the view of firms withholding their 
hiring decisions in response to potential reductions in cash flows and shareholders’ 
wealth. 
Overall, this doctoral thesis contributes to the capital markets research in 
accounting, with a primary focus on tax avoidance and the role of institutional 
investors in financial reporting and corporate decision-making. It examines 
institutional ownership as a determinant of tax planning and geographic segment 
disclosure in the investee firms as well as corporate hiring policies as consequences of 
tax aggressive behaviours. More specifically, Chapters 2 and 3 investigate whether 
monitoring by institutional investors affects managerial tax- and disclosure-related 
decisions. Chapter 2 breaks down institutional ownership into domestic and foreign 
components to investigate the effect of each type of institutions on incentives for 
corporate tax planning. In contrast, Chapter 3 focuses on the association between 
plausibly passive, index-tracking institutional investors and firms’ motives for 
geographic segment reporting. Finally, chapter 4 empirically explores whether 
aggressive tax avoidance leads firms to make sub-optimal labour investment decisions 
and, in particular, to under-hire relative to the level justified by the firms’ economic 
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fundamentals. Chapter 5 concludes and highlights further avenues for research. The 
next sections summarize each chapter of this thesis. 
1.2 Ownership structures and corporate tax policies 
In chapter 2, I examine the association between foreign institutional ownership and 
corporate tax planning using an international sample of more than 26,000 publicly 
listed companies from forty-eight countries between the years 2000 and 2016. The 
main source of inquiry of chapter 2 is whether monitoring by foreign institutional 
investors influences managerial tax-related decisions around the world.  
A number of studies support the view of foreign institutions being better able to 
engage in an independent and objective monitoring over corporate management due 
to their weaker ties with local businesses and management (Ferreira and Matos 2008, 
Aggarwal et al. 2011, Bena et al. 2017). In contrast, domestic institutional investors 
may have lower monitoring incentives as their businesses are more likely to be 
intertwined with local business actors – such as companies, governmental authorities 
and communities (Davis and Kim 2007; Giannetti and Laeven 2009). 
Taxes represent only a line of cost to institutional investors for their investee firms. 
Reducing this cost leads to higher after-tax earnings and, presumably, to higher 
shareholder returns. However, recent studies present evidence that a tax planning 
strategy leading to tax avoidance can act as a friction to shareholders’ preferences 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Blouin 2014; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2014; 
Chyz and Gaertner 2018). That is, companies found to avoid taxes are exposed to 
reputational losses and payments of additional taxes, penalties and interests, potentially 
reducing after-tax earnings and shareholder returns. 
One implication of this trade-off between costs and benefits is that companies may 
look to their industry peers for tax planning strategies. On this spirit, in chapter 2, I 
test two predictions about the effect of foreign institutional ownership on corporate 
tax planning. The first is that the presence of foreign institutional investors plays a 
disciplinary role by leading corporate managers to engage in a level of tax planning that 
is consistent with the average tax position of the company’s country and industry peers. 
The second prediction is that larger and profitable firms are more sensitive to 
deviations from their country/industry norms due to political costs associated with 
being perceived as overly aggressive (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983). 
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The endogeneity of foreign institutional ownership makes it challenging to establish 
causal relations. Foreign investors may choose to invest in companies planning to 
reduce their tax rates, or there may be missing factors associated with both foreign 
institutional ownership and the firm’s tax rate. In chapter 2, I address both the omitted 
correlated variables concern and reverse causality using two methods to isolate a 
plausible exogenous change in foreign institutional ownership.   
First, the elimination of investing limits to Norway’s insurance companies and 
pension funds in January 2008 led to large increases in foreign equity investments by 
Norway’s insurance and pension funds (treatment group) from 2008 onwards but not 
the percentage of foreign stocks held by Norwegian institutional investors other than 
pensions and insurances (control group). Taking advantage of this setting, I present in 
chapter 2 the results of differences-in-differences (DID) analyses. Second, similar to 
prior studies (Aggarwal et al. 2011, Bena et al. 2017), I exploit the exogenous variation 
in foreign institutional ownership that follows the addition (and deletion) of companies 
to the Morgan Stanley Capital International – All Countries World Index (hereafter, 
MSCI ACWI) using both instrumental variable (IV) and regression discontinuity 
(RDD) approaches. 
Results in chapter 2 show that higher foreign ownership in the current year 
increases the likelihood of peer tax planning in the following year. Evidence also 
suggests that higher foreign institutional ownership in the current year is associated 
with less aggressive tax positions (low or high tax avoidance relative to peer levels) in 
the next year. That is, this year’s foreign institutional ownership is negatively associated 
with a firm being extreme tax avoider as well as extreme payer the next year. Thus, 
findings support a symmetrical interpretation of peer planning for tax purposes. 
I also develop a political cost hypothesis consistent with Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) and Zimmerman (1983). Both papers suggest that large and profitable firms are 
less likely to be extreme tax avoiders due to political costs associated with being 
perceived as outliers by the government or their customers. These costs include fines, 
being governmental and regulatory targets, or having customers shun the products of 
firms deemed to be overly aggressive in their tax planning. Consistent with this 
premise, recent evidence by Chen, Powers, and Stomberg (2019) shows that the 
negative tone of media coverage on tax issues increases with larger and more visible 
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firms. I present several tests within chapter 2 and find evidence consistent with a 
political cost theory of tax planning.   
Finally, I examine if the monitoring activities of foreign institutions are substitutes 
or complements to the firms’ other governance structures. Results indicate that the 
effect of foreign institutions on tax planning is stronger for companies with powerful 
CEOs and with lower incentive-based executive compensation. These findings are 
consistent with foreign institutions acting as monitors within the firm’s corporate 
governance structure. Moreover, chapter 2 also finds evidence that long-term oriented 
foreign institutional investors, who have a stronger incentive to be effective monitors 
of managerial tax-related activity, have a more pronounced effect on peer tax planning 
compared to foreign investors with short-term horizons. Overall, my analysis suggests 
that foreign institutions act as effective monitors of managerial tax-related activity. 
Chapter 2 makes a substantial contribution to the literature on institutional 
ownership and tax planning. A number of studies (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 
2010; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield 2012; Khurana and Moser 2012; Khan, 
Srinivasan, and Tan 2017; Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin 2018) focus on institutional 
ownership in U.S. companies and tax avoidance, with most papers finding positive 
correlations between the two. Chapter 2 differs from these studies by distinguishing 
between foreign and domestic institutions within a global setting. It proposes and finds 
evidence that foreign and domestic ownership exert different monitoring effects on 
firms, with foreign institutions pushing firms toward their country and industry peer’s 
effective tax rate and domestic institutions towards less efficient tax avoidance. 
Further, consistent with Khurana and Moser (2012), but not with Chen et al. (2018), 
chapter 2 presents evidence that this monitoring effect is stronger for firms with more 
powerful CEOs.  
Chapter 2 relates to the literature on the effect of foreign institutional ownership 
on corporate decision-making, for example with respect to financial reporting 
comparability (Fang, Maffett, and Zhang 2015), financial reporting quality and 
voluntary disclosure (Beuselinck, Blanco, and García Lara 2017; Tsang, Xie, and Xin 
2019), cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos 2010) and 
investments in tangible, intangible and human capital (Bena et al. 2017). It adds to this 
branch of literature by presenting evidence that foreign institutional investors lead to 
a more effective tax management in their portfolio firms.  
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Chapter 2 also contributes to the literature on peer effects on corporate outcomes. 
Prior studies show evidence of peer effects on corporate financial policy (Leary and 
Roberts 2014), takeover defences (Servaes and Tamayo 2014) and incentive 
compensation schemes provided to executives (Albuquerque 2009), while an emergent 
stream of literature investigates whether a firm’s tax strategy relates to the tax position 
of its peers (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, and Omer 2015; Bird, Edwards, and Ruchti 
2018; Armstrong, Glaeser, and Kepler 2019; Heitzman and Ogneva 2019). Chapter 2 
contributes to this stream of research by presenting evidence that companies with 
higher foreign institutional ownership are more likely to mimic the tax position of their 
peers. Findings are consistent with this “tax squeezing effect” being more prevalent 
for larger and more profitable firms, thus supporting a political cost view of tax 
planning (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983). 
Findings from chapter 2 can be informative to regulators, legislators and other 
company stakeholders at both national and international level when designing and 
enforcing policies targeting at corporate tax avoidance. Unlike anecdotal evidence, the 
analysis in chapter 2 suggests that foreign institutions act as effective corporate 
monitors, as their presence is associated with an increase in tax planning in companies 
subject to high tax rates and a decrease in tax planning in companies engaging in a 
more aggressive tax avoidance. In addition, the findings that a firm’s tax position 
generates externalities on other firms in the same industry/country can also be relevant 
for policymakers, for instance, when designing tax incentives for specific industries. 
1.3 Passive investors and information asymmetries 
In chapter 3, I examine the association between indexed institutional ownership 
and geographic segment disclosure using sample of more than 4,400 U.S. publicly listed 
companies between the years 1998 and 2016. The main source of inquiry of chapter 3 
is whether investors with traditionally passive, index-tracking trading strategies are 
effective monitors of geographic information production in their investee firms. 
ASC 280 (previously SFAS 131) provides the legal framework of geographic 
segment disclosure. Firms are required to present their operations disaggregated by 
one or more operating segments (such as industry, geographic area, legal entity or type 
of costumer) in accordance with their organizational architecture and to provide 
financial information for each “material” country in which they earn revenues and hold 
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assets. Operations for all “immaterial” countries can be aggregated at higher levels 
(regions, continents or in one “Total Foreign” residual entry).  
Yet, the vague definition of materiality in ASC 280 allows corporate managers to 
have some discretion on the countries that are classified as “immaterial” and can, 
thereby, be aggregated and those that are in fact “material”. In practice, a significant 
number of firms aggregate their financial information at higher levels in response to 
the preferences of corporate managers or better informed investors (Herrmann and 
Thomas 2000; Akamah, Hope, and Thomas 2017). In chapter 3, I conjecture that this 
discretion can also have potential implications for firm transparency, warranting an 
increased demand for monitoring managers’ disclosure motives. 
A number of studies support the view that indexed investors engage in effective 
monitoring over corporate management (Appel et al. 2016; Crane et al. 2016) and 
influence in particular transparency and information production in the forms of 
management forecasts, analysts following and liquidity (Boone and White 2015; Bird 
and Karolyi 2016; Schoenfeld 2017). In contrast with these studies, Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach (2017) show that firms owned by indexed investors experience greater 
accumulation of roles, fewer independent director appointments and worse M&A 
transactions due to the high monitoring costs that such activities may entail. 
Thus, the monitoring role of indexed investors could be more complex than 
originally thought. Differently from management earnings forecasts, indexed investors 
are likely to incur higher costs to monitor country-level information production in their 
numerous and diverse holdings. In such a setting, I posit that indexed investors can 
act as effective corporate monitors and strategically direct their monitoring effort 
towards those firms experiencing greater information asymmetries and governance 
problems. 
I find that firms with larger indexed ownership are overall less transparent with 
respect to their geographic operations. Yet, this effect is less pronounced for firms that 
are exposed to greater information asymmetries and governance problems. Results in 
chapter 3 thus are consistent with a strategic allocation of resources from index 
investors with respect to their monitoring activities. I proxy for weaknesses in firms’ 
governance structures using unreported tax haven operations, accumulation of roles 
and active ownership concentration (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 2016; Akamah et 
al. 2017; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017; Dyreng, Hoopes, Langetieg, and Wilde 2018). 
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Following Cremers and Pareek (2016), I find consistent results using two different 
samples of indexed ownership. The first sample relates to the equity holdings of 13F - 
indexed institutional investors as reported by the Factset LionShare database, while the 
second sample consists of firms held by S12 - indexed mutual funds as from the 
Thomson Reuters database.  
To provide causal support to the analysis in chapter 3, I exploit two sources of 
exogenous variation to indexed ownership. First, I conduct a difference-in-differences 
(DID) analysis using a SEC’s exemptive relief order that permits mutual funds to invest 
in iShares Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in excess of the maximum amount outlined 
in section 12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 from May 2003 onwards. 
Second, I take advantage of the discontinuity surrounding Russell index inclusion to 
implement both instrumental variable (IV) and fuzzy regression discontinuity (RDD) 
analyses.  
Overall, results reported in chapter 3 suggest that indexed investors are less likely 
to monitor country-by-country operation disclosure of every firm of their large and 
diversified portfolios. However, this class of shareholder acts as effective corporate 
monitors of country-level operation disclosure in firms that are in greater need of 
monitoring and informational transparency. Chapter 3 thus shows evidence of a more 
nuanced approach of indexed investors in their demand for increased informational 
transparency in their investee firms.  
These findings can be relevant for policymakers and corporate stakeholders when 
designing policies aimed to provide greater transparency about firms’ geographic 
operations. At international level, the comparability between the IFRS 8 and SFAS 
131, resulting from an ongoing convergence project between IFRS and US GAAP, 
makes results informative also for those countries implementing IFRS principles. 
Unlike anecdotal evidence, chapter 3 shows that indexed investors act as effective 
corporate monitors, as their presence is associated with greater country-by-country 
operation disclosure in firms that are exposed to greater information asymmetries and 
governance problems. 
1.4 Corporate tax avoidance and labour demand 
In chapter 4, I examine the association between tax avoidance and firms’ hiring 
policies using a sample of more than 3,000 U.S. publicly listed companies between 
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1992 and 2017. The main source of inquiry of chapter 4 is whether corporate tax 
avoidance, which encompasses statutory tax rates, incentives, complexities and 
enforcements of tax systems and firms’ tax planning preferences, affects hiring 
decisions. 
Labour is an important factor of production, which requires significant investments 
by firms. Yet, there is substantial variation in net hiring across U.S. companies. Part of 
this variation can be attributed to changes in firms’ underlying economic fundamentals 
(such as sales growth, profitability, liquidity and financial constraints) and industry-
level employment rates and is therefore expected. In chapter 4, I investigate whether 
abnormal variations in labour investments relative to such expected levels can be 
explained by firms’ low cash effective tax rates (Low Cash ETR), my proxy for 
corporate tax avoidance.  
From a theoretical standpoint, risks and uncertainties associated with tax avoidance 
can generate an important friction in firms’ investment opportunities (or real options) 
that can make firms more cautious when investing. Firms avoiding taxes are exposed 
to potential reductions of cash flow and investor wealth if, following an investigation, 
tax authorities rule the firm’s tax strategy abusive. For example, tax authorities can 
enforce penalties, additional payments of taxes and interests
 
and firms may also 
experience reputational loss due to increased public scrutiny (sometimes referred to as 
“tax shaming”).  
A number of studies in the real option literature provide evidence that firms 
withhold investments in presence of uncertainty (“wait and see” strategy (Bloom, 
Bond, and Van Reenen 2007)) and Dixit (1997) shows that a similar pattern also applies 
to labour investments. Investments in human capital matter for firms' retaining policies 
because adjustment costs of labour are arguably high. For example firms incur the 
costs of searching, selecting, hiring, training and possibly firing (Bentolila and Bertola 
1990; Dixit 1997) and these costs increase with higher job-specific skills (Ghaly, Anh 
Dang, and Stathopoulos 2017).  
All the arguments above suggest that firms are likely to respond to increased 
uncertainty and risks from tax avoidance by withholding their investments and more 
specifically their labour demand. Therefore, in chapter 4, I test whether firms with low 
cash effective tax rates (Low Cash ETR) undertake sub-optimal labor investments with 




Following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung, Lee, and Weber (2014), I compute 
an inverse measure of labour efficiency as the absolute value of the difference between 
a firm’s net hiring and its expected level. The expected labour investment is based on 
a model of firms’ change in hiring policies as a function of sales growth, profitability, 
liquidity and leverage developed by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). This variable, therefore, 
captures changes in firms’ hiring policies that cannot be explained by the firms’ 
underlying economic fundamentals. In supplemental analysis, I replace the expected 
level of hiring with the industry-median net hiring and average net hiring in the 
previous three years. These variables therefore capture deviations of firms’ changes in 
hiring policies from industry and prior years’ human capital investments.  
I find a positive and significant association between Low Cash ETR in the current 
year and firms’ abnormal net hiring in the following year. However, after breaking 
down the sample into firms with net hiring above (over- investment) and below 
(under-investment) the level justified by their underlying economic fundamentals, I 
find that the effect of tax avoidance on labour is asymmetric: it is statistically 
insignificant for firms over-investing in labour whereas it is positive and significant for 
firms under-investing in human capital. Overall, this result suggests that firms with 
Low Cash ETR increase sub-optimal hiring policies, by choosing a level of net hiring 
that is below the one expected based firms’ fundamentals and industry medians.  
To provide a causal support to my findings, chapter 4 takes advantage of Ireland’s 
statutory corporate tax cut occurred in December 1997 in a difference-in-differences 
(DID) design. For this test, the treatment group consists of U.S. multinationals with 
operations in Ireland before and during the phased reduction of the statutory tax rate 
that began in December 1997, whereas the control group includes U.S. multinationals 
with foreign operations in countries other than Ireland. Firms in the control group 
represent the best match to firms in the treatment group based on several lagged 
covariates and industry fixed effects. Overall, results from this test are consistent with 
the main findings of chapter 4 in that, following the reduction in Ireland’s statutory 
corporate tax rate, firms with Irish operations withhold their investments in human 
capital compared to firms without Irish operations.  
Next, I examine whether firms exposed to greater tax risks and uncertainties are 
associated with abnormal net hiring. The rationale of this test lays in the precautionary 
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motives that can lead firms to choose a level of net hiring below the expected level 
(Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen 2007). I first examine a sub-sample of firms with high 
tax risk (proxied by a five-year volatility of Cash ETR above the sample median) and 
find that the effect on abnormal net hiring is stronger for this group of firms. Second, 
I use firms’ uncertain tax benefit reserve (proxied by UTB above the sample median) 
to investigate whether firms with higher tax uncertainty undertake abnormal labour 
investments. Consistent with my predictions, chapter 4 shows that firms with high tax 
uncertainty choose a level of net hiring that deviates from the expected level based on 
firms’ fundamentals.  
Chapter 4 relates and contributes to several strands of the literature. The first 
focuses on tax risk and uncertainty. Empirical evidence suggests that tax risks can 
impact firms’ overall risk (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011; 
Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams 2017)  and that firms take action to reduce tax 
risks (Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). Tax avoidance can also generate tax 
uncertainty (Guenther, Wilson, and Wu 2018) and firms are found to increase their 
cash balances as a way of hedging themselves from future tax payments (Hanlon, 
Maydew, and Saavedra 2017). Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by presenting 
evidence that tax risks and uncertainties can affect firms’ resource allocation by leading 
firms to make sub- optimal hiring decisions.  
The second strand of the literature focuses on the effect of uncertainty on real 
options. Prior studies suggest that in the presence of uncertainty firms are less likely to 
undertake costly investments or disinvestments (i.e. inaction) (Dixit and Pindyck 1995; 
Bloom et al. 2007; Trigeorgis and Reuer 2017) and that uncertainty affects labor 
policies by leading firms to minimize costly adjustments due to hiring and firing (i.e. 
retention policies) (Oi 1962; Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Dixit 1997; Banker, Byzalov, 
and Chen 2013; Ghaly et al. 2017). Chapter 4 adds to this strand of research by studying 
tax avoidance as a source of uncertainty and by providing evidence that tax avoidance 
affects firms’ labor policies leading to sub-optimal hiring policies relative to the 
expected level based on firms’ fundamentals and industry medians.  
The third strand of literature focuses on the consequences of tax avoidance for 
corporate stakeholders. Overall, evidence from this area of research are consistent with 
the view of tax avoidance affecting different capital providers asymmetrically, with 
equity holders sharing the benefits of greater tax savings (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; 
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Wilson 2009; Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin 2016; Rego, Williams, and Wilson 2017) 
whereas debt holders being exposed to the risks, but not sharing the benefits, of firms’ 
more aggressive tax strategies (Shevlin, Urcan, and Vasvari 2013; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and 
Zhang 2014). Chapter 4 extends this literature by focusing on an important class of 
corporate stakeholders - firms’ workers and employees - and by presenting evidence 
that tax avoidance, involving the risks of future additional tax payments, penalties and 
reputational loss, leads firms to make sub-optimal labour investment decisions.  
Findings in chapter 4 can also have important policy implications. First, they 
provide evidence that, at least for a sub-set of firms with opportunities to avoid taxes, 
tax avoidance leads firms to make sub-optimal hiring decisions relative to the hiring 
level justified by firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and industry medians. 
Second, by showing that fiscal stimuli to labour may be less effective in presence of 
tax risks and uncertainty, results in chapter 4 can be informative to legislators and to 
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Foreign institutional ownership and corporate tax 
planning 
2.1 Introduction and motivation 
In chapter 2, I examine the effects that financial globalization has on tax planning. 
The sample encompasses over 26,000 publicly listed companies from 48 countries over 
the period 2000-2016. The main source of inquiry of this chapter is whether equity 
investments by foreign institutions impact the invested firms’ tax planning. 
The concept of what tax planning is has evolved over time. Many studies specifically 
equate tax planning with tax avoidance (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Graham, 
Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) and Khan, Srinivasan, and Tan (2017)), that is, the 
reduction of explicit corporate taxes (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Because corporate 
taxes represent a cost to shareholders, reducing this cost leads to higher after-tax 
earnings and, presumably, to higher shareholder returns.2 If institutions are profit 
maximizers, then, under this view, all institutions, foreign or domestic, favour a 
corporate tax plan of higher tax avoidance. 
However, theoretical and empirical studies suggest that tax planning is more 
nuanced in that tax avoidance entails the risks of companies incurring payments of 
additional taxes, penalties, and interest if tax authorities later challenge the adopted tax 
strategy (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Blouin 2014), greater agency costs (Slemrod 
2004; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007), reputation loss (Graham et al. 2014), 
undesirable deviations from social norms (Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2013; Hasan, 
Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2017), and enhanced political costs (Jensen and Meckling 1978; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Under this view, institutions may favour a more 
balanced tax planning approach, trading off the costs and benefits that firms incur 
from a uni-directional tax avoidance strategy.  
                                                          
2 The OECD estimates the loss of corporate tax revenues attributable to tax evasion and tax avoidance 
in the range of $100bn and $240bn per year. 
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One implication of this trade-off between costs and benefits is that firms may look 
to their industry peers for tax planning strategies. Armstrong, Gleaser, and Kepler 
(2019) present evidence that firms react to deviations between their tax rates and 
industry competitors by moving their tax rates towards industry peers. Using survey 
data, Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) document companies benchmarking their 
tax positions against those of other companies operating in the same industry and that 
these comparisons extend across different jurisdictions. Similarly, interviews with tax 
executives led by Radcliffe, Spence, Stein, and Wilkinson (2018) confirm that firms 
focus their tax positions towards “industry norms”. For example, a tax executive 
stated: “Relative to other companies [in our industry] our effective tax rate is 16% and 
most other companies are between 16 and 20. That’s kind of the norm in Canada, 
based on the incentives that are there. So, you know, our tax rate isn’t 2%. It’s always 
been between 15 and 20.” (p.52). 
Armstrong et al. (2019) attribute some of these tax decisions to economic factors, 
but they also state that a firm’s new tax strategy relates strongly to managements’ 
concerns about being perceived as being overly aggressive in their tax planning, i.e., 
engaging in too much tax avoidance. In a similar vein, Graham et al. (2014) find that 
the majority of surveyed tax executives at publicly-traded firms would forego a tax 
reducing strategy if the tax strategy lacks an economic purpose, hurts the company’s 
reputation, increases the risk of the strategy being challenged by the IRS, increases the 
possibility of generating negative media attention, or leads to a possible accounting 
restatement. Such decisions though can also entail significant reputational costs as 
recent evidence shows that CEOs of companies that pay substantially higher taxes 
compared to their peers, i.e. not engaging in tax avoidance, are more likely to 
experience a forced turnover (Chyz and Gaertner 2018). 
In this chapter, I posit that the presence of foreign institutional investors plays a 
disciplinary role by leading corporate managers to engage in a level of tax planning that 
is consistent with the average tax position of the company’s country and industry peers, 
as this level is more likely to meet their expectations on the cost-benefit trade-off of 
corporate tax policies3. I further predict that larger firms and more profitable firms are 
                                                          
3 For instance, in March 2015 the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) requested every FTSE 
100 company, through written letters, to submit information about their tax affairs. Similarly, Sasja 
Beslik, head of sustainable finance at Nordea Asset Management, on aggressive tax structures in their 
portfolio states that: “Nordea’s letter asks the companies to lay out their tax risks and disclose whether 
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more sensitive to deviations from their country/industry norms due to political costs 
associated with being perceived as overly aggressive (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 
Zimmerman 1983). Foreign institutions are able to engage in a more independent and 
objective monitoring over corporate tax management due to their weaker ties with 
local businesses and with management (Gillan and Starks 2000; Ferreira and Matos 
2008). In contrast, domestic institutional investors may have incentives to monitor less 
as their businesses are more likely to be intertwined with local business actors – such 
as companies, governmental authorities and communities. Further, domestic financial 
institutions often manage or provide trading platforms for domestic companies’ 
pension funds, thus compromising their potential oversight roles (Giannetti and 
Laeven 2009). 
The disciplining effect of foreign institutions on firm practices is shown in a number 
of recent empirical studies. These practices include corporate governance mechanisms 
(Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos 2011), financial reporting comparability and 
quality (Fang, Maffett, and Zhang 2015; Beuselinck, Blanco, and García Lara 2017), 
voluntary disclosure (Tsang, Xie, and Xin 2019), cross-border mergers and acquisitions  
(Ferreira, Massa and Matos 2010), innovation and long-term investments (Bena, 
Ferreira, Matos, and Pires 2017), and hedge fund activism outcomes (Becht, Franks, 
Grant, and Wagner 2017).  
A counter view is that all institutional investors promote myopic investments in 
their portfolio firms to boost short-term investment returns (The New York Times 
2000; Financial Times 2010). Under this view, foreign institutions prefer their invested 
firms to engage in tax avoidance to increase their short-term income and stock returns. 
Although prior papers do not separate institutional ownership into foreign and 
domestic pieces, several studies support the view that institutions favour a unilateral 
policy of tax avoidance. For example, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) provide 
evidence that family firms with long-term institutional investors are more tax 
aggressive relative to family firms without institutional investors. Cheng, Huang, Li, 
and Stanfield (2012) find that tax avoidance increases after the intervention of activist 
                                                          
these have been discussed at board meetings. If they don’t comply […] Nordea will rally other investors 
and propose shareholder resolutions” (Financial Times 2016). 
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hedge funds relative to the pre-intervention period, and Khan et al. (2017) show that 
quasi-indexer ownership is associated with more tax avoidance.4 
I conduct the empirical analysis using a large sample of publicly listed companies 
from 48 countries over the period 2000-2016. Consistent with Armstrong, Blouin, 
Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015), I compute a relative measure of tax planning as the 
difference between a company’s effective tax rate (ETR) and the average ETR of its 
industry and country peers (we refer to this variable as ETR Diff). I then define the 
peer tax planning using an indicator if a firm/year observation is in the third quintile 
of the ETR Diff distribution (i.e. the closest to zero). I use a similar procedure to 
calculate the minimum difference between tax paid and the average tax paid by peer 
firms. I find that higher foreign ownership in the current year increases the likelihood 
of peer tax planning in the following year. I find the opposite association for domestic 
ownership.  
I also present evidence that higher foreign institutional ownership in the current 
year is associated with less aggressive tax positions (low or high tax avoidance relative 
to peer levels) in the next year. That is, I find a negative association between this year’s 
foreign institutional ownership and a firm being in the first quintile of ETR Diff 
(extreme tax avoiders) next year as well as a negative relation between this year’s 
foreign institutional ownership and a firm being in the fifth quintile of ETR Diff 
(extreme payers) the next year. Thus, my findings support a symmetrical interpretation 
of peer planning for tax purposes. 
Despite using a lag/lead model, the endogeneity of foreign institutional ownership 
makes it difficult to establish causal relations. Foreign investors may choose to invest 
in companies planning to reduce their tax rates, or there may be missing factors 
associated with both foreign institutional ownership and the firm’s tax rate. To address 
both the omitted correlated variables concern and reverse causality, I use two methods 
to isolate a plausible exogenous change in foreign institutional ownership.   
First, I exploit a regulatory change in Norway’s insurance and pension fund industry 
occurred in January 2008, which eliminated a 35% restriction of equity investments for 
insurance and pension funds’ investment portfolios, using a difference-in-differences 
                                                          
4 Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin (2018) find evidence consistent with Khan et al. (2017), but they attribute 
their results to quasi-indexers focusing on improving a firm’s overall performance as measured by ROA 
and not by tax avoidance per se. 
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analysis. As I show, this change led to large increases in foreign equity investments by 
Norway’s insurance and pension funds (treatment group) from 2008 onwards but not 
the percentage of foreign stocks held by Norwegian institutional investors other than 
pensions and insurances (control group). It is worth noting that Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world (The 
Economist 2011; Forbes 2019) having more than $1 trillion of assets under 
management (AUM), with about $625 billion equity holdings in almost nine thousand 
companies in seventy-seven countries (CNBC 2017). 
Second, I instrument (IV) foreign institutional ownership using the addition (and 
deletion) of companies to the MSCI ACWI (Aggarwal et al. 2011, Bena et al. 2017). 
Given that companies cannot directly control their addition (or deletion) to the index 
(which is based on their market capitalization relatively to other firms), and that 
international investors use the index to benchmark their portfolios, MSCI ACWI 
membership can be considered a valid instrument for foreign institutional ownership. 
My two-stage results are consistent with the ones I find using a difference-in-
differences methodology (DID). 
I acknowledge that my identification methods come with caveats. Although widely 
applied in previous literature, the use of MSCI ACWI membership as an instrument 
for foreign institutional ownership is arguably biased towards smaller firms, which are 
more likely to be added or deleted from the index. However, its use renders my results 
comparable to that of other studies focusing on the impact of foreign investors on 
corporate decision-making within a global setting. My difference-in-differences (DID) 
analysis mitigates these concerns, but in this case it could be argued that my setting 
becomes narrowed down to investment activity originating from one country. 
However, given the importance of Norwegian institutional investors for equity 
investments at a global level, I am confident about the generalizability and relevance 
of my findings. Overall, I believe that my identification strategy constitutes a well-
balanced approach at isolating plausible exogenous changes in foreign institutional 
ownership.  
Having demonstrated the association between foreign investors and tax planning, I 
propose a political cost explanation consistent with Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and 
with Zimmerman (1983). Both papers suggest that large and profitable firms are less 
likely to be extreme tax avoiders due to political costs associated with being perceived 
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as outliers by the government or their customers. These costs include being fined, 
being government targets, or having customers shun the products of firms deemed to 
be overly aggressive in their tax planning. Consistent with this premise, recent evidence 
by Chen, Powers and Stomberg (2019) shows that the negative tone of media coverage 
on tax issues increases with larger and more visible firms. I conduct several tests within 
chapter 2 and find evidence consistent with a political cost theory of tax planning.   
Finally, I examine if the monitoring activities of foreign institutions are substitutes 
or complements of the firms’ other governance structures. I find the effect of foreign 
institutions on tax planning to be stronger for companies with powerful CEOs and 
with lower incentive-based executive compensation. These findings are consistent with 
foreign institutions acting as monitors within the firm’s corporate governance 
structure. Moreover, I also provide evidence that long-term oriented foreign 
institutional investors, who have a stronger incentive to be effective monitors of 
managerial tax-related activity, have a more pronounced effect on peer tax planning 
compared to foreign investors with short-term horizons. Overall, my analyses in 
chapter 2 suggest that foreign institutions act as effective monitors of managerial tax-
related activity. 
Chapter 2 contributes to several strands of literature. It adds to the literature on 
institutional ownership and tax planning. A number of studies (Chen et al. 2010; Cheng 
et al. 2012; Khurana and Moser 2012; Khan et al. 2017; Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin 
2018) focus on institutional ownership in US companies and tax avoidance, with most 
papers finding positive correlations between the two. Chapter 2 differs from these 
studies by differentiating between foreign and domestic institutions within a global 
setting. I propose and find evidence that foreign and domestic ownership exert 
different monitoring effects on firms, with foreign institutions pushing firms toward 
their country and industry peer’s effective tax rate and domestic institutions towards 
less efficient tax avoidance.  Further, consistent with Khurana and Moser (2012), but 
not with Chen et al. (2018), I present evidence that this monitoring effect is stronger 
for firms with more powerful CEOs. 
Chapter 2 relates to the literature on the effect of foreign institutional ownership 
on corporate decision-making, for example with respect to financial reporting 
comparability (Fang et al. 2015), financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure 
(Beuselinck et al. 2017; Tsang et al. 2019), cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
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(Ferreira, Massa, and Matos 2010) and investments in tangible, intangible and human 
capital (Bena et al. 2017). It adds to this branch of literature by presenting evidence 
that foreign institutional investors lead to a more effective tax management in their 
portfolio firms.  
Chapter 2 also contributes to the literature on peer effects on corporate outcomes. 
Prior studies show evidence of peer effects on corporate financial policy (Leary and 
Roberts 2014), takeover defenses (Servaes and Tamayo 2014) and incentive 
compensation schemes provided to executives (Albuquerque 2009), while an emergent 
stream of literature investigates whether a firm’s tax strategy relates to the tax position 
of its peers (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, and Omer 2015; Bird, Edwards, and Ruchti 
2018; Armstrong et al. 2019; Heitzman and Ogneva 2019). Chapter 2 contributes to 
this stream of research by presenting evidence that companies with higher foreign 
institutional ownership are more likely to mimic the tax position of their peers. 
Findings in chapter 2 are consistent with this tax squeezing effect being more prevalent 
for larger and more profitable firms, thus supporting a political cost view of tax 
planning (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983). 
Finally, chapter 2 uses a similar setting as Hasan, Kim, Teng, and Wu (2016) 
although the two studies ask very different research questions. Hasan et al. (2016) 
examine whether the social norms of institutions’ home countries translate into 
invested companies changing their taste for tax avoidance. In chapter 2, I examine 
whether foreign institutional investments result in firms moving towards their country 
and industry peer tax rates. Hasan et al. (2016) find evidence in support of their 
hypothesis. However, their research questions as well as their sample period and the 
data needed to calculate their measure of tax avoidance produce a much smaller and 
different sample than mine, making comparisons between their study and mine 
difficult to do. 
Findings in chapter 2 can be informative to regulators, legislators and other 
company stakeholders at both national and international level when designing and 
enforcing policies targeting at corporate tax avoidance. Unlike conventional wisdom, 
my analysis suggests that foreign institutions act as effective corporate monitors, as 
their presence is associated with an increase in tax planning in companies subject to 
high tax rates and a decrease in tax planning in companies engaging in a more 
aggressive tax avoidance. In addition, my findings that a firm’s tax position generates 
29 
 
externalities on other firms in the same industry/country can also be relevant for 
policymakers, for instance, when designing tax incentives for specific industries. The 
remainder of chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background 
information and reviews prior literature. Section 2.3 provides details on the data and 
research design while section 2.4 discusses my findings. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Review of relevant literature 
Chapter 2 relates to and builds on several literature streams. Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) describe tax avoidance as a continuum of activities and strategies that can be 
ordered progressively in terms of their tax aggressiveness, with tax-exempt municipal 
bonds and tax shelters being at the bottom and top ends of the continuum, 
respectively. However, as Blouin (2014) asserts, aggressive tax avoidance can be 
defined only in relation to the risk profile of a company’s tax planning activity/strategy. 
That is, while some activities/strategies provide certain tax savings, others involve the 
risk of being red-flagged by the competent authorities in case of future tax audits. The 
risk of regulatory scrutiny can deter companies from engaging in aggressive tax 
avoidance as potential additional taxes, interests and penalties imposed by the 
authorities may substantially impact cash flow and shareholders’ value.  
In a similar vein, Jensen and Meckling (1978) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
note that the political sector has the power to affect wealth transfers between various 
groups, with corporations being “especially vulnerable” to these wealth redistributions 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978, p. 115). These redistributions can come in the form of 
increased corporate taxes or with new regulations. Several recent high profile cases 
illustrate how government entities punish firms perceived as being too tax aggressive 
– even though their tax policies are not illegal. In 2016, Alphabet reached a settlement 
with the British tax authorities to pay additional taxes of £130 million on revenues 
earned between 2005 and 2014 and in the same year, the European Commission 
demanded additional taxes from Apple of €13 billion for its aggressive tax planning 
(Financial Times 2016). Both companies used a tax strategy called the double Irish and 
Dutch sandwich to reduce their tax bills by moving profits through the Netherlands 
and Ireland (Financial Times 2016).   
Retributions can come also from the private sector.  For example, customers can 
react negatively to the revelation of a corporation’s tax avoidance by boycotting its 
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goods or avoiding its services. Starbuck’s share of coffee sales in Britain fell 
dramatically in the year following Reuter’s exposé of Starbuck’s tax aggression – even 
after the firm pledged £20 million in voluntary tax payments to the U.K. (The 
Guardian 2013). 
Both public and private sector reactions are consonant with a political cost theory 
of tax planning (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Zimmerman 1983).  Under this theory, 
larger and more profitable firms are scrutinized more closely. Therefore, as compared 
to smaller and less profitable firms, they will set their tax avoidance policies in a way 
as to not deviate too much from their peer groups.  In the setting of chapter 2, peer 
firms are in the same industry and country as the affected firm. 
A number of studies document peer effects in corporate policies such as financing 
decisions (Leary and Roberts 2014), takeover defences (Servaes and Tamayo 2014) and 
executive compensation schemes (Albuquerque 2009). A recent stream of literature 
explores the extent of peer effects in corporate tax avoidance. Several mechanisms are 
proposed to explain these effects. Firm can learn from each other through network 
ties and board connections, thus adopting similar levels of tax positions (Brown 2011; 
Brown and Drake 2014). Firm can mimic tax positions of peers they consider to be 
better informed about available tax avoidance opportunities (Kubick et al. 2015). 
Collective rational herding behaviour can also generate peer tax avoidance. That is, 
firms with similar objective functions may find themselves adopting similar tax 
positions (Armstrong et al. 2019; Heitzman and Ogneva 2019). Chapter 2 adds to this 
literature by proposing a political cost rationale for large, profitable firms using an 
international sample. 
A different stream of accounting literature investigates tax avoidance from an 
agency theory perspective (Slemrod 2004; Chen and Chu 2005; Crocker and Slemrod 
2005). Under this view, the separation between ownership and control plays a central 
role in determining the level of tax avoidance due to conflicts between those receiving 
the tax benefits and those bearing the risks of tax avoidance. Part of this literature 
focuses on different types of ownership structures, with “inside” ownership referring 
to equity held by members of a founding family (Chen et al. 2010) or corporate 
managers (McGuire, Wang, and Wilson 2014), and “outside” ownership being equity 
held by private equity firms (Badertscher, Katz, and Rego 2013), hedge funds (Cheng 
et al. 2012), or indexer mutual funds (Khan et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018). In chapter 2, 
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I extend this literature by examining if “outside” investors located in different 
countries to the one in which the firm is listed (i.e. foreign institutional investors) 
influence corporate tax policies.  
A few studies provide evidence that foreign institutional investors contribute to 
important changes in corporate policies of their equity holdings. For instance, foreign 
institutions are associated with better corporate governance practices (Aggarwal et al. 
2011; Ferreira and Matos 2008), financial reporting comparability (Fang et al. 2015) 
and financial reporting quality (Beuselinck et al. 2017). Moreover, evidence suggests 
that companies held by foreign institutional investors are more likely to be innovative 
and to engage in long-term investments in tangible, intangible and human capital (Bena 
et al. 2017). Foreign institutional ownership has also been found to play a key role in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Ferreira et al. 2010).  
However, the question of whether foreign institutional ownership influences peer 
effects in corporate tax policies is still an issue relatively unexplored. The Financial 
Times (2016) provides some examples of foreign institutional investors expressing 
publicly their dissent about invested firms’ aggressive tax planning. These examples 
include Nordea Asset Management, a Nordic fund house, writing negatively about tax 
avoidance to Alphabet, Apple, and Starbucks, as well as several UK asset management 
and pension funds writing in the same vein to Alphabet. That these firms are among 
the largest and most profitable firms in the world is consistent with Watts and 
Zimmerman’s (1978) contention that political costs are greater for firms with higher 
reported profits and firm size. In chapter 2, I address these issues using a large sample 
of international firms. 
 
2.3 Data and research design 
2.3.1 Data sources 
I build my sample using two main sources. International accounting data come from 
Worldscope and institutional ownership data come from Factset LionShares (see 
Ferreira and Matos 2008). I require countries/industry pairs (defined using the Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industry classification) to have at least fifty observations. 
Moreover, my sample excludes utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and companies 
operating in the financial sector (SIC codes 6000-6999) as these industries are subject 
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to different regulations (Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013; Bena et al. 2017). Similarly, I 
remove firm-year observations that do not have pre-tax income or income tax data, or 
with missing data across my explanatory and control variables. Following previous 
studies, I restrict corporate effective tax rates (ETRs) between zero and one and 
winsorize all other continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles (Dyreng, Hanlon, 
and Maydew 2010). After employing my screens, I retain data on 48 countries at a 
yearly frequency over the period 2000-2016. The final sample has 26,082 unique firms 
with 163,003 firm-year observations. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Model 
To test the effect of foreign institutional ownership on corporate tax planning, I 
estimate the following Equation [1]: 
 
Peer Tax Diffit = α0 + α1Foreign IOit−1 + α2Domestic IOit−1 + 




where Peer Tax Diffit is either Peer ETR Diffit or Peer Cash ETR Diffit, (defined 
below), Foreign IOit-1 and Domestic IOit-1 represent percentages of firm i’s stocks held 
in year t-1 by foreign and domestic institutions respectively, Firm sizeit-1 is the natural 
logarithm of market value and Pretax incomeit-1 is pretax income scaled by total assets. 
Xit-1 includes control variables explaining variations in corporate tax planning and 
potentially correlated (but not highly correlated) with foreign institutional holdings. I 
also include Year FE, a yearly fixed effect. By construction, my model takes into 
account country and industry fixed effects. 
 
2.3.3 Tax planning variables 
In this chapter, I use two corporate tax-planning variables. I construct the first 
variable, ETR Diff, based on the difference between a company’s ETR (defined as 
total income tax expense divided by pre-tax income) and the average ETR of its 
country and industry (using Fama-French 48 industry classifications) peers. ETR Diff 
captures country- and industry-adjusted differences in tax rates across firms, regardless 
of their temporary (i.e. deferred taxes) or permanent nature. A negative ETR Diff 
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means the company has a lower ETR vis-à-vis its peer group (tax avoidance) and a 
positive ETR Diff indicates the opposite (non-tax avoidance). As a robustness test, I 
later use an alternative peer definition based, as in Armstrong et al. (2015) and 
Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2019), on size and industry. 
I rank ETR Diff from low to high and divide them into quintiles. Panel A of Table  
2.1 presents the quintile distribution of ETR Diff. Peer ETR Diff is an indicator if the 
company’s ETR Diff lies in the third quintile, as this represents the group of companies 
with the smallest ETR Diff in absolute terms, and zero otherwise. The mean (median) 
Peer ETR Diff is -0.01 (-0.01), indicating that firms in this quintile have deviations 
from their country/industry peers very close to zero. In a similar vein, I designate firms 
in the first quintile as over-investors in tax avoidance (Low ETR Diff) and firms in the 
fifth quintile as under-investors in tax avoidance (High ETR Diff). The mean (median) 
values for these firms are -0.24 (-0.23) for tax avoiders (Low ETR Diff) and 0.29 (0.20) 
for the non-avoiders (High ETR Diff). 
My second tax planning measure is Peer Cash ETR Diff.  Similar to the Peer ETR 
Diff, I compute this variable as an indicator if the difference between a firm’s Cash 
ETR (defined as tax paid divided by pre-tax income) and the average Cash ETR of its 
country and industry peers lies in the third quintile of the Cash ETR Diff distribution. 
Unlike ETR, Cash ETR is, by construction, affected by strategies aimed to defer 
corporate taxes to the following periods, as well as, by tax payments on corporate 
incomes generated in the previous periods.  As a result, Peer Cash ETR Diff captures 
country-industry similarities in the rate of taxes paid by companies at the end of the 
current period. I further designate firms in the first quintile of Cash ETR Diff as over-
investors in tax avoidance (Low Cash ETR Diff) and firms in the fifth quintile of Cash 
ETR Diff as under-investors in tax avoidance (High Cash ETR Diff). As Table 2.1, 
Panel A shows, the mean (median) Peer Cash ETR Diff is -0.05 (-0.05).  Further, the 
means and medians of the Cash ETR Diff quintiles are similar to those reported using 
the earnings measure of ETR (ETR Diff). 
The use of firms’ effective tax rates (ETRs) has several advantages. First, ETR and 
Cash ETR are easy to compute and interpret. They capture the total and cash rate of 
tax per dollar of corporate income and represent inverse measures of corporate tax 
avoidance. Second, they are directly observable by corporate boards, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012; Graham 
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et al. 2014). Third, they can be compared within industries and across companies and 
tax jurisdictions, thereby, making possible an analysis of peer effects. On this line, 
Graham et al. (2011) document that companies tend to benchmark their ETRs against 
the ETRs of their industry peers, and that such comparisons often extend across 
different jurisdictions.  
One limitation of using ETRs is that they capture only non-conforming, and not 
conforming, tax avoidance. That is, while a low ETR represents the reduction of a 
company’s tax liability, for instance, due to tax shelters (non-conforming tax 
avoidance), ETR does not capture companies that avoid taxes by reporting an 
accounting expense to benefit from its deduction from the taxable income 
(conforming tax avoidance).5 See Blouin (2014) for further discussions about 
advantages and limitations of using ETRs as measures of corporate tax avoidance. 
Table 2.1, Panel B presents cross-country statistics on ETR (Cash ETR) and ETR 
Diff (Cash ETR Diff). The average ETR (Cash ETR) for all countries is 0.23 (0.23) 
(i.e. 23%), with ranges from 0.37 (0.35) for Japan to 0.09 (0.06) for Bermuda (a 
renowned tax haven). The average ETR Diff (Cash ETR Diff), by construction, is 0.00 
(0.00), with ranges from -0.13 (-0.15) for Bermuda to 0.09 (0.11) in Italy. Most firms 
have ranges within 0.02 of the mean country/industry ETR. Panel C shows cross-
industry statistics. The ETR (Cash ETR) varies from 0.11 (0.13) for Precious Metals 
to 0.31 (0.33) for Tobacco Products. ETR Diff (Cash ETR Diff) ranges from -0.02 (-
0.02) for Recreation to 0.08 (0.09) for Tobacco Products. Thus, I observe variations 
in tax rates among countries and industries and deviations from tax rates within my 
sample. 
 
2.3.4 Institutional ownership variables 
I collect international institutional ownership data for the years 2000-2016 from 
Factset LionShares database (Ferreira and Matos 2008). Factset LionShares typically 
includes stock holdings of professional fund managers, such as investment banks, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and hedge funds, as reported by 
the mandatory N-30D and 13F filings with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
                                                          
5 For example, companies can take advantage of the deductibility of interests on debts to lower their tax 
base (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
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for U.S. institutions and by local sources, such as national stock exchanges and statistic 
bodies, for institutions domiciled in other countries. Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide 
more details on the data coverage of Factset LionShares database. 
My total institutional ownership (IO) variable is, for each firm, the sum of the 
holdings of all institutions divided by the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the 
year.6 I then identify the geographical origin of firms and institutional investors at 
country-level and classify foreign institutions as those investors domiciled in a different 
country from the one in which the investee firm is listed. In contrast, I classify 
domestic institutions as those investors domiciled in the same country in which the 
investee firm is listed. My foreign institutional ownership (Foreign IO) variable is, for 
each firm, the sum of the holdings of all foreign institutions divided by the firm’s 
market capitalization at the end of the year. Similarly, domestic institutional ownership 
(Domestic IO) is the sum of the holdings of all domestic institutions divided by the 
firm’s market capitalization at the end of the year. I lag institutional ownership by one 
year to provide greater support to my analysis and to mitigate simultaneous causality 
concerns.  
Descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 2.1 show that foreign institutional 
ownership accounts for 5% of firms’ market capitalization on average in my sample. 
Ireland has the largest average foreign institutional ownership (25%), followed by the 
Netherlands (21%) and Luxembourg (17%). Domestic institutional ownership, on 
average, is equal to 19% of firms’ market capitalization in my sample. Firms listed in 
the United States have the largest domestic institutional ownership level (48%), 
followed by those listed in Poland (19%) and in the United Kingdom (18%). Across 
industries (Panel C), firms operating in the Precious Metals (12%) and Tobacco 
Products (11%) sectors receive the largest share of capital from foreign institutions. 
By contrast, domestic institutional ownership is largest in the industries of Defense 
(44%), Aircrafts (32%) and Measuring & Control Equipment (32%). 
 
  
                                                          
6 This includes ordinary share, preferred shares, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), Global 
Depositary Receipts (GDRs) and dual listing stocks when calculating institutional ownership. 
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2.3.5 Political cost proxy variables 
Jensen and Meckling (1978) claim that large firms are subjected to greater 
government scrutiny and wealth transfers than smaller firms. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) refer to this phenomenon as a firm’s political costs. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) propose that to limit these government intrusions, individual firms employ a 
number of “devices” including the choice of accounting procedures to minimize 
reported earnings. Consistent with a large firm political cost hypothesis, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) present a review of numerous studies showing that larger firms are 
more likely to choose income reducing accounting procedures than smaller firms. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) also assert that this unwanted scrutiny and wealth 
transfers are more likely for “high” profit firms, as these firms tend to warrant more 
public attention (p. 115). 
Using effective tax rates as his measure of corporate taxes, Zimmerman (1983)  
asserts and shows that within industries, the largest U.S. exchange-listed firms within 
the manufacturing and the oil and gas sectors have the highest worldwide tax rates.  
He classifies corporate taxes as “one component of political costs” (p. 119) and asserts 
that these higher tax rates are indicative of large firm’s political costs. As further 
evidence that large firms bear political costs, Zimmerman (1983) shows that these 
higher effective tax rates became effective only after the U.S. 1969 Tax Reform Act 
and after the OPEC countries raised their tax rates on U.S. oil producers.   
I include Firm size and Pretax income as political cost proxy variables, where Firm 
size is the natural log of the firm’s market value or alternatively of the firm’s net sales 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978), and Pretax income is pretax income divided by total 
assets (Watts and Zimmerman 1978).  I predict a positive association between Peer 
Tax Diff and each political cost proxy variable.  
 
2.3.6 Control variables 
I include several control variables that prior studies show affect corporate tax 
policies and/or foreign institutional ownership. See the Appendix for all variable 
definitions. First, I control for domestic institutional ownership (Domestic IO) and 
shares owned by corporate insiders (Closely-held-shares). Chen et al. (2010), Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) and McGuire, Omer, and Wilde (2014) provide evidence that 
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domestic institutions and insiders have different incentives and abilities to influence 
corporate tax policies compared to foreign institutional investors. In addition, prior 
studies suggest that large stock ownership by domestic institutions and corporate 
insiders deter investments by foreign institutions (Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 2008; 
Aggarwal et al. 2011; Ferreira and Matos 2008).  
The second set of control variables helps separate the effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on tax rates from other firm-specific characteristics.  Leverage (Leverage) 
takes into account reductions of firms’ tax bases due to deductions of interest expenses 
(Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009). Market-to-book value (Market-to-book) and foreign 
sales (Foreign sales) control for greater tax avoidance opportunities available to firms 
with growth potentials and international operations (Manzon and Plesko 2002; Hope 
et al. 2013; Kubick et al. 2015). Controlling for these factors is also important because 
institutional investors take into consideration firms’ leverage, growth opportunities 
and foreign market presence when deciding their investment strategy (Gompers and 
Metrick 2001; Ferreira and Matos 2008; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001). 
Third, I control for tax planning opportunities for specific sub-sets of firms (PP&E, 
Intangibles, R&D expense and Equity income, Accounting standards). The tax 
treatment of depreciation and amortization produces substantial differences between 
accounting and taxable income of capital intensive firms (Manzon and Plesko 2002; 
Frank et al. 2009). Differences are also significant for firms largely dependent on 
intangibles and innovation and for firms with high equity income (Atwood, Drake, 
Myers, and Myers 2012; Hope et al. 2013). Finally, I include an indicator variable if a 
firm follows internationally recognized accounting standards (Accounting standards) 
to separate the effect of enhanced transparency from foreign institutional investors’ 
monitoring (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 2005; Chen et al. 2010). I also add year 
fixed effects in all model specifications. All control variables except for yearly fixed 
effects are lagged by one year. 
  
2.3.7 Pairwise correlations 
Table 2.2 presents pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables in 
my main analysis. In line with my hypothesis, the correlation coefficients for the 
associations between Foreign IO and Peer ETR Diff (Peer Cash ETR Diff) are positive 
and statistically (0.06 and 0.06, respectively) significant whereas Domestic IO is 
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negatively associated with Peer ETR Diff (Peer Cash ETR Diff) (-0.09 and -0.03, 
respectively). These correlations suggest that firms with larger foreign institutional 
ownership are more likely to set their tax rates close to the average tax rates of their 
country and industry peers. Moreover, consistent with a political cost prediction, large 
and profitable firms are more likely to mimic their peers’ tax positions, as evidenced 
by the positive correlations between my two peer tax difference variables and Firm 
size and Pretax income, respectively. 
 
2.3.8 Identification strategy 
One source of concern that arises from estimating the effect of ownership 
structures on firms’ tax policy is the potential endogeneity that such a relation may 
entail. For example, trading on unobservable private information, foreign institutions 
could invest in companies that are more likely to change their tax positions in the 
following years. If this is the case, results may reflect the ability of institutional 
investors to pick stocks and miss out the actual effect that I propose to estimate. I 
address this issue in two ways. First, I use an exogenous shock to foreign institutional 
ownership occurred around a regulatory change in Norway’s insurance and pension 
fund industry that became effective in January 2008. The Act on Insurance Activity, 
passed in June 2005, eliminated the 35% equity investment restriction for securities 
held by Norwegian insurance companies and pension funds.7 As shown in Figure  2.1, 
this change in the regulation led to a large mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) 
increase in foreign equity investments by Norwegian insurance companies and pension 
funds from January 2008 onward (top-green line), while no significant impact was 
found on stocks held by other Norwegian institutional investors (bottom-orange line). 
One affected fund was Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). 
GPFG is the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world (The Economist 2011, Forbes 
2019), with more than $1 trillion of assets under management (AUM), investing in 
                                                          
7 Chapter 7, on pension undertakings, and Chapter 9, on life insurance activities, of the Act on Insurance 
Activity (Regulation of 10 June 2005 no.44) became law in January 2008 (Regulation of 17 December 
2007 no. 1457) (OECD 2009). In the new regulation there are no longer quantitative restrictions on 
equity investments by Norwegian insurance companies and pension funds, but a greater emphasis is 
given to the Prudent Person Rule. I obtained information on insurance and pension fund regulation 
from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway. 
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almost nine thousand companies in seventy-seven countries (CNBC 2017).8 Legally, 
GPFG cannot invest in domestic companies; instead, it must hold foreign equities and 
debt securities (NBIM 2008). As a result of the Act, GPFG registered a sharp increase 
in equity investments from January 2008 onward, an increase in line with Figure 2.1 
(NBIM 2017). 
To provide a causal support to the effect of foreign institutional ownership, I 
exploit the increase in Norwegian pension fund and insurance ownership that followed 
the elimination of equity portfolio restrictions in January 2008 using a difference-in-
differences (DID) design. In this setting, the treatment group consists of foreign firms 
held by Norwegian pension funds and insurance companies. The corresponding 
control group includes foreign firms held by Norwegian institutional investors other 
than pensions and insurances. Each company in the treatment group is matched based 
on a number of lagged (two years) covariates to companies in the control group using 
propensity score matching with replacement. I match on Foreign IO, Firm size, 
Leverage, Market-to-book, Pretax income, Equity income and Foreign sales, as well as 
industry classification. I assess covariate balance in Table  2.3, Panel A where I observe 
that, on average, foreign firms held by pension funds and insurance companies have 
comparable leverage, market-to-book value of equity, net property, plant and 
equipment, and research and development expense to the ones that are held by any 
other type of Norwegian institutional investors. However, they are statistically 
significantly different primarily in variables related to the size of the firm, such as 
market value of equity, pretax income, foreign sales and intangible assets and also 
closely held shares and the adoption of IFRS or US-GAAP as accounting standards. 
For new equity investments covariates are more balanced for treatment and control 
firms, with the exceptions of the variables net property, plant and equipment, foreign 
sales, closely held shares and accounting standards. It therefore becomes important 
that in my setting I control for those factors that may violate the random assignment 
assumption due to, for example, specific investors’ tastes for large and profitable 
firms9. 
  
                                                          
8 Norges Bank Investment Management (hereafter, NBIM), a separate agency within the Norwegian 
central bank (i.e. Norges Bank), manages GPFG on behalf of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 
9 Untabulated tests also show that the pre-treatment parallel trend assumption is met. 
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Using data from 2006 to 2010, I estimate the following Probit model [2]: 
 
Peer Tax Diffit = δ0 + δ1Treated × Postit + δ2Treatedit + δ3Postit + 




where Treated is one if a firm is in the treatment group and zero otherwise, Post is one 
from 2008 onwards and zero otherwise, and Treated × Post is the interaction term. 
Importantly, Equation [2] includes Firm size, Pretax income (my political cost proxy 
variables) and all remaining controls from Equation [1], addressing concerns related to 
potential covariate imbalances discussed above.  
Second, I implement two-stage Probit regressions (IV Probit) using the inclusion 
of companies in the Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Index 
(MSCI ACWI)10 as an instrumental variable (IV) for foreign institutional ownership. 
The MSCI ACWI is a global equity market index comprised of large and mid-cap 
securities across forty-nine countries (split between 24 developing and 25 developed 
economies). For each country, firms are ranked by their free-float-adjusted market 
capitalizations, and the top 85% for each country is included in the MSCI ACWI. Thus, 
firms enter or leave the index as they cross over the 85% threshold of market 
capitalization. Given that companies cannot exactly control their market capitalizations 
relatively to other companies, the shock to foreign institutional ownership that follows 
their inclusion or exclusion in the MSCI ACWI is considered as exogenous. 
According to the MSCI website (https://www.msci.com/acwi), over $4.1 trillion 
of assets are benchmarked to the MSCI ACWI. Examples of funds indexed to the 
MSCI ACWI are Ivy Proshares NSCI ACWI Index Fund, iShares MSCI ACWI ETF, 
and BlackRock MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. IMI Ind Fund. Prior literature provides evidence 
that the addition or deletion of a firm to the MSCI ACWI affects its ownership 
structure (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Ferreira and Matos 2008). Specifically, Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that MSCI ACWI is a commonly used 
investment index for foreign institutional investors, whereas domestic institutional 
investors’ portfolio compositions vary with local stock market indexes (Aghion, Van 
                                                          
10 I obtain the list of MSCI ACWI constituents from Ferreira and Matos (2008) for the years 1998-2010 
and from the MSCI Inc. for the years 2011-2015. I use MSCI constituents of year 2015 for year 2016 to 
make full use of my sample period in all tests and overcome data availability issues. 
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Reenen, and Zingales 2013; Khan et al. 2017). Anecdotally, Chinese A-share firms 
registered a significant price increase and inflow of foreign capital following the 
decision of MSCI Inc. to add Chinese A-shares to the index (Financial Times 2017). 
Figure 2.2 highlights the significance of the inclusion in MSCI ACWI for foreign 
institutional investors’ portfolio choices within my sample. Following the index 
inclusion rule, I plot foreign institutional ownership against the country-specific 
market capitalization ranking for 2015 (Panel A), which is the last year for Foreign IO 
in my sample, and for the entire period (Panel B).  In both graphs, I observe a 
discontinuity around the 85% threshold, with a sharp decline in Foreign IO occurring 
at the break point.  
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I implement two-stage Probit regressions using 
MSCI membership as an instrumental variable (IV) for foreign institutional ownership 
(Foreign IO). Equation [3] represents my first-stage regression model: 
 
Foreign IOit = β0 + β1MSCI membershipit + β2Domestic IOit + 




where MSCI membership is an indicator equal to one if a firm is included in the MSCI 
ACWI in the current year and zero otherwise and all other variables are previously 
defined. My second-stage regressions estimate the effect of foreign institutional 
ownership on tax planning using the predicted value of Foreign IO from the first-
stage. Equation [4] shows the second-stage regression specification: 
 
Peer Tax Diffit = γ0 + γ1Foreign IOit−1 + γ2Domestic IOit−1 + 
γ3Firm sizeit−1 + γ4Pretax incomeit−1 + ΣγiXit−1 + γjYear FE + ε, 
    
[4] 
 
where Peer Tax Diffit is either Peer ETR Diffit or Peer Cash ETR Diffit, Foreign IOit-1 
is the predicted value of Foreign IOit-1 from the first-stage regression and all other 







2.4.1 Norway’s elimination of investing limits: Quasi-natural 
experiment 
My first test takes advantage of the January 2008 regulatory change in Norway’s 
insurance and pension fund industry, which eliminated the quantitative restriction of 
35% of total portfolio share available for equity investments. I use difference-in-
differences (DID) Probit models on Peer ETR Diff (Cash Peer ETR Diff) (Equation 
[2]) with a sample that only includes firms in treatment (foreign firms held by 
Norwegian insurance companies and pension funds) and control groups (foreign firms 
held by Norwegian institutional investors other than insurances and pensions). As 
Figure  2.1 Panels A and B show, the percentage of foreign equity held by institutions 
in the treatment group follow a similar trend to firms in the control group in the pre-
treatment period (parallel-trend assumption), but show a markedly turn upward in the 
post-treatment period. All models include the control variables described in Equation 
[1].   
Table  2.3 Panel B shows the effect of the regulatory change to foreign stocks held 
by Norwegian pension funds (treatment group) relative to those held by Norwegian 
institutional investors other than pensions (control group) using difference-in-
differences Probit models. The coefficient estimates on Treated × Post in column (1) 
suggests that, following the elimination of portfolio restriction to Norwegian 
insurances and pension funds, treated firms are more likely to benchmark their taxes 
against their peers relative to firms in the control group. The marginal effect on Treated 
× Post is 0.057, indicating a 1-percent increase in Norwegian insurance and pension 
fund ownership leading to a higher probability of firms planning their taxes of about 
6 percentage points relative to firms in the control group and after the change in the 
regulation. 
In columns (2) and (3), I examine whether Norwegian insurance and pension fund 
ownership is associated with the firm being more tax aggressive (Low ETR Diff) or 
less tax aggressive (High ETR Diff). That is, is the “squeezing toward the middle” tax 
phenomenon I report in column (1) symmetric in both ends of the tax-paying 
spectrum or is it being fostered by one direction only? As columns (2) and (3) show, 
the coefficient on Treated × Post is negative and statistically insignificant for the 
regressions on Low ETR Diff and significantly negative for the regression on High 
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ETR Diff. This supports a symmetrical tax planning view – that is, firms experiencing 
an exogenous increase in foreign (Norwegian) institutional holdings are less likely to 
be in the extreme quintile of tax avoiders or tax payers. The marginal effect on Treated 
× Post, shown at the bottom of column (2) is 0.005 and statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. The marginal effect in column (3) is -0.050 and significant at 0.05 level. 
Column (4) presents the results for my Peer Cash ETR Diff variable. The positive 
and significant coefficient on Treated × Post is consistent with the estimate reported 
in column (1). It indicates that after the elimination of portfolio restriction, investee 
firms of Norwegian insurances and pension funds are more likely to benchmark their 
taxes against their peers relative to firms held by other Norwegian institutional 
investors. Moreover, similar to the above analysis, columns (5) shows a negative but 
statistically insignificant coefficient on Treated × Post for the regressions on Low Cash 
ETR Diff whereas the coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.10 level in column 
(6) for High Cash ETR Diff. In line with the above analysis, this result suggests that 
firms plan their taxes away from the extremes following an exogenous increase in 
equity holdings by Norwegian insurances and pension funds.  
Domestic IO has a negative coefficient on both Peer ETR Diff and Peer Cash ETR 
Diff, suggesting a moving away from the peer tax group for firms with larger domestic 
institutional holdings. The coefficient on Domestic IO is negative and statistically 
significant (insignificant) for the regression on Low ETR Diff (Low Cash ETR Diff), 
but it is significantly positive for the regressions on High ETR Diff and High Cash 
ETR Diff. This suggests that firms with high Domestic IO are less likely to use tax 
avoidance strategies relative to their peers. In contrast, they are more likely to bear 
higher ETRs and Cash ETRs relative to their peers, which could be a reflection of the 
stronger ties of domestic institutions with local business and governments (Giannetti 
and Laeven 2009). 
The two political cost variables, Firm size (Pretax income) are significantly positive 
at the 0.01 levels in columns (1), (2) and (6) (all columns) and insignificant in columns 
(3), (4) and (5). These results are consistent with the premise that larger and more 
profitable firms are less willing to stand out in terms of tax planning, and therefore are 
more likely to mimic their country/industry peers (Zimmerman 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978). Leverage and growth opportunities (Market-to-book), are 
negatively associated with Peer ETR Diff, whereas Accounting standards is positively 
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associated with Peer ETR Diff. Foreign Sales present a significantly positive coefficient 
for the regressions on both Peer ETR Diff and Peer Cash ETR Diff. Results also hold 
whether I exclude the year in which the regulation change was implemented (2008). 
In Panel C, I use a treatment sample that includes only new foreign equity 
investments of Norwegian pension funds. Similar to Panel B, coefficient estimates 
indicate that, following the elimination of portfolio restrictions to Norway’s insurances 
and pension funds, treated companies are more likely to align their tax positions to 
their peers’ tax rates relative to firms in the control group and move away from the 
extreme tax avoider and tax payer quintiles. Further, the regressions on both Peer ETR 
Diff and Peer Cash ETR Diff have significantly positive coefficients on Firm size and 
Pretax income, lending further support to the political cost hypothesis of tax planning. 
 
2.4.2 Political costs hypothesis: Quasi-natural experiment 
To further examine the political and reputational costs of tax avoidance faced by 
larger and more profitable firms, similar to Zimmerman (1983), I split the whole 
sample of 163,003 firm-year observations into large and small firms based on the 
median of Net revenues. Table 2.4, Panel A, shows that after this split treated and 
control groups consist of mainly (about 84%) large firms, which can also provide an 
explanation for the size-related imbalances found in Panel A of Table 2.3. In Panel B 
of Table  2.4, I re-run the difference-in-differences (DID) Probit models on each set 
of firms within each subsample, where the treatment group is foreign firms held by 
Norwegian insurance companies and pension funds and the control group includes 
foreign firms held by Norwegian institutional investors, other than insurances and 
pensions. Panel C includes only new foreign equity investments of Norwegian pension 
funds as a treatment group. According to the political cost theory of tax planning, the 
subsample of firms with the largest net revenues should be the ones most likely to be 
in the Peer ETR Diff (Peer Cash ETR Diff) group. Findings in Table 2.4 are consistent 
with these predictions.   
First, I note that in Panel B the interactive terms Treated × Post is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the regression on Peer ETR Diff (column 
(1)) and at the 0.05 level for the regression on Peer Cash ETR Diff   (column (4)) for 
the subsample including large firms only, while they are statistically insignificant in 
columns (1) and (4) for small firms. Similarly, in Panel C the interactive terms on Peer 
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ETR Diff (column (1)) and Peer Cash ETR Diff (column (4)) are positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively, for larger firms. As in 
panel B, all interactive terms on Peer ETR Diff (column (1)) and Peer Cash ETR Diff 
(column (4)) are statistically insignificant for the subsample of small firms. Results from 
all the other columns (2, 3, 5 and 6) of both Panels B and C suggest that firms are less 
likely to adopt aggressive tax avoidance positions or paying too much taxes. 
These results are consistent with those reported in Table 2.3, adding further 
credence to a theory of large firms being exposed to greater political costs of tax 
avoidance (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983), thereby adopting a more 
effective peer-benchmarked tax planning strategy. 
 
2.4.3 MSCI assignment: Instrumental variable approach 
Table 2.5 presents the results using Probit regressions of the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership (Foreign IO) on corporate tax planning. Panel A presents 
results with ETR Diff measures and Panel B has my findings using Cash ETR Diff 
measures. 
I begin by presenting a Probit model on Peer ETR Diff using all institutional 
ownership (IO) as an independent variable. Previous studies show a positive 
correlation between tax avoidance for U.S. companies and institutional ownership 
(Chen et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2012; Khan et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018). These studies 
do not categorize institutions as foreign or domestic; nor do they use an international 
setting of firms. My first question, then, is whether my international data yields results 
similar to these papers. As column (1) shows, the coefficient on IO is significantly 
negative, suggesting that larger equity investments by institutional investors, on 
average, are associated with firms being less likely to move their ETRs towards their 
country/industry peers. These findings are consistent with prior studies. 
In column (2), I separate institutional ownership into foreign (Foreign IO) and 
domestic (Domestic). With this dichotomy, the coefficient on Foreign IO is 
significantly positive, whereas the coefficient on Domestic IO is significantly negative. 
The positive coefficient on Foreign IO is consistent with larger equity investments by 
foreign institutions in time t-1 being associated with a greater probability of firms 
planning their taxes in line with their peers. The marginal effect on Foreign IO, shown 
at the bottom of column (2), indicates that a 1-percent increase in foreign institutional 
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ownership is associated with an increase of 6 percentage points in the probability of a 
firm being in the peer tax group in year t. This result is in line with the effect I find in 
Table 2.3, Panel B, of firms squeezing their taxes towards the middle. 
In columns (3) and (4), I present the first and second stage results of my IV Probit 
regression using inclusion in the MSCI ACWI (MSCI membership) as an instrumental 
variable (IV) for foreign institutional ownership (equations 2 and 3). First stage results 
are presented in in column (3). They show that firms experience an increase in Foreign 
IO of 5.31%, on average, following their addition to MSCI ACWI. Moreover, Foreign 
IO is positively associated with size (Firm size), growth opportunities (Market-to-
book), profitability (Pretax income), PP&E, Intangibles, Foreign sales, and the use of 
internationally recognized Accounting standards. By contrast, firms that experience an 
increase in Closely-held-shares, Domestic IO and Equity income are associated with a 
reduction of Foreign IO in the following period. 
Column (4) reports the second stage results. Consistent with the non-IV Probit 
result in column (2), the coefficient estimate on Foreign IO is positive and significant, 
meaning that firms with larger foreign institutional ownership in year t-1 are more 
likely to select tax positions in year t that do not stand far from their peers’ tax rate. 
The marginal effect indicates that a 1-percent increase in Foreign IO from year t-1 is 
associated with an increase in the probability of the firm being in its country/industry 
peer tax quintile by 29 percentage points. Differences in coefficient estimates between 
columns (2) and (4) could reflect the ability of foreign institutions to target firms that 
currently do not plan their taxes or engage in excessive tax avoidance, but may change 
their tax policy in the following years. If this is the case, my IV Probit regressions are 
more likely to provide unbiased coefficient estimates of the effect of Foreign IO 
compared to Probit regressions. Domestic IO has a negative coefficient, suggesting a 
moving away from the peer tax group in year t for firms with larger domestic 
institutional holdings in year t-1. 
My two political cost variables, Firm size and Pretax income are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 levels in columns (1), (3) and (4). These results are consistent with 
the premise that larger and more profitable firms are less willing to stand out in terms 
of tax planning, and therefore are more likely to mimic their country/industry peers 
(Zimmerman 1983, Watts and Zimmerman 1978). The coefficient on Firm size ranges 
from 0.0551 in column (4) to 0.0677 in column (1); the coefficient on Pretax income 
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ranges from 0.7865 in column (4) to 0.8048 in column (1).  The tight range of these 
coefficients across specifications is consistent with my political cost proxies being 
robust across models. Leverage, growth opportunities (Market-to-book), R&D 
expense and Intangibles are negatively associated with Peer ETR Diff, whereas Equity 
Income and Accounting standards are positively associated with Peer ETR Diff.   
Next, I examine whether foreign institutional ownership in year t-1 is associated 
with the firm being more tax aggressive (Low ETR Diff) or less tax aggressive (High 
ETR Diff) in year t. As columns (5) and (6) show, the coefficients on Foreign IO are 
significantly negative for the IV Probit regressions on Low ETR Diff and on High 
ETR Diff. This overall supports the view that firms symmetrically plan their taxes away 
from both ends of the tax-paying spectrum – that is, firms with higher foreign 
institutional holdings in year t-1 are less likely to be in the extreme quintile of tax 
avoiders or tax payers. The marginal effect on Foreign IO, shown at the bottom of 
columns (5), and (6) are -0.8198 and -0.3813, respectively. 
In contrast, the coefficient on Domestic IO is negative on the IV Probit model on 
Low ETR Diff, but it is positive for the IV Probit model on High ETR Diff.  This 
suggests that firms with high Domestic IO are less likely to use tax avoidance strategies 
relative to their peers. In contrast, they are more likely to bear higher ETRs relative to 
their peers, which could be a reflection of the stronger ties of domestic institutions 
with local business and governments.  
Consistent with political cost theory, larger and more profitable firms are less likely 
to engage in extreme tax avoidance, as evidenced by the negative coefficients on Firm 
size and Pretax income in column (5). Similarly, larger and more profitable firms are 
more likely to be extreme taxpayers (column 6), although the positive coefficient on 
Pretax Income could be a reflection of more profitable firms being in higher tax 
brackets, thus paying more taxes. 
In Panel B, I use Cash ETR Diff quintiles as the dependent variable in lieu of ETR 
Diff. The empirical results using cash measures of income tax rates are very similar to 
those reported in Panel A. Columns (1) through (4) examine peer effects, while 
columns (5) and (6) examine the probability of being in the extreme tax avoider quintile 
or the extreme taxpayer quintile. In columns (2) and (4), the Probit and IV Probit 
produce significantly positive coefficients on Foreign IO, suggesting a positive 
association between last period’s foreign institutional ownership and this year’s 
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probability of a firm being in Peer Cash ETR Diff. The negative coefficients on 
Foreign IO in columns (5) and (6) are consistent with those found in Panel A, 
supporting the view that firms with larger foreign institutional holdings are less likely 
to be extreme tax avoiders or payers in the next year, i.e., they move towards their 
peers from either direction.   
Similar findings are found for Domestic IO in Panel B when compared to Panel A, 
with the exception of an insignificantly positive coefficient in column (4). Of equal 
note, the coefficient on IO, total institutional holdings, in column (1) is insignificantly 
different from zero in Panel B, whereas it is significantly negative in Panel A. 
With respect to the political cost proxies, Firm size and Pretax income, I see the 
same significantly positive coefficients on both variables when estimated on Peer Cash 
ETR as I saw in Panel A. These coefficients are consistent with larger and more 
profitable firms not wishing to stand out in the tax rate arena. Similarly, Firm size and 
Pretax income are negatively related to the firm being in the extreme tax avoidance 
quintile (column 5) but positively related to the firm being in the extreme tax payer 
quintile (column 6). 
Thus, findings are robust across both measures of effective tax rates. 
 
2.4.4 Political costs hypothesis: Instrumental variable approach 
To further examine the political and reputational costs of tax avoidance faced by 
larger and more profitable firms, similar to Zimmerman (1983), I divide the whole 
sample of 163,003 firm-year observations into quartiles based on Net revenues and 
then match treatment with control companies. I test my hypotheses on a sample that 
includes only treated and control firms. In Table 2.6, Panel A, I re-run the IV Probit 
models on Peer ETR Diff, Low ETR Diff, and High ETR Diff on each set of firms 
within each quartile. In Panel B, I re-run the IV models using the Cash ETR Diff 
variables instead. According to the political cost theory of tax planning, the quartile of 
firms with the largest net revenues should be the quartile most likely to be in the Peer 
ETR Diff group and the least likely to be among the most aggressive tax avoiders (Low 
ETR Diff). Findings in Table 2.6 are consistent with these predictions.   
First, I note that in both Panels A and B, Foreign IO is significantly associated with 
the IV, MSCI membership, for all four quartiles. Second, in Panel A, the coefficient 
estimates for Foreign IO are significantly positive for the second-stage Probit model 
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on Peer ETR Diff for the first two quartiles only, and they turn statistically insignificant 
in the two quartiles with the smallest firms. Similarly, in Panel B only the first two 
quartiles of largest stocks produce a significantly positive coefficient on Peer Cash 
ETR Diff. Third, the coefficient on Foreign IO is significantly negative in the first 
quartiles for the second-stage Probit model on Low ETR Diff and Low Cash ETR 
Diff in Panels A and B, respectively. Thus, only the largest companies in firm size are 
more likely to shun tax avoidance. Finally, I note a significant negative coefficient on 
Foreign IO for the quartile of smallest firms for the regressions on High ETR Diff 
and High Cash ETR Diff. These smallest firms are less likely to be in the high payer 
quartile of firms. 
These results are consistent with those reported in Table 2.5. Chapter 2 thus 
provide further evidence to a theory of large firms being exposed to greater political 
costs of tax avoidance (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zimmerman 1983), which is 
arguably associated to a more effective peer-benchmarked tax planning strategy.  As 
an added test, I split the firms into quartiles based on Firm size. Results (untabulated) 
are similar to those reported in Table 2.6. 
 
2.4.5 Foreign institutional ownership and corporate governance 
Previous studies show that both CEO overconfidence (Chyz, Gaertner, Kausar, 
and Watson 2014; Kubick and Lockhart 2017) and indexer institutional ownership 
(Chen et al. 2018) cause CEOs or their firms to engage in more aggressive tax 
avoidance. The latter paper finds this effect to be stronger for firms with weaker 
corporate governance, as proxied by high G-indices and low executive equity 
incentives. Chen et al. (2018) regard at tax avoidance as being desirable to institutional 
owners.  In contrast, Khurana and Moser (2013) find that long-term institutional 
ownership reduces tax aggressiveness in firms with high G-indices. They view tax 
avoidance as an opportunity for managerial rent-extraction, taking an opposite view of 
Chen et al. (2018). Both papers view institutional ownership as having a mitigating 
effect on CEO opportunistic behaviour, albeit in different directions with respect to 
tax aggressiveness. 
I examine whether foreign institutional investors act as effective monitors of firms’ 
tax planning choices in firms with weaker corporate governance structures.  Unlike the 
previous papers, I propose that being in the peer group by country/industry is the 
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most desirable tax position for the firm. I test my prediction by including two measures 
indicative of corporate governance weaknesses: CEO power and Low incentive 
compensation. CEO power is an indicator if the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Board and has tenure at the firm above the sample mean.  Low incentive compensation 
is a variable indicating whether the ratio of incentive-based compensation over total 
compensation is below the median at a country-level. I calculate incentive 
compensation as the sum of bonuses and stocks awarded at the end of each financial 
year.11 I interact Foreign IO with each variable. A positive coefficient on the interactive 
term is consistent with foreign institutions acting as effective monitors of strong 
CEOs; a negative coefficient is consistent with the opposite effect. 
Table 2.7 contains the empirical results. As column (1) shows, firms with powerful 
CEOs are less likely to peg their tax rates to their peer firms, as evidenced by the 
negative coefficient on CEO power. However, the coefficient on the interactive 
variable Foreign IO × CEO power is significantly positive, thereby indicating that the 
effect of foreign institutional ownership on peer tax planning mitigates this negative 
influence. The results are similar in column (2) for Peer Cash ETR Diff. In column 
(3), I find a similar negative coefficient on Low incentive compensation, indicating that 
firms with a lower alignment of interests between managers and shareholders are less 
likely to mimic their country and industry tax peers. However, the positive and 
significant coefficient on the interactive variable Foreign IO × Low incentive 
compensation in column (3) supports the view that foreign institutional ownership 
reduces this negative effect.12  Results in column (4) for Peer Cash ETR Diff are similar 
to the ones in column (3).  Overall, the results in Table 2.6 provide evidence that 
foreign institutional investors are more likely to monitor corporate tax policies when 
managers have a stronger position within the firm or there is a lower alignment of their 
interests and those of the shareholders. 
 
2.4.6 Additional analyses 
                                                          
11 Low incentive compensation does not include stock options. Despite significantly affecting 
managerial risk-aversion, information about this pay structure across multiple countries is subject to 
data availability issues and could substantially reduce the number of firm-year observations in my 
international sample. 
12 In columns 3 and 4, I drop Close and FxSales because of their collinearity with CEO power and Low 
incentive compensation.  
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To further validate my findings and provide additional support to my research 
strategy, in Table 2.8, I repeat my IV Probit regression analysis using a sample 
restricted to the 10% bandwidth of the stocks around the threshold for inclusion in 
the MSCI ACWI, i.e., firms 5% below and 5% above (inclusive) the 85% cut-off point 
of total (free-float) country-level market capitalization ranking. This analysis is 
analogous to studies using a regression discontinuity design in that it limits my sub-
sample to firms with similar underlying traits (Khan et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2018).  
Results remain similar to the ones presented in Table 2.3, Panel A for ETR (columns 
2-4). For Cash ETRs the direction of effects of Foreign IO on tax planning are similar 
to the ones presented in Table 2.3, Panel B but they are statistically insignificant for 
Peer Cash ETR Diff (column 6) and High Cash ETR Diff (column 8).   
I conduct additional tests to gain further insights in the mechanisms through which 
foreign institutional investors relate to their investee firms’ tax policy. I repeat my 
analysis focusing on several investor and firm-level characteristics that could impact 
on tax-related decision making. First, I examine whether the investment horizon of 
foreign investors impacts on peer effects in tax planning. Prior literature indicates that 
long-term investors have stronger incentives to be better monitors of corporate activity 
compared to short-term ones (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005; Harford, Kecskés, and 
Mansi 2018). Specifically for foreign investors, prior studies show a more pronounced 
effect of long-term oriented foreign institutional owners on innovation and 
investments in human capital, capital expenditure and R&D (Bena et al. 2017) and on 
improved voluntary disclosure (Tsang et al. 2019). Based on my argument that the peer 
group by country/industry is the most desirable tax position for the firm, I expect a 
more pronounced peer effect on tax planning for long-term foreign investors. For this 
reason, I classify foreign investors based on their investment horizons using the 
methodology from Gaspar et al. (2005) and repeat the analysis after splitting foreign 
investors into long-term and short-term oriented.13     
Second, I examine whether the legal origin of the investor’s domicile country 
impacts on the investee firm’s tax planning. Prior studies show that investors from 
countries with common law legal origins are exporters of good governance practices 
to their investee firms (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Bena et al. 2017). For this reason, I am 
                                                          




motivated to examine whether this is also relevant for peer effects in tax planning; I 
split foreign investors into common and civil law based on their country of origin, 
following the classification by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
and I examine whether investors from common law countries are more strongly related 
to peer effects in tax planning for their portfolio firms in countries with weak investor 
protection. Finally, since a large part of my sample includes U.S. firms, I repeat the 
analysis splitting it between Non-U.S. and U.S. firms.  
Table 2.9 reports the empirical results. Panel A shows a more pronounced peer 
effect on tax planning for long-term oriented foreign investors. Column (2) shows that 
Foreign IO LT is positive and statistically significant, while it is positive but 
insignificant for Foreign IO ST. Also the coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for Foreign IO LT, indicating that 
in the presence of long-term foreign institutional investors firms are less likely to stand 
out in their tax planning compared to their peers. For Foreign IO ST, I find less 
pronounced (column (3)) or statistically insignificant (column (4)) coefficients. In 
columns (6) to (8), I find similar findings for my cash-based tax measures.  
My findings contribute Aggarwal et al. (2011) by showing, in Panel B, that following 
an increase in foreign institutional holdings from common law countries, firms 
domiciled in countries with weaker investor protection legislations are more likely to 
select a tax position similar to their peers, and away from more aggressive or lax tax 
strategies. I proxy for investor protection legislation using the anti-self-dealing index 
developed by Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and common 
law countries are defined by LaPorta et al. (1998). Panel C shows similar results to 
Table 2.5, when I split my sample between U.S. and non-U.S. firms.  
 
2.4.7 Other robustness tests   
One concern of my research design is that firms operating in the same industries 
and constantly reporting losses could drive my results of peer effects in tax planning. 
Panel A of Table 2.9 presents the results of my main analysis on a sample of firm-year 
observations with non-negative pre-tax income. The effect of Foreign IO on peer 
planning is similar across all my specifications to those presented in the main analysis. 
That is, firms are more likely to select a tax position that is consistent with their peers 
following an exogenous increase in Foreign IO. Moreover, similar to my main analysis, 
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firms with greater Foreign IO are less likely to over-invest (Low ETR Diff and Low 
Cash ETR Diff) or under-invest (High ETR Diff and High Cash ETR Diff) in tax 
planning compared to their peers. Therefore, firms experiencing losses do not seem to 
be driving my results. 
To account for the undue influence of one or two firm-year observations, I re-do 
my analysis using three-year rolling means for all my variables except those computed 
as indicators (MSCI membership and Accounting standards). Panel B of Table 2.9 
shows that the main results are consistent in both specifications. Foreign IO is 
positively associated with Peer ETR Diff and negatively associated with Low ETR Diff 
and High ETR Diff. Moreover, similarly to my main results, Domestic IO is negatively 
associated with Peer ETR Diff and Low ETR Diff and positively associated with High 
ETR Diff. 
The analysis in chapter 2 has so far found evidence of peer effects among 
companies operating in the same industry and domiciled in the same country (industry 
and country peers), but it has not tested the existence of an international peer effect 
mechanism. Yet, Graham et al. (2011) suggest that firms tend to benchmark their tax 
positions against the tax rates of firms operating in the same industry and that this 
comparison also extends across different jurisdictions. To test the hypothesis of an 
international peer effect in corporate tax planning, I construct an alternative peer 
definition based on industry (using on Fama-French 48 industry classification) and size 
(industry-adjusted total assets) (see Armstrong et al. 2015). Panel C of Table 2.9 
presents the results of my regressions using this alternative peer definition. Consistent 
with my main analysis, results indicate that the probability of firms selecting a tax 
position close to those of its peers (Peer ETR Diff and Peer Cash ETR Diff) increases 
following an exogenous increase in Foreign IO. 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
I use a comprehensive sample of about 26,000 publicly listed companies from 48 
countries to examine the effects of foreign institutional investors on corporate tax 
planning. My research design exploits two sources of exogenous shocks to foreign 
institutional ownership - the addition to the Morgan Stanley Capital International - All 
Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) and the elimination of portfolio restrictions to 
Norwegian insurance companies and pension funds. I show that firms with higher 
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foreign institutional ownership are more likely to engage in a level of tax planning that 
is the most similar to that of their peers. My results overall suggest that the impact of 
foreign institutional investors on corporate tax planning activities is through a 
monitoring channel. This indicates that, unlike anecdotal evidence, foreign institutions 
act as effective corporate monitors of shareholders’ interests, as their presence is 
associated with a more effective tax planning especially in firms with unresolved 
governance issues. In chapter 2, I also present evidence consistent with a political cost 
view of tax planning – that is, I find evidence that larger and more profitable firms are 





Table A.2.1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Tax planning variables  
ETR Diff Difference between a firm’s ETR and the average ETR of its country and 
industry (Fama-French 48 industry classification) peers. ETR is calculated 
as income taxes (Worldscope 1451) divided by pre-tax income 
(Worldscope 1401) 
Peer ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if ETR Diff is zero or close to zero (third 
quintile of the ETR Diff distribution); and zero otherwise 
Low ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if ETR Diff is the largest negative difference 
(first quintile of the ETR Diff distribution); and zero otherwise 
High ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if ETR Diff is the largest positive difference 
(fifth quintile of the ETR Diff distribution); and zero otherwise 
Cash ETR Diff Difference between a firm’s Cash ETR and the average Cash ETR of its 
country and industry (Fama-French 48 industry classification) peers. Cash 
ETR is calculated as income taxes paid as from the cash flow statement 
(Worldscope 4150) divided by pre-tax income (Worldscope 1401) 
Peer Cash ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if Cash ETR Diff is zero or close to zero 
(third quintile of the Cash ETR Diff distribution); and zero otherwise 
Low Cash ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if Cash ETR Diff is the largest negative 
difference (first quintile of the Cash ETR Diff distribution); and zero 
otherwise 
High Cash ETR Diff Indicator variable equal to one if Cash ETR Diff is the largest positive 





IO For each firm, sum of the holdings of all institutions divided by the firm’s 
market capitalization (Factset LionShares) 
Foreign IO For each firm, sum of the holdings of all institutions that are located in a 
different country to the one in which the firm is listed divided by the firm’s 
market capitalization (Factset LionShares) 
Domestic IO For each firm. sum of the holdings of all institutions that are located in the 
same country in which the firm is listed divided by the firm’s market 
capitalization (Factset LionShares) 
Political cost variables  
Firm size Natural logarithm of period-close market price (Worldscope 5085) 
multiplied by common shares outstanding current (Worldscope 5301) 
Pretax income Pre-tax income (Worldscope 1401) divided by total assets (Worldscope 
2999) 
Net revenues Natural logarithm of net sales or revenues in U.S. dollars (Worldscope 
7240) 
Control variables  
Closely-held-shares Closely-held-shares as a percentage of total shares (Worldscope 8021) 
divided by one hundred 
Leverage Total debt (Worldscope 3255) divided by total assets (Worldscope 2999) 
Market-to-book  Period-close market price (Worldscope 5085) multiplied by common 
shares outstanding (Worldscope 5301) divided by total assets (Worldscope 
2999) 
PP&E Net property, plant and equipment (Worlscope 2501) divided by total 
assets (Worldscope 2999) 
R&D expense Research and development expense (Worldscope 1201) divided by total 
assets (Worldscope 2999) 
Equity income Equity income from unconsolidated subsidiaries (Worldscope 1503) 
divided by total assets (Worldscope 2999) 
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Intangibles Net intangibles (Worldscope 2649) divided by total assets (Worldscope 
2999) 
Foreign sales Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales (Worldscope 8731) divided by 
one hundred 
Accounting standards Indicator variable equal to one if accounting standards (Worldscope 7536) 
are IFRS or US GAAPs; and zero otherwise 
Index membership variables  
MSCI membership Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is included in the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) (MSCI Inc. 
and Bena et al. 2017); and zero otherwise 
Below cut-off Indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s free-float adjusted market 
capitalization ranking is lower or equal to 85% of the total market 
capitalization in each country; and zero otherwise 
Corporate governance variables  
CEO power Indicator variable equal to one if a CEO is also Chairman and has a long-
term tenure (appointment period longer than the sample mean); and zero 
otherwise (BoardEx) 
Low incentive comp. Indicator variable equal to one if the ratio incentive compensation to total 
compensation is below the median calculated at country-level; and zero 
otherwise. Incentive compensation is the sum of bonuses and stocks 
awarded at the end of the period (BoardEx) 
Other ownership variables  
Foreign IO LT For each firm, sum of the holdings of long-term foreign institutions 
divided by the firm’s market capitalization (Factset LionShares). Following 
Gaspar et al. (2005), long-term foreign institutions have a portfolio 
turnover below the country-, year-median. 
Foreign IO ST For each firm, sum of the holdings of short-term foreign institutions 
divided by the firm’s market capitalization (Factset LionShares). Following 
Gaspar et al. (2005), short-term foreign institutions have a portfolio 
turnover above the country-, year-median. 
Foreign IO Common For each firm, sum of the holdings of foreign institutions domiciled in 
English common law countries, as defined by LaPorta et al. (1998), divided 







Table 2.1. Summary Statistics 
Quintile statistics of ETR Diff and Cash ETR Diff (Panel A) and summary statistics of tax and institutional ownership by country (Panel B), industry 
(Panel C) and by tax planning quintiles. Values in Panels B and C represent sample means with the exception of N (equal to number of observations) 
and Peers (equal to median number of observations per country (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) peers). 
Panel A: Quintile Distribution of Tax Planning Variables 
  ETR Diff     Cash ETR Diff  
Quintile Variable Mean Median Min Max Variable Mean Median Min Max 
First Low ETR Diff -0.24 -0.23 -0.74 -0.18 Low Cash ETR Diff -0.25 -0.24 -1.00 -0.18 
Second - -.0.12 -0.12 -0.18 -0.06 - -.0.14 -0.14 -0.18 -0.10 
Third Peer ETR Diff -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 Peer Cash ETR Diff -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 0.01 
Fourth - 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.13 - 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.14 




Panel B: Summary Statistics by Country 










Australia 6,341 0.18 -0.01 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.02 
Austria 422 0.24 0.00 0.22 -0.01 0.11 0.02 
Belgium 623 0.23 0.00 0.21 -0.00 0.08 0.03 
Bermuda 139 0.09 -0.13 0.06 -0.15 0.14 0.12 
Brazil 502 0.24 0.00 0.14 -0.10 0.13 0.03 
Canada 6,942 0.19 -0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.11 0.14 
Cayman Islands 64 0.14 -0.09 0.15 -0.08 0.04 0.06 
Chile 362 0.22 -0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.03 0.01 
China 5,860 0.19 -0.00 0.39 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Colombia 78 0.26 0.04 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.00 
Czech Republic 66 0.22 -0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.08 0.01 
Denmark 384 0.21 -0.01 0.21 -0.00 0.07 0.10 
Egypt 279 0.19 -0.04 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.00 
Finland 589 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.10 0.12 
France 5,105 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.05 
Germany 3,128 0.25 -0.00 0.23 -0.01 0.08 0.04 
Greece 797 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Hong Kong 7,884 0.15 -0.03 0.14 -0.03 0.05 0.01 
Hungary 104 0.17 -0.05 0.17 -0.05 0.12 0.01 
India 7,763 0.25 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.05 
Indonesia 797 0.24 0.02 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.00 
Ireland 549 0.14 -0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.25 0.01 
Israel 1,232 0.17 -0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.14 0.02 
Italy 986 0.32 0.09 0.34 0.11 0.06 0.02 
Japan 16,672 0.37 0.02 0.35 0.01 0.04 0.03 
Korea 4,248 0.22 0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.00 
Luxembourg 103 0.20 -0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.17 0.01 
Malaysia 4,918 0.22 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
Mexico 274 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.09 0.02 
Morocco 153 0.30 0.07 0.28 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Netherlands 1,291 0.22 -0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.21 0.05 
New Zealand 753 0.26 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.02 
Norway 847 0.22 -0.02 0.18 -0.03 0.09 0.11 
Peru 84 0.30 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.06 0.01 
Philippines 592 0.23 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.05 0.00 
Poland 1,426 0.19 -0.02 0.19 -0.02 0.03 0.19 
Portugal 244 0.25 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.04 0.03 
Russia 503 0.26 0.01 0.30 0.05 0.11 0.00 
Singapore 3,661 0.18 -0.01 0.18 -0.02 0.04 0.01 
South Africa 1,813 0.28 0.05 0.28 0.02 0.07 0.06 
Spain 917 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.04 
Sweden 1,034 0.22 -0.00 0.20 -0.01 0.07 0.17 
Switzerland 902 0.19 -0.03 0.19 -0.02 0.11 0.08 
Taiwan 2,915 0.17 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.01 
Thailand 678 0.17 -0.05 0.18 -0.03 0.04 0.01 
Turkey 1,480 0.19 -0.03 0.18 -0.03 0.04 0.00 
United Kingdom 14,050 0.21 -0.00 0.20 -0.00 0.05 0.18 
United States 52,473 0.21 0.00 0.19 -0.00 0.04 0.48 






Panel C: Summary Statistics by Industry 










Unclassified 369 0.28 0.04 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.21 
Agriculture 1,404 0.23 -0.01 0.22 -0.02 0.05 0.09 
Food Products 4,259 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.12 
Candy & Soda 894 0.28 0.01 0.27 -0.01 0.07 0.10 
Beer & Liquor 1,135 0.27 0.04 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.11 
Tobacco Products 241 0.31 0.08 0.33 0.09 0.11 0.19 
Recreation 822 0.23 -0.02 0.22 -0.02 0.04 0.19 
Printing & Publishing 1,596 0.26 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.21 
Consumer Goods 2,983 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.06 0.18 
Apparel 1,974 0.26 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.04 0.18 
Medical Equipment 4,143 0.17 -0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.06 0.29 
Pharmaceutical Products 7,459 0.15 -0.00 0.20 0.00 0.07 0.22 
Chemicals 5,133 0.25 -0.00 0.27 0.00 0.04 0.16 
Rubber & Plastic Products 1,377 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.17 
Textiles 1,430 0.24 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.03 0.08 
Construction Materials 5,268 0.25 -0.00 0.25 0.01 0.05 0.14 
Construction 7,931 0.27 0.00 0.26 -0.00 0.05 0.09 
Steel Works Etc. 3,837 0.24 -0.00 0.24 -0.01 0.04 0.13 
Fabricated Products 660 0.26 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.16 
Machinery 5,537 0.26 -0.00 0.26 -0.00 0.05 0.22 
Electrical Equipment 1,054 0.21 -0.01 0.22 -0.01 0.06 0.11 
Automobiles & Trucks 3,930 0.26 -0.00 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.18 
Aircrafts 715 0.27 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.05 0.32 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip. 501 0.23 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.05 0.16 
Defense 151 0.25 0.01 0.23 -0.00 0.01 0.44 
Precious Metals 2,867 0.11 -0.01 0.13 -0.00 0.12 0.07 
Non-Metallic & Industr. Metal 3,058 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Coal 880 0.17 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.04 0.14 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 7,067 0.21 -0.00 0.17 -0.00 0.07 0.21 
Communication 4,834 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.18 
Personal Services 6,643 0.25 -0.00 0.22 -0.00 0.04 0.24 
Business Services 23,068 0.21 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.05 0.24 
Computers 8,738 0.22 -0.00 0.22 -0.01 0.05 0.19 
Electronic Equipment 10,185 0.18 -0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.06 0.24 
Measuring & Control Equip. 2,803 0.21 -0.01 0.22 -0.00 0.05 0.32 
Business Supplies 1,904 0.25 -0.01 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.18 
Shipping Containers 565 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.20 
Transportation 5,679 0.23 -0.01 0.21 -0.00 0.06 0.18 
Wholesale 6,926 0.27 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.18 
Retail 8,855 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.23 
Restaurants, Hotels & Motels 4,128 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.22 




Table 2.2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) Peer ETR Diff 1.00               
                 
(2) Peer Cash ETR Diff 0.18 1.00              
  (0.00)               
(3) Foreign IO 0.06 0.06 1.00             
  (0.00) (0.00)              
(4) Domestic IO -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 1.00            
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
(5) Closely-held-shares 0.06 0.02 -0.20 -0.46 1.00           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
(6) Firm size 0.18 0.08 0.23 -0.02 0.03 1.00          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
(7) Pretax income 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.35 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
(8) Market-to-book -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.35 1.00        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
(9) Leverage -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.22 -0.10 1.00       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
(10) PP&E 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.06 0.13 0.08 -0.17 0.23 1.00      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
(11) R&D expense -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.16 -0.20 -0.46 0.34 -0.04 -0.24 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
(12) Equity income 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 1.00    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.63) (0.15) (0.00)     
(13) Intangibles -0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.26 -0.18 -0.16 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.36 0.01 -0.04 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
(14) Foreign sales 0.03 0.04 0.21 -0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 1.00  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
(15) Accounting standards 0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.12 0.16 1.00 




Table 2.3. DID Probit: Foreign Institutional Ownership and  
Corporate Tax Planning 
Difference-in-differences regressions around the elimination of portfolio restrictions to 
Norwegian pension funds in 2008. Pre-treatment means (Panel A) and results are for overall 
foreign equity investments by Norwegian insurances and pension funds (Panel B) and new equity 
investments only (Panel C). Treated is an indicator variable that equals one if a foreign stock is 
held by a Norwegian pension fund; and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals 
one in the years after 2008; and zero otherwise. The analysis is led on a two-year event window 
surrounding 2008. The control group includes foreign investee firms of Norwegian institutional 
investors other than pension funds. Treatment firms are matched to the nearest neighbour control 
firms with replacement using propensity scores with multiple lagged (two-year) variables. The 
Appendix contains variable definitions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
adjusted for clusters at firm level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Pre-Treatment Means 
 Treated firms Control firms Difference T-test 
Total Equity Investments by Norwegian Insurances and Pension 
Fund 
    
Foreign IO 0.0747 0.1066 0.0319*** 4.9503 
Domestic IO 0.3328 0.3261 -0.0067 -0.3376 
Closely-held-shares 0.3584 0.2934 -0.0650*** -4.9579 
Firms size 21.9816 22.4554 0.4739*** 4.1268 
Pretax income 0.0749 0.0919 0.0170*** 2.3927 
Leverage 0.2119 0.2081 -0.0038 -0.3743 
Market-to-book 1.7405 1.6577 -0.0828 -0.8837 
PP&E 0.2926 0.2744 -0.01823 -1.5016 
R&D expense 0.0220 0.0188 -0.0031 -1.0994 
Equity income 0.0010 0.0014 0.0004* 1.6462 
Intangibles 0.1418 0.1586 0.0169* 1.6894 
Foreign sales 0.2470 0.3376 0.0907*** 5.4005 
Accounting 
standards 
0.2059 0.31.98 0.1139*** 4.9944 
     
New Equity Investments by Norwegian Insurances and Pension Fund     
Foreign IO 0.0805 0.0934 0.0129** 1.9683 
Domestic IO 0.2645 0.2965 0.0320 1.6190 
Closely-held-shares 0.3825 0.3217 -0.0608*** -4.4416 
Firms size 22.3219 22.4463 0.1243 0.9730 
Pretax income 0.0762 0.0869 0.0107 1.4013 
Leverage 0.2150 0.2084 -0.0066 -0.6043 
Market-to-book 1.7932 1.6384 -0.1548 -1.5356 
PP&E 0.3058 0.2656 -0.0403*** -3.1603 
R&D expense 0.0188 0.0196 0.0008 0.2822 
Equity income 0.0011 0.0012 0.0000 0.3337 
Intangibles 0.1292 0.1351 0.0058 0.5805 
Foreign sales 0.2397 0.2889 0.0492*** 2.8323 
Accounting 
standards 




Panel B. Total Equity Investments by Norwegian Insurances and Pension Funds 



















       
Treated × Post 0.2043*** -0.0288 -0.1601** 0.1628** 0.0605 -0.1290* 
 (0.0687) (0.0838) (0.0644) (0.0709) (0.0827) (0.0692) 
Post -0.1303* 0.1239 0.0547 -0.0769 -0.0209 0.0489 
 (0.0700) (0.0848) (0.0653) (0.0702) (0.0854) (0.0700) 
Treated -0.0890 -0.0286 0.1364** -0.1170* -0.0684 0.1052* 
 (0.0608) (0.0818) (0.0669) (0.0629) (0.0759) (0.0628) 
Domestic IO -0.4672*** -0.4990*** 0.6027*** -0.3032*** -0.1431 0.3100*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0864) (0.0756) (0.0734) (0.0926) (0.0713) 
Closely-held-shares -0.0936 0.0108 0.0054 -0.1717** 0.1102 0.1034 
 (0.0828) (0.1018) (0.0892) (0.0842) (0.1042) (0.0859) 
Firm size 0.0585*** -0.0795*** -0.0050 0.0090 -0.0196 0.0295*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0108) 
Pretax income 0.5674*** -1.4503*** 1.1849*** 1.4556*** -2.5262*** 1.3295*** 
 (0.1969) (0.2418) (0.1719) (0.3436) (0.4004) (0.1739) 
Leverage -0.3013*** 0.8054*** -0.0393 -0.0178 0.3232** -0.3445*** 
 (0.0985) (0.1208) (0.1067) (0.1016) (0.1291) (0.1082) 
Market-to-book -0.0602*** -0.0451* -0.0466*** -0.0123 -0.0963*** -0.0992*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0257) (0.0168) (0.0210) (0.0360) (0.0186) 
PP&E -0.0675 -0.1351 0.2895*** 0.0045 -0.0568 -0.2305** 
 (0.0988) (0.1175) (0.1078) (0.0994) (0.1192) (0.1026) 
R&D expense -0.3112 0.4741 0.1701 0.0327 -2.0929** -0.8148* 
 (0.4499) (0.6283) (0.4185) (0.5279) (0.8145) (0.4809) 
Equity income 2.6183 -2.2423 9.5741** 4.6074 -3.6106 5.5905 
 (3.6044) (5.3458) (4.4047) (3.8083) (5.2463) (4.0362) 
Intangibles -0.1779 -0.1313 0.4569*** -0.2090* -0.5617*** 0.3547*** 
 (0.1207) (0.1374) (0.1227) (0.1163) (0.1382) (0.1157) 
Foreign sales 0.1376** 0.0548 -0.1284** 0.1477** -0.1327* -0.0739 
 (0.0584) (0.0742) (0.0639) (0.0575) (0.0759) (0.0597) 
Acc. standards 0.1662*** -0.3328*** -0.0613 -0.0539 0.0861 0.0381 
 (0.0508) (0.0638) (0.0580) (0.0537) (0.0660) (0.0557) 
       
Observations 10,207 10,207 10,207 9,392 9,392 9,392 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.02 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Marginal effect: 
Treated × Post 






Panel C. New Equity Investments by Norwegian Insurances and Pension Funds 



















       
Treated × Post 0.1991*** 0.0361 -0.3212*** 0.1984*** 0.1290 -0.2229*** 
 (0.0756) (0.0867) (0.0672) (0.0754) (0.0830) (0.0722) 
Post -0.0777 0.0735 0.1369** -0.0603 -0.0782 0.0758 
 (0.0750) (0.0850) (0.0681) (0.0749) (0.0863) (0.0728) 
Treated 0.0045 -0.0066 0.1172 -0.0296 -0.0973 0.0501 
 (0.0655) (0.0836) (0.0713) (0.0662) (0.0786) (0.0678) 
Domestic IO -0.5274*** -0.4368*** 0.5165*** -0.3167*** -0.2261* 0.2907*** 
 (0.1001) (0.1067) (0.0988) (0.0957) (0.1173) (0.0911) 
Closely-held-shares -0.1228 0.0038 0.0068 -0.1830* 0.0852 0.1758* 
 (0.1055) (0.1240) (0.1145) (0.1050) (0.1259) (0.1065) 
Firm size 0.0548*** -0.0923*** -0.0003 0.0223* -0.0233 0.0274** 
 (0.0121) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0129) 
Pretax income 0.7110*** -1.8879*** 0.9506*** 1.9305*** -3.1334*** 0.7968*** 
 (0.2758) (0.3171) (0.2011) (0.2895) (0.4039) (0.2096) 
Leverage -0.3705*** 1.0538*** -0.0335 0.0727 0.3346** -0.2411* 
 (0.1236) (0.1499) (0.1392) (0.1241) (0.1529) (0.1370) 
Market-to-book -0.0631*** -0.0232 -0.0614*** -0.0222 -0.0455 -0.0689*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0300) (0.0198) (0.0224) (0.0345) (0.0214) 
PP&E -0.2118* -0.0669 0.3350** -0.0054 -0.1204 -0.2757** 
 (0.1137) (0.1388) (0.1316) (0.1203) (0.1477) (0.1277) 
R&D expense -1.2883* -0.0375 0.6480 -0.3615 -2.3293** -0.6001 
 (0.7392) (0.8355) (0.5795) (0.8007) (0.9338) (0.6377) 
Equity income 2.6228 1.0970 4.2365 8.4423* -3.5521 -3.4412 
 (4.0538) (6.4315) (5.6532) (4.7563) (6.6378) (4.8088) 
Intangibles -0.1584 -0.3918** 0.5862*** -0.1574 -0.7121*** 0.2523* 
 (0.1502) (0.1720) (0.1629) (0.1475) (0.1741) (0.1423) 
Foreign sales 0.1522** 0.1138 -0.1037 0.1864** -0.0326 -0.1079 
 (0.0712) (0.0937) (0.0844) (0.0747) (0.0907) (0.0764) 
Acc. standards 0.1616*** -0.2414*** -0.1093 -0.0671 0.1484** 0.0402 
 (0.0585) (0.0743) (0.0701) (0.0653) (0.0756) (0.0641) 
       
Observations 6,719 6,719 6,719 6,210 6,210 6,210 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.02 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Marginal effect: 
Treated × Post 





Table 2.4. DID Probit: The Role of Political Costs on Tax Planning 
Difference-in-differences regressions using quartile sub-samples based on size (Net revenues). Descriptive statistics (Panels A) and results 
for overall foreign equity investments by Norwegian insurances and pension funds (Panel B) and new equity investments only (Panel C). 
Treated is an indicator variable that equals one if a foreign stock is held by a Norwegian pension fund; and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator 
variable that equals one in the years after 2008; and zero otherwise. The analysis is led on a two-year event window surrounding 2008. All 
regressions include control variables, with the exception of Firm size, and year fixed effects. The Appendix contains variable definitions. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics by Net Revenues 
 Net revenues  N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Total Equity Investments       
 Large 8,525 21.095 20.941 1.157 19.301 26.768 
 Small 1,592 18.264 18.654 1.243 10.158 19.300 
New Equity Investments       
 Large 5,579 21.189 21.025 1.214 19.301 25.546 





Panel B. Total Equity Investments: Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Probit: 
Peer ETR Diff 
Probit: 
Low ETR Diff 
Probit: 
High ETR Diff 
Probit: 
Peer Cash ETR 
Diff 
Probit: 
Low Cash ETR 
Diff 
Probit: 
High Cash ETR 
Diff 
Large firms subsample       
Post × Treated 0.2480*** -0.0525 -0.1306* 0.1707** 0.0615 -0.0999 
 (0.0714) (0.0979) (0.0687) (0.0755) (0.0936) (0.0718) 
Post -0.1664** 0.1216 0.0032 -0.0179 -0.0716 -0.0004 
 (0.0725) (0.0975) (0.0691) (0.0745) (0.0943) (0.0723) 
Treated -0.1497** 0.0290 0.1171* -0.1268* -0.0479 0.0803 
 (0.0656) (0.0974) (0.0703) (0.0660) (0.0836) (0.0653) 
       
Observations 8,522 8,522 8,522 8,089 8,089 8,089 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.02 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Small firms subsample       
Post × Treated -0.0861 0.3165 -0.5581** 0.1622 0.2578 -0.6537** 
 (0.2607) (0.2010) (0.2204) (0.2617) (0.2517) (0.3003) 
Post 0.0329 -0.0816 0.6109*** -0.4300 -0.0258 0.6580** 
 (0.2706) (0.2035) (0.2230) (0.2696) (0.2716) (0.3129) 
Treated 0.1412 -0.2624 0.3870* -0.0391 -0.3381 0.3964* 
 (0.1785) (0.1867) (0.2164) (0.1981) (0.2117) (0.2398) 
       
Observations 1,591 1,591 1,591 1,247 1,247 1,247 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.06 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Panel C. New Equity Investments: Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Probit: 
Peer ETR Diff 
Probit: 
Low ETR Diff 
Probit: 
High ETR Diff 
Probit: 
Peer Cash ETR 
Diff 
Probit: 
Low Cash ETR 
Diff 
Probit: 
High Cash ETR 
Diff 
Large firms subsample       
Post × Treated 0.2161*** 0.0276 -0.2976*** 0.2072** 0.0916 -0.2242*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0990) (0.0743) (0.0825) (0.0940) (0.0771) 
Post -0.0706 0.0275 0.0980 -0.0109 -0.1109 0.0647 
 (0.0811) (0.0962) (0.0751) (0.0820) (0.0943) (0.0777) 
Treated -0.0183 -0.0106 0.1003 -0.0193 -0.0983 0.0553 
 (0.0720) (0.0936) (0.0779) (0.0715) (0.0863) (0.0720) 
       
Observations 5,578 5,578 5,578 5,310 5,310 5,310 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.01 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Small firms subsample       
Post × Treated 0.0636 0.0270 -0.3769* 0.1657 0.2721 -0.2639 
 (0.2174) (0.2008) (0.1970) (0.2063) (0.2208) (0.2422) 
Post -0.1751 0.3017 0.3132 -0.2309 0.0241 0.0456 
 (0.2138) (0.1915) (0.1964) (0.1983) (0.2448) (0.2484) 
Treated 0.0323 0.1615 0.1698 -0.2151 -0.0102 0.0289 
 (0.1577) (0.1899) (0.1654) (0.1733) (0.2253) (0.2008) 
       
Observations 1,073 1,073 1,073 858 858 858 
Pseudo R 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.06 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 






Table 2.5. IV Probit: Foreign Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax 
Planning 
Probit and IV Probit regressions using longitudinal data on an international sample of non-
financial and non-utility firms over the period 2000-2016. In the IV Probit regressions, MSCI 
membership is used as instrument for Foreign IO. Whole sample in Panel A. In Panel B sub-
samples are defined dividing LnMV into quartiles and all regressions include all control variables 
and year fixed effects. The Appendix provides variable definitions. All the explanatory variables 
are lagged by one year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
adjusted for clusters at firm level. Fama-French 48 industry classification is used to identify 
industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Earnings-based ETR 





















IO -0.2786***      
 (0.0252)      
Foreign IO  0.2147***  1.1022*** -3.0233*** -1.4151*** 
  (0.0591)  (0.3864) (0.4653) (0.4377) 
Domestic IO  -0.3322*** -0.0637*** -0.2776*** -0.6241*** 0.4999*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0038) (0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0422) 
Closely-held-shares 0.0779*** 0.0937*** -0.0938*** 0.1848*** -0.4079*** -0.0949* 
 (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0039) (0.0457) (0.0548) (0.0525) 
Firm size 0.0677*** 0.0629*** 0.0055*** 0.0551*** -0.0635*** 0.0074* 
 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0043) 
Pretax income 0.8048*** 0.8073*** 0.0196*** 0.7865*** -0.4678*** 0.9801*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0557) (0.0018) (0.0564) (0.0277) (0.0454) 
Leverage -0.2214*** -0.2167*** -0.0008 -0.2180*** 0.4778*** 0.0103 
 (0.0318) (0.0317) (0.0026) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0339) 
Market-to-book  -0.0121*** -0.0130*** 0.0022*** -0.0152*** -0.0148*** -0.0349*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0047) 
PP&E -0.0404 -0.0474 0.0138*** -0.0628** 0.0698* 0.1174*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0032) (0.0302) (0.0360) (0.0355) 
R&D expense -0.4587*** -0.4355*** 0.0098 -0.4464*** -0.0332 -0.8142*** 
 (0.1303) (0.1299) (0.0070) (0.1297) (0.1060) (0.1227) 
Equity income -1.1529 -1.1358 -0.2757*** -1.1275 -3.2592** 8.0683*** 
 (1.2980) (1.2949) (0.0878) (1.2918) (1.5761) (1.4620) 
Intangibles -0.2093*** -0.2105*** 0.0419*** -0.2560*** 0.2938*** 0.3528*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0048) (0.0415) (0.0453) (0.0458) 
Foreign sales 0.1306*** 0.1018*** 0.0476*** 0.0546** 0.1647*** 0.0585** 
 (0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0027) (0.0265) (0.0312) (0.0294) 
Accounting standards 0.1279*** 0.1066*** 0.0134*** 0.0916*** -0.1644*** 0.0283* 
 (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0019) (0.0156) (0.0199) (0.0170) 
MSCI membership   0.0543***    
   (0.0026)    
       
Observations 130,648 130,648 130,648 130,648 130,648 130,648 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.05 
Marginal effect: Foreign IO  0.0566***  0.2908*** -0.8198*** -0.3813*** 
68 
 
Panel B: Cash-based ETR 





















IO -0.0277      
 (0.0228)      
Foreign IO  0.3874***  1.5945*** -4.1458*** -1.5174*** 
  (0.0620)  (0.3716) (0.4202) (0.4017) 
Domestic IO  -0.0655*** -0.0715*** 0.0186 -0.6690*** 0.0922** 
  (0.0235) (0.0044) (0.0359) (0.0417) (0.0397) 
Closely-held-shares 0.0605** 0.0746*** -0.1023*** 0.2099*** -0.3972*** -0.1273** 
 (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0045) (0.0478) (0.0564) (0.0527) 
Firm size 0.0271*** 0.0229*** 0.0053*** 0.0125*** -0.0117** 0.0366*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0039) 
Pretax income 0.3568*** 0.3594*** 0.0238*** 0.3284*** -0.5775*** 1.3078*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0024) (0.0380) (0.0374) (0.0716) 
Leverage -0.1299*** -0.1275*** 0.0010 -0.1307*** 0.5399*** -0.1905*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0033) (0.0312) (0.0379) (0.0360) 
Market-to-book 0.0161*** 0.0153*** 0.0031*** 0.0112*** -0.0408*** -0.0535*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
PP&E 0.1679*** 0.1626*** 0.0129*** 0.1412*** -0.1059*** -0.1838*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0037) (0.0306) (0.0387) (0.0348) 
R&D expense -0.0562 -0.0345 -0.0019 -0.0375 -0.7906*** -1.3307*** 
 (0.1204) (0.1202) (0.0099) (0.1202) (0.1369) (0.1568) 
Equity income 3.8459*** 3.8419*** -0.2379** 3.7932*** -7.2151*** 4.7235*** 
 (1.2887) (1.2827) (0.0945) (1.2719) (1.5062) (1.4810) 
Intangibles -0.1220*** -0.1244*** 0.0521*** -0.1986*** 0.0086 0.2252*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0056) (0.0430) (0.0546) (0.0471) 
Foreign sales 0.1593*** 0.1341*** 0.0495*** 0.0674** 0.1507*** 0.0201 
 (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0029) (0.0271) (0.0327) (0.0290) 
Accounting standards 0.0471*** 0.0296** 0.0125*** 0.0105 0.1039*** 0.0121 
 (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0021) (0.0156) (0.0186) (0.0168) 
MSCI membership   0.0531***    
   (0.0028)    
       
Observations 108,483 108,483 108,483 108,483 108,483 108,483 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.03 




Table 2.6. IV Probit: The Role of Political Costs on Tax Planning 
IV Probit regressions dividing Net revenues into quartile sub-samples. In Panel A (Panel B) the 
dependent variable is Peer ETR Diff (Peer Cash ETR Diff). MSCI membership is used as 
instrument for foreign institutional ownership. All regressions include control variables, with the 
exception of Firm size, and year fixed effects. The Appendix provides variable definitions. All the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at industry-year level. Fama-French 48 industry 
classification is used to identify industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance levels at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Earnings-based ETR 




Peer ETR Diff 
Second-stage: 
Low ETR Diff 
Second-stage: 
High ETR Diff 
Largest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  4.0649*** -7.1346*** -1.6128 
  (0.8374) (0.4155) (1.0168) 
Domestic IO -0.1824*** 0.2826 -1.4173*** 0.0079 
 (0.0080) (0.1959) (0.0976) (0.2074) 
MSCI membership 0.0198***    
 (0.0022)    
Observations 27,931 27,931 27,931 27,931 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.29 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Second largest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  1.2214* -1.4893 -2.6453*** 
  (0.6741) (0.9225) (0.7268) 
Domestic IO -0.1089*** -0.5246*** -0.3022*** 0.3779*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0961) (0.1147) (0.1089) 
MSCI membership 0.0600***    
 (0.0045)    
Observations 26,796 26,796 26,796 26,796 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.04 
Second smallest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  1.8956 -0.1107 -4.7241*** 
  (1.2403) (1.4518) (1.2843) 
Domestic IO -0.0626*** -0.4731*** -0.1089 0.4729*** 
 (0.0034) (0.1071) (0.1074) (0.1134) 
MSCI membership 0.0726***    
 (0.0085)    
Observations 25,129 25,129 25,129 25,129 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.04 
Smallest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  -2.8483 7.5558*** -5.5610* 
  (2.7213) (1.8279) (2.9649) 
Domestic IO -0.0171*** -0.2717*** -0.3239*** 0.4869*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0825) (0.1066) (0.1041) 
MSCI membership 0.0871***    
 (0.0167)    
Observations 23,254 23,254 23,254 23,254 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 
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Panel B: Cash-based ETR 




Peer ETR Diff 
Second-stage: 
Low ETR Diff 
Second-stage: 
High ETR Diff 
Largest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  4.7708*** -7.2232*** -1.4826 
  (0.7466) (0.4115) (1.0350) 
Domestic IO -0.1847*** 0.7750*** -1.4372*** -0.2194 
 (0.0083) (0.1718) (0.1028) (0.2000) 
MSCI membership 0.0183***    
 (0.0023)    
Observations 25,956 25,956 25,956 25,956 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.29 0.01 0.10 0.01 
Second largest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  2.6818*** 0.1278 -3.0921*** 
  (0.7092) (0.9294) (0.7540) 
Domestic IO -0.1083*** 0.1426 -0.1177 -0.1804* 
 (0.0050) (0.0942) (0.1167) (0.0988) 
MSCI membership 0.0612***    
 (0.0049)    
Observations 24,501 24,501 24,501 24,501 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.21 0.01 0.07 0.02 
Second smallest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  1.0040 3.0252** -4.4831*** 
  (1.4499) (1.3754) (1.5055) 
Domestic IO -0.0612*** -0.1662 -0.0971 -0.1312 
 (0.0035) (0.1144) (0.1274) (0.1140) 
MSCI membership 0.0676***    
 (0.0087)    
Observations 22,073 22,073 22,073 22,073 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.03 
Smallest firms sub-sample     
Foreign IO  -4.1312 10.1135*** -6.6805** 
  (3.6839) (2.7893) (3.3437) 
Domestic IO -0.0254*** -0.4283*** -0.3445** 0.0512 
 (0.0031) (0.1189) (0.1627) (0.1260) 
MSCI membership 0.0757***    
 (0.0184)    
Observations 15,749 15,749 15,749 15,749 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.07 







Table 2.7. Foreign Institutional Ownership, Corporate Governance and Tax 
Planning 
Probit regressions using longitudinal data on international non-financial and non-utility firms 
across the years 2000-2016. The Appendix provides variable definitions. All the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and adjusted for clusters at industry-year level. Fama-French 48 industry classification is used to 
identify industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 

















     
Foreign IO 1.1426*** 0.4528** 1.4856*** 0.9118** 
 (0.2116) (0.2238) (0.3827) (0.4016) 
CEO power -0.0766*** -0.0370   
 (0.0256) (0.0247)   
Foreign IO × CEO power 1.0733*** 0.7483**   
 (0.3269) (0.3007)   
Low incentive comp.   -0.0775*** -0.0866*** 
   (0.0296) (0.0336) 
Foreign IO × Low incentive comp.   0.4202* 0.5455** 
   (0.2193) (0.2595) 
Domestic IO -0.1991*** -0.0549 0.0689 0.3430*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0361) (0.1043) (0.1148) 
Firm size 0.0626*** 0.0472*** 0.0099 -0.0021 
 (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0116) (0.0132) 
Pretax income 0.6964*** 0.1764** 0.5956*** 0.0988 
 (0.0929) (0.0890) (0.1286) (0.0777) 
Leverage -0.0631* -0.0470 0.0938 -0.0492 
 (0.0377) (0.0435) (0.0697) (0.0710) 
Market-to-book -0.0420*** 0.0105* -0.0273*** 0.0107 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0098) (0.0086) 
PP&E -0.2022*** 0.0653 -0.2064** -0.0146 
 (0.0499) (0.0720) (0.0903) (0.0823) 
R&D expense -0.1892 0.2231 0.6864*** 0.8581*** 
 (0.1593) (0.1949) (0.2645) (0.2187) 
Equity income -2.9934** -2.9615* -2.7913 -4.0749 
 (1.4657) (1.5735) (2.7489) (3.0418) 
Intangibles -0.2342*** -0.1241*** -0.3264*** -0.1875*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0441) (0.0755) (0.0687) 
Accounting standards 0.2228*** 0.0996*** 0.2291*** 0.1927*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0481) (0.0461) 
     
Observations 63,336 52,093 19,984 16,876 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 2.8. Foreign Institutional Ownership and Tax Planning with Bandwidth 
IV Probit regressions using longitudinal data on an international sample of non-financial and non-utility firms over the period 2000-2016. The sample is 
restricted to firms in the 10% bandwidth around the MSCI ACWI cut-off point in each country. The cut-off point is, in each country, the first firm after 
which the free-float adjusted market capitalization ranking is at least 85% of the total free-float market capitalization. Free-float adjusted market 
capitalization ranking lower or equal to 85% (Below cut-off) is used as instrument for foreign institutional ownership. The Appendix provides variable 
definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters 
at firm level. Fama-French 48 industry classification is used to identify industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 





























         
Foreign IO  4.9346*** -4.9738** -6.0073***  0.3698 -7.5066*** -1.7121 
  (1.9131) (2.2144) (1.5215)  (2.5321) (1.1019) (2.5046) 
Domestic IO -0.1629*** 0.4897 -1.3750*** -0.5914 -0.1620*** -0.1287 -1.5543*** -0.2088 
 (0.0156) (0.3935) (0.2994) (0.3776) (0.0169) (0.4233) (0.1637) (0.4317) 
Below cut-off 0.0208***    0.0196***    
 (0.0057)    (0.0057)    
         
Observations 11,584 11,584 11,584 11,584 10,593 10,593 10,593 10,593 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.24 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.08 0.02 





Table 2.9. The Role of Investor and Firm’s Characteristics 
IV Probit regressions using longitudinal data on an international sample of non-financial and non-utility firms over the period 2000-2016. In Panel A, 
investors are classified based on investment horizons into long-term and short-term; in Panel B, I classify investors based on their legal origin and include  
foreign investors from common law countries and include a subsample of firms from countries with low investor protection; Panel C includes subsamples 
of firms classified as U.S. and non-U.S. listed. The Appendix contains variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm level. Fama-French 48 industry classification is used to identify 
industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Investment Horizons of Foreign Institutional Investors 






























         
Foreign IO LT  3.0369*** -8.6708*** -3.8825***  4.2574*** -11.6207*** -4.0149*** 
  (1.0516) (1.3343) (1.1968)  (0.9707) (1.2114) (1.0500) 
Foreign IO ST  0.8191 -2.1759** -0.0926  2.3293*** -1.1556 -1.2772 
  (0.6960) (0.9024) (0.7825)  (0.7113) (0.9102) (0.8437) 
Domestic IO -0.0043 -0.3373*** -0.4891*** 0.5777*** -0.0085** -0.0594** -0.5026*** 0.1664*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0270) (0.0304) (0.0284) (0.0037) (0.0247) (0.0337) (0.0269) 
MSCI membership 0.0199***    0.0203***    
 (0.0021)    (0.0022)    
         
Observations 130,648 130,648 130,648 130,648 108,483 108,483 108,483 108,483 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.03 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 



































         
Foreign IO Common  1.2394** -4.2117*** 0.2022  3.6133*** -4.9847*** -1.4486** 
  (0.6156) (0.7927) (0.7019)  (0.6426) (0.7712) (0.6959) 
MSCI membership 0.0490***    0.0492***    
 (0.0035)    (0.0038)    
         
Observations 40,467 40,467 40,467 40,467 31,374 31,374 31,374 31,374 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.20 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.04 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Non-U.S. Sample         
Foreign IO  0.8831*** -2.3750*** -0.3506  1.5440*** -2.6966*** -0.9767*** 
  (0.2947) (0.3773) (0.3396)  (0.2994) (0.3509) (0.3256) 
MSCI membership 0.0768***    0.0763***    
 (0.0034)    (0.0035)    
         
Observations 86,851 86,851 86,851 86,851 72,318 72,318 72,318 72,318 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.02 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
U.S. Sample         
Foreign IO  6.7082*** -5.3168* -9.6721***  -1.4702 -8.7740*** -8.1791*** 
  (2.4150) (3.0405) (0.8972)  (3.1753) (1.3799) (1.7001) 
MSCI membership 0.0146**    0.0123*    
 (0.0058)    (0.0063)    
         
Observations 43,797 43,797 43,797 43,797 36,165 36,165 36,165 36,165 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.04 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.10. Robustness Tests 
IV Probit regressions using longitudinal data on an international sample of non-financial and non-utility firms over the period 2000-2016. Results are 
presented using a sub-sample of firm/year observations with non-negative pre-tax income (Panel A), three-year rolling means (Panel B) and an alternative 
definition of peer groups based on industry and size (Panel C). The Appendix contains variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at industry-
year level. Fama-French 48 industry classification is used to identify industries. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























         
Panel A. Non-negative pretax income         
Foreign IO  0.9172** -2.4353*** -1.9914***  1.0088** -3.1457*** -1.9184*** 
  (0.4358) (0.6415) (0.5033)  (0.4114) (0.5564) (0.4461) 
Domestic IO -0.0824*** -0.4060*** -0.5910*** 0.3400*** -0.0843*** -0.0431 -0.7020*** -0.0131 
 (0.0049) (0.0488) (0.0655) (0.0575) (0.0053) (0.0436) (0.0579) (0.0491) 
MSCI membership 0.0508***    0.0501***    
 (0.0027)    (0.0029)    
         
Observations 93,504 93,504 93,504 93,504 83,647 83,647 83,647 83,647 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Marginal effect: Foreign IO  0.2877*** -0.3803*** -0.6318***  0.3075*** -0.5512*** -0.6318*** 




Panel B. Three-year rolling means         
Foreign IO  1.6188*** -3.1842*** -2.7792***  1.4158** -3.5580*** -2.7191*** 
  (0.5278) (0.7337) (0.6261)  (0.5538) (0.6987) (0.6532) 
Domestic IO -0.0835*** -0.0135 -0.8091*** 0.2418*** -0.0922*** 0.1274** -0.5340*** 0.0087 
 (0.0052) (0.0562) (0.0692) (0.0720) (0.0060) (0.0598) (0.0754) (0.0773) 
MSCI membership 0.0471***    0.0452***    
 (0.0030)    (0.0032)    
         
Observations 88,653 88,653 88,653 88,653 73,895 73,895 73,895 73,895 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.03 
Marginal effect: Foreign IO  0.4150*** -0.8230*** -0.7460***  0.3486*** -0.8834*** -0.6714*** 
         
Panel C. Alternative peer measure         
Foreign IO  7.5513*** -5.8212*** -8.2733***  7.2610*** -5.2108* -9.8046*** 
  (1.5843) (1.9444) (1.4940)  (2.3190) (2.9751) (1.5058) 
Domestic IO -0.1350*** 0.9518*** -1.0142*** -0.8781*** -0.1501*** 1.0219** -0.6775 -1.3819*** 
 (0.0091) (0.2622) (0.2696) (0.2813) (0.0107) (0.4046) (0.4913) (0.3206) 
MSCI membership 0.0122***    0.0086**    
 (0.0033)    (0.0035)    
         
Observations 130,648 130,648 130,648 130,648 108,483 108,483 108,483 108,483 
Adj/Pseudo R2 0.32 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.33 0.03 0.08 0.07 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Figure 2.1. Foreign Institutional Ownership around Norway’s Elimination of 
Portfolio Restriction 
Panel A (B) shows a graphical representation of annual average (median) foreign equity 
investment by Norwegian insurances and pension funds (i.e. Treated) in the top (green) line 
and Norwegian institutional investors other than insurances and pension funds (i.e. Control) 
in the bottom (orange) line plotted across time. Year represents the calendar end of the year 
(31/12). The regulatory change in the Norwegian insurance and pension fund industry 
occurred in January 2008 and it is represented by the vertical line at the end of 2007. Control 
firms are matched using propensity score matching replacement that best matches each firm 
in the treatment group. The sample includes Worldscope non-financial and non-utility firms 
and covers the years 2000-2016. 











Figure 2.2. Foreign Institutional Ownership around the MSCI ACWI Cut-Off 
Point 
The figures plot foreign institutional ownership against the cumulative share of firms in the 
2015 sample (Panel A) and in the whole sample (Panel B). The cut-off point is, for each 
country, the first firm after which the free-float market capitalization ranking is at least 85% 
of the total free-float market capitalization. The dots represent the sample means of the two 
variables in each bin. Bins are selected using the evenly spaced method (Calonico, Cattaneo, 
and Titiunik 2015). Lines represent first-order polynomials estimated separately above and 
below the cut-off (i.e. 85% of cumulative shares of firms). The sample includes Worldscope 
non-financial and non-utility firms and covers the years 2000-2016. 
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Indexed institutional ownership and geographic 
segment disclosure 
3.1 Introduction and motivation 
The growing importance of indexed investors, whose investment strategy is 
essentially based on an index-tracking activity, has raised questions about their impact 
on the effectiveness of the “traditional” corporate governance mechanisms 
(McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 2016; Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2016; Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach 2017) and on their role on informational transparency of publicly listed 
firms (Boone and White 2015; Bird and Karolyi 2016; Schoenfeld 2017).14 Chapter 3 
adds to this literature by focusing on the effect of indexed ownership on geographic 
disclosure policies, in particular, with respect to country-level disclosure.  
The importance of this research area stems from the economically significant, and 
often opaque, offshore activities led by U.S. multinationals (Reuters 2015) and the 
managerial incentives for decreased transparency around such activities related to 
political and reputational costs (Akamah, Hope, and Thomas 2017; Dyreng, Hoopes, 
Langetieg, and Wilde 2018). For example, a report released by Oxfam documents that 
U.S. multinationals are keeping $1.4tn in overseas tax havens (Davies 2016).15 Given 
the concerns that large indexed investors, due to their passive management strategies 
and large investment portfolios, might undermine the efficacy of corporate governance 
(Murphy 2016), this is a particularly interesting setting to examine the monitoring 
activities of indexed investors with respect to informational transparency in their 
investee firms.  
ASC 280 (previously SFAS 131) provides the legal framework of geographic 
segment disclosure. Firms are required to present their operations disaggregated by 
                                                          
14 Indexed institutions are professional investors who seek to mimic the performance of equity or bond 
indexes. Unlike active stock-pickers, the trading strategy of indexed funds follows index reconstitutions. 
For this reason, indexed investors are also called “passive investors”. 
15 This figure represents approximately 7% of U.S. GDP in 2016. Tax motives are likely to be important 
determinants of corporate (non-) disclosure behaviour (Akamah et al. 2017). 
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one or more operating segments (such as industry, geographic area, legal entity or type 
of costumer) in accordance with their organizational architecture and to provide 
financial information for each “material” country in which they earn revenues and hold 
assets. Operations for all “immaterial” countries can be aggregated at higher levels 
(regions, continents or in one “Total Foreign” residual entry). Yet, the vague definition 
of materiality in ASC 280 allows corporate managers to have some discretion on the 
countries that are classified as “immaterial” and can, thereby, be aggregated and those 
that are in fact “material”. I conjecture that this discretion can also have potential 
implications for firm transparency, warranting an increased demand for monitoring 
managers’ disclosure motives. 
As a result, there is substantial variation in the extent to which U.S. multinationals 
report their foreign operations on a country-by-country basis. In practice, a significant 
number of firms aggregate their financial information at higher levels in response to 
the preferences of corporate managers or better informed investors (Herrmann and 
Thomas 2000; Akamah et al. 2017). Such aggregation reduces firm transparency and 
increases monitoring costs, thereby, discouraging monitoring activities by indexed 
investors. I argue that one implication of the higher monitoring costs is that indexed 
investors may strategically ration their relevant resources16, directing them towards 
firms more exposed to information asymmetries and governance problems. In a similar 
vein, Crane, Michenaud, and Weston (2016) present evidence that indexed investors 
are effective corporate monitors especially in firms with potentially higher agency 
costs; evidenced by the stronger positive effect on corporate pay-out policies for these 
firms17.  
Findings of prior studies are consistent with the resource rationing view of indexed 
investors. Appel et al. (2016) argue that investors may engage in widespread, but “low-
cost” monitoring activities. One way could be by voting for their shares according to 
recommendations provided by proxy advisors (Malenko and Shen 2016). Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach (2017) present evidence that indexed investors are less effective as 
corporate monitors when monitoring activities entail “high-costs” (i.e. monitoring 
M&A transactions).  
                                                          
16 Monitoring activity by indexed investors on every firms of their large and diversified portfolios may 
be limited by a cost-minimization strategy or lack of resources. 
17 Crane et al. (2016) measure high agency costs using the accumulation of the roles of CEO and 
Chairman, low growth options, low profitability, high free cash flow and large board size. 
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Furthermore, a few studies document increased governance problems in firms that, 
following the implementation of SFAS 131 (now ASC 280), no longer disclose their 
geographic earnings. For example, Hope and Thomas (2008) provide evidence that 
non-disclosing companies experience higher foreign sales, lower foreign profit margins 
and lower firm value, relative to companies that continue to disclose geographic 
earnings. These findings are consistent with corporate managers undertaking 
suboptimal (“empire building”) decisions, which have detrimental effects on 
shareholder value, as a result of the less transparent environment brought about by the 
adoption of SFAS 131. 
Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013) find that firms that no longer disclose their earnings 
by geographic area register lower effective tax rates and Akamah et al. (2017) show 
that companies with tax haven operations tend to aggregate their geographic disclosure 
to a greater extent; thereby, making income shifting activities less transparent. Overall, 
these findings suggest that following the implementation of SFAS 131 corporate 
managers enjoy some level of discretion in reporting and aggregating financial 
information of firms’ geographic operations with potential implications for firm 
transparency. 
In this chapter, I posit that indexed investors, due to high information asymmetries 
and related monitoring costs, are less likely to demand increased geographic disclosure 
in every firm of their generally large and diverse portfolios (i.e., all firms included in 
the tracked index). In contrast, I argue that indexed investors can choose to 
strategically allocate their resources and promote country-level operation disclosure in 
those firms that are exposed to greater information asymmetries and agency problems. 
More specifically, I examine firms’ tax haven operations as a source of asymmetric 
information between managers and shareholders that can trigger indexed investors’ 
preferences for informational transparency. 
There are compelling reasons why indexed investors would exert influence on 
country-level disclosure in their investee firms. First, unlike their active counterparts 
that can trade based on private information, indexed investors are subject to greater 
information asymmetries and may, thereby, favour improvements in the information 
environment. Country-level disclosure can benefit shareholders because it increases 
firm transparency concerning profitability, risk and uncertainties of firms’ geographic 
operations (Hope and Thomas 2008; Akamah et al. 2017). Second, indexed investors 
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can incur larger costs from acquiring private information and from engaging in 
monitoring activities because of their generally large portfolios, which encompass 
diverse holdings. Improved geographic disclosure reduces information acquisition 
costs and makes monitoring over corporate management more accessible to 
shareholders (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Boone 
and White 2015). Finally, indexed investors can benefit from enhanced monitoring as 
their intervention can improve firm performance whereas disinvestment (which is 
associated with changes in the index membership status of the investee firms) is a less 
viable governance channel (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 2016). 
A number of studies support the view that indexed investors act as effective 
corporate monitors (Appel et al. 2016; Crane et al. 2016). Moreover, Boone and White 
(2015), Bird and Karolyi (2016) and Schoenfeld (2017) find that indexed ownership is 
associated with greater corporate transparency and information production in the 
forms of management disclosure, analyst following and liquidity18. 
However, the monitoring role of indexed investors could be more complex than 
originally thought. Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) show that stockholdings of 
indexed investors experience greater accumulation of roles, fewer independent director 
appointments and worse M&A transactions because of the high monitoring costs that 
such activities may entail. Differently from management guidance, index-tracking 
institutions are likely to incur higher costs to monitor (or promote) country-level 
operation disclosure in their diverse holdings. In such a setting, indexed investors can 
act as effective corporate monitors by strategically allocating their monitoring effort to 
those firms experiencing information asymmetries and governance problems. 
I conduct my analysis using a sample of U.S. firms that explicitly define their 
operating segment by geographic area. My sample spans from 1998 to 2016, a post-
SFAS 131 period. I find that companies with larger indexed ownership are overall less 
transparent with respect to their geographic operations. Yet, this effect is less 
pronounced for firms that are exposed to greater information asymmetries and 
governance problems. My results thus indicate a strategic allocation of resources from 
index investors with respect to their monitoring activities. I proxy for weaknesses of 
                                                          
18 Prior studies examining the effect of indexed investors on firms’ information environment have 
primarily focused on the information embedded into the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Form 8-K filings concerning management earnings guidance. 
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firms’ governance structures using tax haven operations, accumulation of roles and the 
entrenchment index (McCahery et al. 2016; Akamah et al. 2017; Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach 2017; Schoenfeld 2017; Dyreng et al. 2018). Following Cremers and 
Pareek (2016), I find that my results are consistent using two different samples of 
indexed ownership. The first sample relates to the equity holdings of 13F - indexed 
institutional investors as reported by the Factset LionShare database, while the second 
sample consists of firms held by S12 - indexed mutual funds as from the Thomson 
Reuters database.  
To provide causal support to my results, I exploit two sources of exogenous 
variation to indexed ownership. First, I conduct a difference-in-differences (DID) 
analysis using a SEC’s exemptive relief order allowing mutual funds to invest in iShares 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in excess of the maximum amount outlined in section 
12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 from May 2003 onwards. Second, I 
take advantage of the discontinuity surrounding Russell index inclusion to implement 
both instrumental variable (IV) and regression discontinuity (RDD) analyses.  
Overall, my results suggest that indexed investors are less likely to monitor country-
by-country operation disclosure of every company of their large and diversified 
portfolios. However, this class of shareholder acts as effective corporate monitors of 
country-level operation disclosure in firms that are in greater need of monitoring and 
informational transparency. I thus show evidence of a more nuanced approach of 
indexed investors in their demand for increased informational transparency in their 
investee firms.  
My findings can be relevant for policymakers and corporate stakeholders when 
designing policies aimed to provide greater transparency about firms’ geographic 
operations. At international level, the comparability between the IFRS 8 and SFAS 
131, resulting from an ongoing convergence project between IFRS and US GAAP, 
makes my results informative also for those countries implementing IFRS principles. 
Unlike anecdotal evidence, I show that indexed investors act as effective corporate 
monitors, as their presence is associated with greater country-by-country operation 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides details 
on the data and research design. Section 3.3 discusses my findings. Section 3.4 presents 
robustness tests and Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data and research design 
I conduct my analysis on a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms reporting geographic 
segment disclosure in the years 1998-2016. I start my sample in 1998 because from this 
year onwards a new accounting standard - ASC 280 or former SFAS 131 - requires 
financial information for each “material” country in which companies lead their 
operations. I remove firm-year observations for which the necessary data is unavailable 
from the whole Compustat population. I further restrict my sample to industries - 
defined using the Fama-French 48 industry classification - with at least forty 
observations. I then merge this data with ownership-level data. Following Cremers and 
Pareek (2016), I conduct my analysis using two different samples of indexed 
ownership. The first sample includes U.S. publicly listed firms held by institutional 
investors from Factset LionShares - 13F - database. The second sample consists of 
U.S. stock holdings by mutual funds as reported in Thomson Reuters - S12 - database. 
To conclude, I winsorize all my continuous variables at 1% to mitigate the influence 
of extreme values on my analysis.  
 
3.2.1 Geographic segment disclosure variables 
I limit my sample to companies that define their operating segment by geographic 
area. I measure (country-level) geographic segment disclosure using an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm includes the name of at least one foreign country in 
the segment reporting on the notes of its financial statements and zero otherwise 
(Country disclosure). To calculate this variable, I code the names of the 195 countries 
in the world as from the list of the U.S. Department of State - 
https://www.state.gov/misc/list/.19 I also measure aggregate disclosure using an 
indicator variable that equals one if a company aggregates its foreign operations in one 
                                                          
19 For several countries I code various name combinations (i.e. “United Kingdom”, “Great Britain” and 




single “Other”, “Foreign”, “International” or “Rest of the World” entry (Aggregated 
disclosure); this can thus be considered as an inverse measure of firms’ informational 
transparency with respect to their geographical operations.20 
Table A.3.2 of the Appendix shows three examples of geographic segment 
disclosure as shown in the notes of the financial statements. The three examples 
present financial information by geographic area from the highest to the lowest level 
of aggregation. All firms belong to the Computer industry. In the first example, Dell 
Technology Inc. divides geographic information about net revenues and long-lived 
assets between “United States” and “Foreign countries”. No other country apart from 
the United States represents more than 10% of Dell’s total revenues. This level of 
aggregation provides little information about geographic profitability, exposure and 
risks to shareholders and other corporate stakeholders and signals a low level of 
transparency of the firm’s foreign operations.  
In the second example, Alphabet Inc. reports geographic net revenues and long-
lived assets by macro-regions; namely “United States”, “EMEA”, “APAC” and “Other 
Americas”. Similar to the first example, this level of aggregation of the company’s 
geographic operation evidences low transparency about profitability and risks of the 
firm’s foreign markets. Finally, in the third example, Oracle Corporation presents 
geographic disclosure of financial information disaggregated at country level into 
entries such as “United States”, “United Kingdom”, “Japan”, “Germany”, “Canada” 
and “Other countries”; each representing at least 3% of the company’s total revenues. 
Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows the number of companies reporting country-level 
financial information per year. Since 1999, the year after the adoption of SFAS 131 
now ASC 280, the number of disclosing firms has grown and is more than 20% higher 
in 2016. Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the percentage of firms reporting their 
operations at country-level relative to the total number of firms that define their 
operating segments by geographic area. Consistent with Panel A, Panel B shows that 
country-level disclosure as a percentage of total geographic disclosure increased over 
time and is about 11% higher in 2016 compared to its 1999 level. 
 
                                                          
20 Untabulated results using Aggregated disclosure as dependent variable show a positive association 
between index investors and more aggregated disclosure. 
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3.2.2 Indexed institutional ownership variables 
Following Cremers and Pareek (2016), I conduct my analysis using two different 
samples of indexed ownership. The first sample includes U.S. publicly listed firms held 
by institutional investors from Factset LionShares - 13F - database. The second sample 
consists of U.S. stock holdings by mutual funds as reported in Thomson Reuters - S12 
- database.  
Factset LionShares includes data on the stockholdings of professional fund 
managers, such as investment banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension 
funds and hedge funds, managing $100 million or more as reported by the mandatory 
N-30D and 13F filings with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC)21. I identify 
indexed institutional investors based on a flag assigned by the Factset research staff to 
institutions whose stated objective from publicly available reports is index tracking. I, 
then, calculate indexed institutional ownership at firm-level as the sum of the holdings 
of all institutions that are flagged as index in the database divided by the stock’s market 
capitalization (Index IO).  
Similarly, I also define hedge funds as those institutions whose investment style is 
classified as “Hedge fund” (Hedge IO) and active investors those whose flag is 
different from index (i.e. GARP, Yield, Deep Value, Value, Growth and Aggressive 
Growth). I label all investors that are not flagged by the Factset research staff as 
unclassified institutions.  
To find index-tracking mutual funds in the Thomson Reuters database, I adopt a 
similar approach to that of Busse and Tong (2012), Iliev and Lowry (2015) and Appel 
et al. (2016). I merge mutual fund data from Thomson Reuters and CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database using the MFLINKS table available on WRDS. I then generate an indicator 
variable that equals one if a fund name on CRSP includes a string that identifies it as 
an indexed investor and zero otherwise22. Based on this indicator variable, I then 
calculate indexed mutual fund ownership at firm-level as the sum of the holdings of 
all funds that are classified as index divided by the stock’s market capitalization. I also 
                                                          
21 See Ferreira and Matos (2008) for more details on the data coverage of Factset LionShares database. 
22 In line with Appel et al. (2016), the strings I use to identify indexed mutual funds are: Index, Idx, Ind_ 
(where _ indicates space), Russell, S & P, S and P, S&P, SandP, SP, DOW, Dow, DJ, MSCI, Bloomberg, 
KBW, NASDAQ, NYSE, STOXX, FTSE, Wilshire, Morningstar, 100, 400, 500, 600, 900, 1000, 1500, 
2000 and 5000. 
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classify all mutual funds other than indexed as actively managed. All my explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year to mitigate simultaneous causality concerns. 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of indexed ownership for my sample of 
firms that report geographic segment information. Indexed 13F institutional 
ownership is on average 6% of firms’ market capitalization while indexed S12 mutual 
fund ownership is on average 3% of firms’ market capitalization. Figure 3.2 shows the 
year-averages stock holdings by indexed 13F institutional investors (Panel A) and S12 
mutual funds (Panel B). Both Panels show an upward trend in indexed ownership, with 
13F institutional investors increasing their average stock holdings by 80% between 
1999 and 2016 and S12 mutual funds registering higher ownership levels by 40% 
during the same period. 
 
3.2.3 Tax haven variables 
Akamah et al. (2017) show that U.S. multinationals that are found to conduct their 
operations in tax haven countries tend to reduce informational transparency by 
aggregating their geographic disclosure at regional or macro-regional level or in a single 
“Total Foreign” entry. By doing so, managers can conceal financial information about 
tax haven activities to avoid unwanted public and regulatory scrutiny on firms’ tax 
planning strategies. In a similar vein, Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2019) find that 
tax aggressive firms are characterized by lower financial transparency, proxied by 
analysts’ forecast errors and dispersions and bid-ask spread.  
Akamah, Hope, and Thomas (2017) and Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2019) 
overall seem to suggest that information asymmetries are more severe in companies 
with tax haven operations and tax aggressive strategies. This can be a substantial cause 
of concerns for indexed investors who, due to limited resources and large portfolios, 
likely rely on publicly available information for monitoring (Boone and White 2015). I 
examine indexed investors’ monitoring motives by including Haven countries and 
Haven subsidiaries as proxies for information asymmetries. Haven countries is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the majority of the countries in which firms conduct 
their operations are tax havens and zero otherwise (Akamah, Hope, and Thomas 
2017), and Haven subsidiaries is an indicator of whether the majority of a firm’s 
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subsidiaries are domiciled in tax haven countries.23 I predict a positive effect of Index 
IO on geographic segment disclosure when firms have tax haven operations. 
 
3.2.4 Control variables 
My analysis includes several control variables to help separate the effect of indexed 
institutional ownership on geographic segment disclosure from other firm-specific 
characteristics. The first set of control variables captures firms that are arguably subject 
to greater informational transparency and are more likely to be included in market 
indexes (Ln (market value), Domestic pretax income, Foreign pretax income and 
Multinational). First, I include firm size and domestic profitability in my model 
specification to control for a greater demand for, and benefit of, transparency in larger 
and profitable firms (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Miller 2002; Boone and White 2015; 
Bourveau and Schoenfeld 2017). Second, I add foreign profitability and an indicator 
variable for multinationals as firms with profitable foreign operations are more likely 
to report their operations at country level (Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012; 
Hope et al. 2013).  
The second set of control variables includes proxies for the availability of firm-
specific information (Analysts following, Forecast accuracy, Forecast diversity, 
Discretionary smoothing and Big 5 auditor) to disentangle the effect on geographic 
disclosure from the information environment (Maffett 2012). First, the presence of 
analysts and Big 5 auditors should increase transparency. Analysts following is, for each 
firm-year, the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts and Big 5 auditor is an 
indicator of whether a firm is audited by a global accounting firm. Second, following 
Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012), I add proxies for the accuracy and diversity of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. High levels of Forecast accuracy indicate greater transparency 
whereas high Forecast diversity suggests firm-level opacity. Finally, I add Discretionary 
smoothing because prior studies have found that discretionary earnings smoothing is 
associated with higher levels of opacity (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003, Lang, Lins, 
and Maffett 2012). 
                                                          




The third set of control variables includes Leverage, Market-to-book, Intangibles 
and Turnover (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010; Boone and White 2015). While 
companies with larger external debts are subject to stricter disclosure requirements, 
firms with growth opportunities and intangible assets may be more exposed to 
proprietary costs of disclosure. Finally, I control for stock Turnover because managers 
can use voluntary disclosure to improve liquidity of their firms’ shares (Balakrishnan, 
Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist 2014). I lag all my control variables by one year to 
mitigate simultaneous causality concerns. 
Table 3.1, Panels A and B, shows descriptive statistics for all variables. On average, 
indexed institutional investors own 9% of their investee firms (Panel A) whereas 
indexed mutual funds hold about 4% of shares (Panel B). Hedge funds ownership is 
7% in the two samples. The average firm is large and profitable, is audited by a global 
accounting firm and has a median of seven analysts assessing its earnings. 
 
3.2.5 Correlation matrix 
Table 3.2 reports pairwise correlations between my variables. The univariate 
association between Country disclosure and Index IO is negative but statistically 
insignificant, indicating that there may be additional factors affecting such a 
relationship. Large correlation coefficients on Country disclosure indicate that 
companies providing country-level financial information are more likely to be 
multinationals with profitable foreign operations. Furthermore, univariate statistics 
show that indexed investors (Index IO) are more likely to target high market cap (Ln 
(market value) and liquid (Turnover) stocks whose earnings are assessed by a larger 
number of analysts (Analysts following). 
 
3.2.6 Research design 
I begin my analysis of the effect of indexed ownership on geographic segment 
disclosure using Probit regressions. Yet, this approach raises concerns about potential 
endogeneity issues affecting my results. For example, indexed investors may find 
themselves investing in firms that prior to index inclusion were already engaging in an 
enhanced level of transparency with respect to their geographic operations. If this is 
the case, results may reflect the role played by the information environment in 
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determining firms’ index inclusion and therefore miss out the actual effect I aim to 
estimate. I address this issue by exploiting multiple sources of exogenous variation in 
indexed ownership.  
My primary empirical strategy for identifying the effect of Index IO on geographic 
segment disclosure exploits an exemptive relief order released by the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to iShares Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) using a 
difference-in-differences (DID) design. ETFs are indexed funds which can amass 
significant holdings in their portfolio firms and, due to their long-term investment 
strategy, can have a special interest in shaping management decisions that foster long-
term value creation24. Similar to other indexed investors, however, their monitoring 
activity is constrained by resources, which makes ETFs’ providers more sensitive to 
the information environment of their investee firms.  
Beginning in May 2003, an exemptive order released by the SEC allows mutual 
funds to invest in iShares ETFs in excess of the maximum amount outlined in section 
12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 194025. Because ETFs can be traded as stocks 
throughout the trading day and are highly liquid, demand shocks for ETFs likely 
transfer to the shares of the firms in the ETFs’ portfolio. Figure 3.3 shows that the 
SEC’s exemptive order has led to a large increase in equity investments by iShares 
ETFs from 2003 onward relative to other ETFs. In this setting, my “treatment group” 
includes firms held by iShares Exchange Traded Funds while my corresponding 
“control group” consists of companies held by Exchange Traded Funds other than 
iShares. Firms in the control group represent the best match of firms in the treatment 
group. 
My difference-in-differences equation is: 
 
Country disclosure = α + β Treated × Post + γ Treated + δ Post + 




                                                          
24 iShares ETFs’ provider BlackRock influences managerial decisions of iShares ETFs’ investee firms 
by voting for their shares in line with BlackRock’s voting policies. Medium-sized ETF providers often 
delegate their voting rights to proxy advisory firms (JustETF 2018). 
25 Section 12(d) prohibits an investment company from acquiring more than 3% of the total outstanding 
voting shares of another investment company. Secondly, it restricts investment companies from 
investing more than 5% of their total assets in a single investment company. The section also prohibits 
investing more than 10% of total assets in two or more investment companies 
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where, for each firm-year, Treated is an indicator for firms in the treatment group, 
Post indicates the post-SEC’s exemptive-order period and Treated × Post is the 
interaction term. The analysis is led on a two-year event window before and after May 
2003.  
My second empirical strategy is an instrumental variable (IV) approach which relies 
on the plausibly exogenous variation in Index IO that follows a firm’s inclusion in the 
Russell index (Boone and White 2015; Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 2015; Appel et 
al. 2016). The underlying assumptions of this approach are that (1) index membership 
largely explains variations in Index IO (“relevance condition”) and (2) index inclusion 
is uncorrelated to disclosure policies concerning the location of foreign operations, 
and their determinants, outside through its effect on Index IO (“exogeneity 
condition”).  
In this section, I argue that my instrument is (2) exogenous as it is unclear whether 
firms can affect their relative market capitalization ranking which is based on the index 
weights constructed by Russell using proprietary adjustments26. However, larger firms 
are potentially subject to greater disclosure requirements than their smaller 
counterparts, and firm size is correlated to changes in index membership. To mitigate 
concerns that the “exogeneity condition” is violated, I restrict my analysis to the ±300 
companies surrounding the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold in a sample that 
includes only firms assigned to either the Russell 1000 or the Russell 2000. Variations 
in Indexed IO for this subset of firms is more likely to be exogenous to their 
geographic segment disclosure policies. Figure 3.4, Panels A and B, shows the 
discontinuity around the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold. 
Russell makes some proprietary adjustments to the end-of-May market 
capitalization ranking based on the publicly available float to construct its index 
weights. Such index weights are then used by Russell to produce the end-of-June 
ranking, which ultimately drives indexed ownership. Because of the proprietary 
adjustments, index membership could be correlated with some firm characteristics 
other than market capitalization rankings. This would invalidate my IV approach. I 
address this issue by interacting actual index assignments (Russell 2000) with the end-
of-May’s market capitalization rankings (Rank adjusted) and by controlling for a 
                                                          
26 I provide evidence on (1) the instrument relevance in the Results section. Graphically, Panels A and 
B of Figure 3.4 show the discontinuity in Index IO around the Russell 1000/2000 index threshold. 
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number of factors (such as hedge fund ownership, shares’ turnover and managerial 
discretion over reported earnings) that can affect Index IO, Russell 2000 and Rank 
adjusted in my IV regressions. 
My first- and second-stage equations are: 
 
Index IOit = α + βRussell 2000it + θRank adjustedit
+ μ Russell 2000it × Rank adjusted it + σ Controlsit






Country disclosureit = γ + ρ Index IOit−1 + π Controlsit−1 + 




where, for each firm-year, Russell 2000it indicates actual index membership, Rank 
adjustedit is the distance of the end-of-May’s market capitalization rankings to the 
threshold and their interaction, Russell 2000it × Rank adjustedit. The instrumental 
variables, Russell 2000it, Rank adjustedit and Russell 2000it × Rank adjustedit are 
excluded from the second-stage specification.  
In 2007, Russell introduced a new banding policy which affects the index 
assignment rule. The new policy allows Russell to keep a stock in its current index if 
the stock experiences only a small change in market capitalization27. Under the new 
rule, index assignment is related to firms’ characteristics other than market 
capitalization rankings, which can violate the “exogenous condition”. To mitigate 
concerns that my results are affected by the banding policy, I control for firms that, 
after 2006, do not switch index at the reconstitution date despite having their end-of-
May market capitalization ranking crossing the index threshold, Bandit, and for the 
interaction between Bandit and the index assignment in the previous year, Bandit × 
Russell 2000it-1 (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2018). 
Both instrumental variables and difference-in-differences approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. After including control variables in the first-stage 
                                                          
27 Beginning in May 2007, a stock is “banded” by Russell and does not switch index at the reconstitution 
year if the distance between its market capitalization and the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff is less than 2.5% 
of the cumulative market capitalization of the Russell 3000E Index (Appel et al. 2018). 
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regressions, I show that Russell index inclusion is unrelated to firms’ geographic 
disclosure policies and their determinants. However, this approach raises concerns that 
the effect on geographic segment disclosure around the Russell 1000/2000 indexes 
cutoff is only local and mainly driven by smaller companies whose disclosure 
requirements are arguably lower. The use of a difference-in-differences design helps 
address these concerns. First, this methodology covers on the whole sample of treated 
and control companies making estimates non-local and, second, it helps focusing on 
larger companies, subject to ETFs acquisitions. Yet, my difference-in-differences 
analysis encompasses only one fund, iShares ETFs, which can make results less 
generalizable. As a result, I believe that the combination of the two empirical 
approaches, addressing one another limitations, can provide greater validity to the 
effect I aim to estimate. 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Elimination of investing limits in ETFs: Quasi-natural 
experiment 
To provide causal support to the effect of indexed ownership on geographic 
segment disclosure, I take advantage of a quasi-natural experimental setting offered by 
the SEC’s elimination of investing limits in iShares Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). 
Before May 2003, Section 12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 restricted 
mutual funds from (1) acquiring more than 3% of the total outstanding voting shares 
of another investment company, (2) investing more than 5% of their total assets in a 
single investment company and (3) more than 10% in two or more investment 
companies. From May 2003 an exemptive relief order released by the SEC permits 
mutual funds to invest in iShares Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in excess of the 
limits outlined in Section 12(d).  
Mutual funds largely benefit from the elimination of investing limits in ETFs 
(Financial Planning 2003). By acquiring ETFs, mutual funds can have immediate 
exposure to equities while taking the advantages of ETFs’ high liquidity (ETFs can be 
traded at any point during a trading day), low capital gain taxes (because of the 
redemption “in-kind” mechanism), low portfolio turnover (given that ETFs track 
specific market indexes) and thereby low transaction costs. Two reasons make the 
SEC’s exemption relief order of May 2003 particularly relevant to my study. First, 
102 
 
demand shocks for ETFs likely transfer to the shares of the firms in the ETFs’ 
portfolio. On this spirit, Figure 3.3 shows a sharp increase in equity holdings by iShares 
ETFs following the SEC’s exemptive order relative to other ETFs. Second, the 
exemptive relief order of May 2003 was only granted to investments in iShares ETFs 
whereas all the other ETFs traded in the U.S. market were still subject to the limits of 
Section 12(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
My primary research approach consists of a difference-in-differences (DID) 
analysis around the elimination of mutual funds’ investing limits in iShares ETFs. My 
treatment group includes investee firms of iShares ETFs whereas my control group 
consists of firms included in the portfolios of other (non-iShares) ETFs. Tests are led 
on a sample that encompasses only firms in the treatment and control groups. Firms 
are matched using propensity score matching (PSM) without replacement based on 
several lagged (two years) covariates and industry classifications. 
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the differences in means between treated and control 
groups for all the variables used in the study in the two years preceding the elimination 
of investing limits in iShares ETFs. I mitigate concerns of these differences affecting 
my results by including all variables in my difference-in-differences (DID) analysis in 
Panel B. The interaction term Treated × Post in Panel B captures variations in the 
effect of the SEC’s exemptive order for companies included in iShares ETFs’ 
portfolios relative to those held by ETFs other than iShares28. I find a negative and 
significant coefficient on Treated × Post, which indicates a negative effect of indexed 
ownership on geographic segment disclosure. More specifically, the marginal effect at 
the bottom of Column 1 of Panel B suggests that a 1-percent increase in iShares ETFs 
ownership following the elimination of investing limits outlined in Section 12(d) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 leads to a reduction of 12 percentage points in the 
probability of Country disclosure relative to investee firms of other non-iShares ETFs. 
The dependent variable, Country disclosure (excl. Canada), in Column 2 is an 
indicator equal to one if a company provides financial information for at least one 
foreign country in which it leads its operations excluding Canada and zero otherwise. 
Similar to Column 1, the coefficient estimate on Treated × Post in Column 2 is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an exogenous increase in indexed 
                                                          
28 Untabulated results show that the parallel trend assumption is also met. 
103 
 
ownership leads firms to provide fewer country-level information about profitability, 
risks and uncertainties of their foreign operations. I find similar results after dropping 
the year in which the SEC released the exemptive relief order to investments in iShares 
ETFs (i.e. 2003) from the post-treatment period. These findings, overall, lend support 
to the view of indexed investors as “passive owners” (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017) 




3.3.2 The role of tax haven operations: Quasi-natural experiment 
I now examine the role of indexed investors in companies that are more exposed 
to information asymmetries. Akamah et al. (2017) provide evidence that U.S. 
multinationals with tax haven operations tend to aggregate their geographic disclosure 
to a larger extent, reducing informational transparency. In such a setting, I posit that 
indexed investors would favour greater disclosure about firms’ geographic segments 
when firms conduct large part of their activities in tax havens as this would reduce 
information acquisition costs, making monitoring over corporate management more 
accessible.  
Table 3.4, Panels A and B, presents the results of my difference-in-differences 
(DID) analysis. The interaction term Treated × Post × Haven countries in Panel A 
captures the effect of SEC’s exemptive order for companies included in iShares ETFs’ 
portfolios that lead their operations in tax havens (i.e. % haven countries). The 
coefficient estimate on Treated × Post × Haven countries in Column 1 of Panel A is 
positive and significant, suggesting that indexed ownership is positively associated with 
Country disclosure in firms that lead their operations in tax haven countries. The 
marginal effect at the bottom of Column 1 indicates that a 1-percent increase in 
ownership by iShares ETFs leads to about 1.6 increase in the probability of country-
level operation disclosure. This finding is consistent with my hypothesis of indexed 
investors increasing monitoring in companies that are exposed to greater information 
asymmetries and governance problems. 
I find similar results when I exclude Canada from the list of foreign countries in 
which U.S. multinationals conduct their activities (Column 2) and when I exclude the 
year in which SEC released the exemptive relief order (i.e. 2003) from the post-
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treatment period (Columns 3 and 4). Across the four columns of Panel A, I also find 
that Treated × Post is negatively associated with Country disclosure and Country 
disclosure (excl. Canada), which is consistent with my results in Panel B of Table 3.3. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on Treated × Haven countries are negative and 
significant. This result indicates that country-level disclosure is less likely in the investee 
firms of iShares ETFs that lead their operations in tax haven countries as for these 
companies information asymmetries are likely higher. 
In Panel B of Table  3.4, I present the results of the difference-in-differences (DID) 
analysis using Haven subsidiaries as an indicator for firms having the majority of their 
subsidiaries in tax haven countries (i.e. % haven subsidiaries). Similar to Panel A, I find 
a positive and significant coefficient on Treated × Post × Haven subsidiaries in 
Column 1 of Panel B. That is, companies included in iShares ETFs’ portfolios are more 
likely to report country-by-country financial information when they lead the majority 
of their foreign operations using tax haven subsidiaries. The marginal effect at the 
bottom of Column 1 suggests that a 1-percent increase in iShares ETFs ownership 
leads to a 1.8 increase in the probability of Country disclosure, ceteris paribus. This 
finding overall presents evidence that indexed investors are more likely to direct their 
resources towards those firms that, due to larger information asymmetries, are in 
greater need of monitoring. 
In Column 2, I replace my dependent variable with Country disclosure (excl. 
Canada) whereas in Columns 3 and 4 I exclude the year in which the SEC’s exemptive 
relief order was released (i.e. 2003). Overall, results are consistent with the above 
analysis and my research hypothesis of a selective approach to monitoring by index-
tracking institutions. Similar to Table  3.3, I also find that the coefficient on Treated × 
Post is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that indexed investors are in 
general “passive owners” when it comes to geographic segment disclosure. Yet, 
indexed investors increase monitoring on those firms that are more exposed to 
information asymmetries and governance problems, as proxied by tax haven 
operations. 
 




Table 3.5 presents the results of Probit and IV Probit regressions of geographic 
segment disclosure into indexed institutional ownership (Panel A) and mutual fund 
ownership (Panel B). In Column 1, the dependent variable Country disclosure is an 
indicator of whether a firm reports the name of at least one foreign country in which 
it leads its operations. The coefficient estimate on Index IO is negative and significant, 
which suggests that an increase in indexed ownership reduces the probability of 
country-level disclosure. The marginal effect at the bottom of Column 1 indicates that 
a standard deviation (0.07) increase in equity investments by indexed institutions is 
associated with a 5.25 percentage point reduction in Country disclosure, ceteris paribus 
[0.07×(-0.75)×100]. 
To mitigate concerns of firms engaging in an enhanced level of disclosure prior to 
index inclusion, I exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in indexed ownership that 
follows a company’s index assignment around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff using an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach. Column 2 reports the results of my first-stage 
regression from equation [2] using a bandwidth of ±300 firms around the threshold. 
The effect of Russell 2000 on Index IO is positive and significant. Consistent with 
Gloßner (2018), I find that indexed institutional ownership increases by about 0.5 
percentage points following the assignment of a company into the Russell 2000 index 
relative to similar stocks included in the Russell 1000. Figure 3.4, Panel A, shows the 
discontinuity for 13F - Indexed Institutional Ownership.  
Importantly, my empirical strategy also addresses concerns that, due to Russell’s 
proprietary float adjustments, firm characteristics other than market capitalization 
rankings could affect Index IO. More specifically, I include the same control variables 
in my first- and second-stage regressions to mitigate these concerns. First-stage results 
reported in Column 2 show positive and significant coefficients on Turnover and 
Discretionary smoothing, which suggests that shares’ liquidity and managerial 
discretion in reported earnings play a role on indexed institutional ownership besides 
the effect of index assignment and market capitalization rankings. 
Column 3 of Panel A presents a negative and significant coefficient on Index IO, 
indicating that firms with larger indexed institutional ownership are less likely to 
disclose their financial information at country-level. The marginal effect at the bottom 
of Column 3 suggests that a standard deviation (0.07) increase in Index IO is associated 
with a lower probability of firms disclosing their operations country-by-country of 
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about 41.3 percentage points, ceteris paribus [0.07×(-5.9)×100]. Column 4 displays 
similar results when the dependent variable Country disclosure (excl. Canada) excludes 
Canada from the list of foreign countries in which companies defining their operating 
segments by geographic area lead their operations. 
Results for S12 – indexed mutual funds in Panel B of Table 3.5 are consistent with 
those for 13F – indexed institutional investors in Panel A and above analysis. The 
magnitude of the effect of indexed ownership is larger in Column 1. The marginal 
effect at the bottom of Column 1 suggests that a standard deviation (0.04) increase in 
Index IO is associated with a reduction of Country disclosure by 4.48 percentage 
points [0.04×(-1.12)×100], ceteris paribus. The larger negative effect of Index IO is 
also reflected in the second-stage results of Columns 3 and 4. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the view of indexed investors trading-off costs and benefits of 
monitoring all the companies of their large portfolios when it comes to geographic 
segment disclosure. 
 
3.3.4 The role of tax haven operations: Instrumental variable 
approach 
I now examine the role of information asymmetries, proxied by tax haven 
operations, on geographic segment disclosure around the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff. 
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the results for 13F – indexed institutional investors. The 
coefficient estimate on the interactive term Index IO × Haven countries in Column 1 
is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative effect of indexed investors on 
Country disclosure is less pronounced for firms operating in tax haven countries. The 
coefficient on the interaction term in Column 2 is still positive but statistically 
insignificant. One reason of this can be attributed to corrections to end-of-May’s 
market capitalization rankings29 and bandwidth choice.  
In Column 3, Index IO × Haven subsidiaries presents a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate, which indicates a positive effect of indexed investors on 
geographic segment disclosure in firms that largely take advantage of tax haven 
subsidiaries. Similar to Column 2, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term in 
Column 4 is positive but statistically insignificant when I exclude Canada from the list 
                                                          
29 As discussed above in Section 2.5, I correct end-of-May’s market capitalization rankings using actual 
end-of-June’s Russell 1000/2000 index assignments. 
107 
 
of foreign countries for which companies provide financial information. These results 
overall provide evidence of a greater demand for country-by-country financial 
information by indexed investors in companies that are more exposed to information 
asymmetries and governance problems, as proxied by tax haven operations. 
Panel B of Table 3.6 presents the results for S12 – indexed mutual funds ownership. 
Findings are overall consistent with Panel A and above analysis. Column 1 reports a 
positive and significant coefficient on Index IO × Haven countries, which suggests 
that an increase in indexed ownership is associated with improved Country disclosure 
in firms operating in tax haven countries. The coefficient on the interaction term is 
positive but statistically insignificant in Column 2. Column 3 presents a positive and 
significant coefficient on Index IO × Haven subsidiaries whereas the coefficient 
estimate in positive but statistically insignificant in Column 4. Overall, results are 
consistent with the view of indexed investors’ monitoring motives being stronger in 
firms operating in tax haven countries. 
 
3.3.5 Indexed ownership and CEO power 
To provide additional support to my prediction, I investigate whether the effect of 
indexed investors on geographic segment disclosure could be explained by the 
preferences of powerful CEOs. I measure CEO power using the accumulation of roles 
(i.e. CEO-Chairman and CEO-President) and managerial entrenchment (i.e. E-index) 
(McCahery et al. 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2017; Schoenfeld 2017).  
Table 3.7 presents my regression results. The coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term IO Index × CEO-Chairman in Column 1 is positive and statistically significant, 
which means that the negative effect of indexed investors on geographic disclosure is 
less pronounced in firms with powerful CEOs. This result is consistent with the view 
of indexed investors engaging in greater monitoring over the offshore activities of 
firms at higher risk of governance problems. In Column 2 the coefficient on the 
interaction term is still positive although statistically insignificant.  
Columns 3 and 4 report positive and significant coefficient estimates on IO Index 
× CEO-President and in Columns 5 and 6 the relation between IO Index × E-index 
and geographic segment disclosure is also positive and significant. Results in Panel B 
are consistent with my analysis above although coefficients on the interaction terms 
are statistically insignificant in Columns 1, 3, 5 and 6. Overall, findings suggest that 
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indexed investors have greater incentives to monitor corporate managers’ disclosure 
policies when boards are less likely to question managerial activity. 
 
3.3.6 Additional analysis 
I further provide evidence on the effect of indexed institutional ownership on 
aggregated disclosure of a company’s geographic operations (Aggregated disclosure). 
Results (untabulated) show that the presence of 13F - index institutional investors 
increases the likelihood of aggregation of foreign operations under a single entry 
labelled as “Foreign”, “International”, “Rest of the World” or “Other”. The marginal 
effect suggests that a 1-percent increase in equity investments by indexed institutions 
is associated with a higher probability of aggregation of geographic segments by about 
30 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Results for S12 - indexed mutual funds are 
consistent with those for 13F – indexed institutional investors in Panel A and above 
analysis. The coefficient estimate on Index IO is still positive but statistically 
insignificant for Aggregated disclosure. 
 
3.3.7 Other robustness tests: Regression discontinuity design 
Following Boone and White (2015) and Chen, Huang, Li, and Shevlin (2018), I 
implement a regression discontinuity design (RDD) around the Russell 1000/2000 
cutoff to identify the effect on geographic segment disclosure. More specifically, I 
examine whether the probability of country-level operation disclosure differs around 
the cutoff for firms assigned to Russell 2000 using a conventional bandwidth of ±300. 
Similar to my analysis above, I construct rankings based on the end-of-May’s market 
capitalization and correct those using actual end-of-June’s index assignments after 
Russell introduced its banding policy in 2007. 
Panel A of Table  3.8 presents the results of my RDD regressions fitting a local 
third (N=3) order polynomial using a triangular kernel to the left and right of the 
Russell 1000/2000 cutoff using the bias-correction methodology proposed by 
Calonico et al. (2015). Coefficient estimates on Russell 2000 are negative and 
significant for both Country disclosure and Country disclosure (excl. Canada) in 
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. In line with my analysis above, these results indicate 
that firms reduce informational transparency about their geographical operations 
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following an exogenous increase in indexed ownership. Findings are also robust to 
changes in the bandwidth from ±300 to ±200 and ±400. I find similar results when I 
measure indexed ownership using S12 - indexed mutual fund ownership, although 
coefficients on Russell 2000 are statistically insignificant for Country disclosure (excl. 
Canada). 
In Table 3.9, I run a similar analysis to the tests reported in Table 3.6 replacing the 
±300 bandwidth with ±200 and ±400. Results are consistent with the above analysis 
in that coefficient estimates on Index IO × Haven countries are positive and 
statistically significant in most regressions. This finding is in line with the view of 
indexed investors’ motives for greater informational transparency being more 
important for firms exposed to information asymmetries, proxied by tax haven 
operations. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Using a sample of about 4,400 U.S. publicly listed firms over the years 1998-2016, 
I find that companies with larger indexed ownership are less transparent with respect 
to their geographic operations. Yet, this effect is less pronounced for firms that are 
exposed to greater information asymmetries and agency problems. I find these effects 
using two different samples of indexed ownership which include 13F - institutional 
investors and S12 - mutual funds, respectively. Moreover, I exploit a regulatory change 
to iShares Exchange Traded Funds as sources of exogenous variation in indexed 
ownership and stocks assignments to Russell 1000/2000 to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. Overall, my results are consistent with the view that indexed investors 
strategically allocate their resources to improve informational transparency of their 






Table A.3.1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Geographic segment disclosure variables  
Country disclosure Equal to one if a firm reports the name of at least one foreign country in which 
it leads its operations and zero otherwise (Compustat) 
Country disclosure  
(excl. Canada) 
Equal to one if a firm reports the name of at least one foreign country in which 
it leads its operations excluding Canada and zero otherwise (Compustat) 
Aggregated disclosure Equal to one if a firm aggregates its foreign operations under a single “Foreign”, 
“International”, “Rest of the World” or “Other” entry and zero otherwise 
(Compustat) 
Institutional ownership variables  
Index IO Sum of the holdings of all institutions or mutual funds that are identified as 
indexed for each firm divided by the firm’s market capitalisation (Factset 
LionShares or Thomson Reuters) 
Hedge IO Sum of the holdings of all institutions that are identified as hedge funds for each 
firm divided by the firm’s market capitalisation (Factset LionShares) 
Control variables  
Ln (market value) Natural logarithm of market price times common shares outstanding current 
(Compustat: prcc_c×csho) 
Leverage Leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets (Compustat: lt/at) 
Market-to-book Market price at the end of the period times common shares outstanding at the 
end of the period divided by total assets (Compustat: (prcc_c×csho)/ceq) 
Domestic pretax income Domestic pre-tax income divided by total assets (Compustat: pidom/at) 
Foreign pretax income Foreign pre-tax income divided by total assets (Compustat: pifo/at) 
Intangibles Net intangibles divided by total assets (Compustat: intan/at) 
Multinational Equal to zero when foreign income taxes is missing or zero, and equal to one 
otherwise (Compustat: txfo) 
Turnover Daily trading volume divided by share outstanding (Compustat) 
Transparency variables  
Analysts following For each year, median number of analysts providing one-year-ahead EPS 
forecast (I/B/E/S) 
Forecast accuracy Percentile-ranked residual value from a regression of Raw accuracy on Earnings 
surprise and Forecast bias. Raw accuracy is the absolute value of the forecast 
error multiplied by -1 and divided by the stock price at the end of the previous 
year, Forecast error is the analysts’ mean earnings forecast less the actual earnings 
reported by I/B/E/S Summary File and Earnings surprise is the change in actual 
earnings between two subsequent years divided by the stock price at the end of 
the previous year (I/B/E/S) 
Forecast diversity Percentile-ranked residual value from a regression of Raw diversity on Earnings 
surprise and Forecast bias. Raw diversity is the standard deviation of the firm’s 
earning forecast produced by analysts for the following year minus the mean 




Discretionary smoothing The combination of two commonly used measures of earnings management 
proposed by Lang et al. (2012): 1) the variability of net income relative to cash 
flows and 2) the correlation between accruals and cash flows. The two proxies 
are first regressed on a set of determinants of earnings smoothness (total assets, 
leverage, book-to-market value, sales volatility, frequency of accounting losses, 
length of the firm’s operating cycle, sales growth, operating leverage, average 
cash flows from operations, year fixed effects and industry fixed effects). The 
average of the scaled percentile rank of the resulting residuals is then used to 
form the discretionary earnings smoothness measure 
Big 5 auditor Equal to one if auditing company is Big 5 and zero otherwise (Compustat: au) 
Tax haven variables  
Haven countries Equal to one if, according to Exhibit 21 data (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009), the 
majority of the countries in which a firm leads its operations are tax havens; and 
zero otherwise  
Haven subsidiaries Equal to one if, according to Exhibit 21 data (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009), the 
majority of foreign subsidiaries are domiciled in tax haven countries; and zero 
otherwise 
Corporate governance variables  
CEO-Chairman Equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board of directors and zero 
otherwise (Capital IQ) 
CEO-President Equal to one if the CEO is also the President of the board of directors and zero 
otherwise (Capital IQ) 
E-index For each firm-year, average score assigned to the following corporate governance 
characteristics Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009): a staggered board, limits to 
shareholder bylaw and charter amendments, poison pill, golden parachute and a 
super-majority requirement for mergers (Institutional Shareholder Services) 
Russell index inclusion variables  
Russell 2000 Equal to one if a firm is included in the Russell 2000 index in the current year and 
zero otherwise (Bloomberg) 
Rank adjusted End-of-May market capitalization ranking adjusted for Russell 1000 membership. 
The ranking is constructed on a sample of firms that at the Russell index 





Table A.3.2. Examples of Geographic Segment Disclosure 
Examples of different levels of aggregation of geographic information in the Computers 
industry. Examples 1, 2 and 3 show geographic segment reporting for Dell Technology Inc., 
Alphabet Inc. and Oracle Corporation, respectively. 
 






























Table 3.1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. 13F – Institutional Ownership 
   N Mean  Median   SD   Min   Max 
Country disclosure 21,621 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Country disclosure (excl. Canada) 21,621 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Aggregated disclosure 21,621 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Index IO 21,621 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.22 
Hedge IO 21,621 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.32 
Ln (market value) 21,621 6.99 6.95 1.97 2.29 11.40 
Leverage 21,621 0.52 0.51 0.25 0.08 1.40 
Market-to-book 21,621 2.89 2.13 4.71 -18.10 29.34 
Domestic pretax income 21,621 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.43 0.25 
Foreign pretax income 21,621 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.10 0.14 
Intangibles 21,621 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.75 
Multinational 21,621 0.59 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Turnover 21,621 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.79 
Analysts following 21,621 8.98 7.00 7.44 1.00 33.00 
Forecast accuracy 21,621 6.63 6.00 4.57 1.00 18.00 
Forecast diversity 21,621 6.32 5.00 4.41 1.00 18.00 
Discretionary smoothing 21,621 6.22 5.50 3.48 1.00 15.50 
Big 5 auditor 21,621 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel B. S12 – Mutual Fund Ownership 
   N Mean   Median   SD   Min   Max 
Country disclosure 22,352 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Country disclosure (excl. Canada) 22,352 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Aggregated disclosure 22,352 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Index IO 22,352 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.14 
Hedge IO 22,352 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.32 
Ln (market value) 22,352 6.97 6.92 1.96 2.52 11.38 
Leverage 22,352 0.52 0.51 0.25 0.08 1.34 
Market-to-book 22,352 2.91 2.14 4.60 -16.76 27.57 
Domestic pretax income 22,352 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.41 0.25 
Foreign pretax income 22,352 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.09 0.14 
Intangibles 22,352 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.00 0.74 
Multinational 22,352 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Turnover 22,352 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.79 
Analysts following 22,352 9.06 7.00 7.38 1.00 32.00 
Forecast accuracy 22,352 6.75 6.00 4.76 1.00 19.00 
Forecast diversity 22,352 6.58 5.00 4.71 1.00 19.00 
Discretionary smoothing 22,352 6.35 5.50 3.73 1.00 16.50 




Table 3.2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)  
(1) Country disclosure 1.00                 
                   
(2) Index IO -0.01 1.00                
  (0.34)                 
(3) Hedge IO -0.04 0.14 1.00               
  (0.00) (0.00)                
(4) Ln (market value) 0.16 0.36 -0.12 1.00              
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
(5) Leverage -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.08 1.00             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
(6) Market-to-book 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.06 1.00            
  (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
(7) Domestic pretax inc. 0.05 0.13 -0.10 0.26 -0.07 0.07 1.00           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
(8) Foreign pretax inc. 0.23 0.16 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.06 0.19 1.00          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
(9) Intangibles 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.09 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)          
(10) Multinational 0.47 0.19 0.03 0.21 -0.05 0.04 0.11 0.34 0.26 1.00        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
(11) Turnover -0.02 0.38 0.29 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.11 1.00       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)        
(12) Analysts following 0.12 0.37 0.02 0.61 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.25 0.36 1.00      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
(13) Forecast accuracy 0.11 0.12 -0.11 0.16 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.06 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)      
(14) Forecast diversity 0.09 -0.00 -0.13 0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.37 1.00    
  (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
(15) Discretionary smoot. 0.11 0.07 -0.13 0.14 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.13 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.38 0.49 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)    
(16) Big 5 auditor 0.06 0.18 -0.02 0.37 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.04 1.00  





Table 3.3. DID Probit: Indexed Ownership and Geographic Segment 
Disclosure 
Pre-treatment descriptive statistics (Panel A) and difference-in-differences (DID) regressions 
of geographic segment disclosure around the elimination of investing limits in iShares ETFs 
in 2003 (Panel B). The sample includes US publicly listed firms and covers the years 1998-
2016. Treated is an indicator variable that equals one if a stock is held by an iShares exchange 
traded fund; and zero if it is held by an exchange traded fund other than iShares (i.e. Control). 
Post is an indicator variable that equals one in 2003 and after; and zero otherwise. The analysis 
is led on a two-year event window before and after 2003. Treated firms are matched to the 
nearest neighbour control firms without replacement using propensity scores based on 
multiple (two-year) lagged covariates. Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm level (in 
parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Pre-Treatment Means 
 Treated Control Difference T-test 
Index IO 0.0214 0.0255 -0.0041*** -2.6482 
Hedge IO 0.0309 0.0259 0.0051 1.2319 
Ln (market value) 7.6324 7.4915 0.1409 0.8243 
Leverage 0.5319 0.4834 0.0484* 1.6963 
Market-to-book 3.3688 3.6110 -0.2422 -0.4087 
Domestic pre-tax income 0.0000 0.0052 -0.0052 -0.6503 
Foreign pre-tax income 0.0017 0.0136 -0.0119*** -3.7333 
Intangibles 0.1485 0.1363 0.0122 0.6204 
Multinational 0.1963 0.5092 -0.3129*** -6.2370 
Turnover 0.1953 0.1437 0.0515*** 2.9954 
Analysts following 13.2147 9.2914 3.9233*** 5.0029 
Forecast accuracy 5.3926 7.0123 -1.6196*** -3.0849 
Forecast diversity 8.6380 9.7244 -1.0863* -1.8401 
Discretionary smoothing 7.1046 8.7480 -1.6434*** -2.9268 







Panel B. Difference-in-differences regressions 
 Year 2003 included  Year 2003 excluded  















     
Treated × Post -0.3352*** -0.2250** -0.3777** -0.2521** 
 (0.1229) (0.1074) (0.1475) (0.1277) 
Treated 0.0687 0.0180 0.0702 0.0252 
 (0.2183) (0.2093) (0.2200) (0.2102) 
Post -0.2029 -0.0579 -0.1383 -0.0071 
 (0.1836) (0.1644) (0.1892) (0.1671) 
Hedge IO 4.7020*** 2.8982* 4.2844*** 2.3921* 
 (1.4862) (1.5139) (1.4602) (1.4405) 
Ln (market value) 0.2393** 0.1933** 0.2363** 0.1791** 
 (0.0963) (0.0800) (0.0947) (0.0768) 
Leverage 0.5562 -0.3312 0.6150 -0.2986 
 (0.4098) (0.4086) (0.4011) (0.4059) 
Market-to-book -0.0183 -0.0026 -0.0207 -0.0010 
 (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0128) (0.0111) 
Domestic pretax income 0.9149 -0.1703 1.1126 0.1224 
 (1.0654) (0.9938) (1.0574) (0.9865) 
Foreign pretax income 4.9042 5.3097** 4.6983 5.2452** 
 (3.0286) (2.5215) (2.9666) (2.4810) 
Intangibles -1.6663*** -1.4558*** -1.6263*** -1.3745** 
 (0.5531) (0.5463) (0.5519) (0.5455) 
Multinational 0.8226*** 0.6874*** 0.8493*** 0.7176*** 
 (0.1997) (0.1932) (0.2045) (0.1971) 
Turnover -1.4571*** -1.2256** -1.2956** -1.0611* 
 (0.5403) (0.5630) (0.5425) (0.5664) 
Analysts following 0.0185 0.0042 0.0152 0.0034 
 (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0154) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0102 0.0129* -0.0011 0.0054 
 (0.0090) (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0085) 
Forecast diversity 0.0041 0.0140 0.0061 0.0151 
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0130) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0312* 0.0191 0.0398** 0.0250 
 (0.0178) (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0169) 
Big 5 auditor -0.1254 0.1369 -0.1358 0.0679 
 (0.3651) (0.3283) (0.3486) (0.3324) 
     
Observations 1,495 1,495 1,243 1,243 
Pseudo-R2 0.34 0.29 0.35 0.30 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 






Table 3.4. DID Probit: The Role of Tax Haven Operations 
Difference-in-differences regressions of geographic segment disclosure around the elimination 
of investing limits in iShares ETFs in 2003. The sample includes US publicly listed firms and 
covers the years 1998-2016. Treated is an indicator variable that equals one if a stock is held 
by an iShares exchange traded fund; and zero if it is held by an exchange traded fund other 
than iShares (i.e. Control). Post is an indicator variable that equals one in 2003 and after; and 
zero otherwise. Haven countries is an indicator equal to one if the majority of the countries in 
which a firm leads its operations are tax havens; and zero otherwise (Panel A). Haven 
subsidiaries is an indicator equal to one if the majority of foreign subsidiaries are domiciled in 
tax haven countries; and zero otherwise (Panel B). The analysis is led on a two-year event 
window before and after 2003. Treated firms are matched to the nearest neighbour control 
firms without replacement using propensity scores based on multiple (two-year) lagged 
covariates. Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * 





Panel A. Tax haven countries 
 Year 2003 included  Year 2003 excluded  















     
Treated × Post × Haven countries 4.9455*** 6.3503*** 5.3301*** 6.6321*** 
 (1.0495) (1.0721) (1.1041) (1.1015) 
Treated × Post -0.5988*** -0.6217*** -0.7216*** -0.7552*** 
 (0.1712) (0.1636) (0.2102) (0.1903) 
Treated × Haven countries -4.7764*** -4.5927*** -5.0536*** -4.9870*** 
 (0.9645) (0.9409) (1.0139) (0.9708) 
Treated 0.1463 0.2422 0.1891 0.2985 
 (0.2871) (0.2692) (0.2893) (0.2703) 
Post × Haven countries -3.6570*** -4.7738*** -3.9085*** -4.9596*** 
 (0.9673) (0.9021) (1.0030) (0.9076) 
Post -0.2682 -0.0358 -0.2176 0.0333 
 (0.2484) (0.2178) (0.2658) (0.2259) 
Haven countries 3.0953*** 3.0557*** 3.2199*** 3.2818*** 
 (0.7750) (0.6742) (0.8040) (0.6952) 
Hedge IO 6.4600*** 3.6129** 6.4475*** 3.4109* 
 (1.9174) (1.8378) (1.9548) (1.8672) 
Ln (market value) 0.5502*** 0.3781*** 0.5893*** 0.3663*** 
 (0.1158) (0.1094) (0.1147) (0.1090) 
Leverage -0.1133 -1.2506** -0.1437 -1.2468** 
 (0.5050) (0.4902) (0.4974) (0.5000) 
Market-to-book -0.0517** -0.0294 -0.0642*** -0.0335* 
 (0.0203) (0.0182) (0.0209) (0.0196) 
Domestic pretax income -0.5212 -0.8611 -0.6310 -0.5256 
 (1.1941) (1.0663) (1.1798) (1.0687) 
Foreign pretax income 5.7462* 6.7131** 6.5417* 7.2139*** 
 (3.3496) (2.8178) (3.3756) (2.7851) 
Intangibles -2.5349*** -1.7452*** -2.5451*** -1.6708*** 
 (0.6658) (0.6346) (0.6742) (0.6326) 
Multinational 0.6983*** 0.5966** 0.7675*** 0.6874*** 
 (0.2346) (0.2482) (0.2439) (0.2617) 
Turnover -1.7311** -1.5306** -1.5736** -1.4165** 
 (0.7175) (0.6772) (0.7102) (0.6724) 
Analysts following -0.0203 -0.0333* -0.0293* -0.0355* 
 (0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.0183) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0019 0.0103 -0.0056 0.0061 
 (0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0125) (0.0110) 
Forecast diversity -0.0035 0.0142 -0.0002 0.0147 
 (0.0184) (0.0167) (0.0187) (0.0169) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0265 0.0214 0.0334 0.0301 
 (0.0234) (0.0216) (0.0236) (0.0217) 
Big 5 auditor -0.3592 0.1723 -0.3690 0.1090 
 (0.4959) (0.4775) (0.4844) (0.4779) 
     
Observations 938 938 783 783 
Pseudo-R2 0.33 0.29 0.35 0.30 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Margins: Treated × Post × Haven 
countries 




Panel B. Tax haven subsidiaries 
 Year 2003 included  Year 2003 excluded  















     
Treated × Post × Haven subsidiaries 5.8215*** 1.5021** 6.2225*** 1.7781* 
 (0.7984) (0.7367) (0.9099) (0.9337) 
Treated × Post -0.6294*** -0.6250*** -0.7619*** -0.7659*** 
 (0.1748) (0.1676) (0.2125) (0.1958) 
Treated × Haven subsidiaries -5.5688*** -0.1999 -5.5375*** -0.2641 
 (0.8980) (1.0059) (0.9123) (1.0300) 
Treated 0.1556 0.2195 0.1927 0.2762 
 (0.2834) (0.2637) (0.2844) (0.2650) 
Post × Haven subsidiaries -5.3179*** -1.0737** -5.6849*** -1.4190** 
 (0.6384) (0.4342) (0.6681) (0.5913) 
Post -0.2854 -0.0717 -0.2170 0.0343 
 (0.2497) (0.2153) (0.2633) (0.2222) 
Haven subsidiaries 5.3644*** 0.2698 5.3803*** 0.3203 
 (0.4607) (0.6526) (0.4558) (0.6546) 
Hedge IO 6.7242*** 3.9595** 6.7106*** 3.6998* 
 (1.9183) (1.8693) (1.9703) (1.9103) 
Ln (market value) 0.5428*** 0.3755*** 0.5850*** 0.3644*** 
 (0.1141) (0.1074) (0.1134) (0.1073) 
Leverage -0.0357 -1.2060** -0.0643 -1.2035** 
 (0.5046) (0.4839) (0.4952) (0.4939) 
Market-to-book -0.0493** -0.0282 -0.0613*** -0.0322* 
 (0.0199) (0.0177) (0.0205) (0.0190) 
Domestic pretax income -0.7228 -1.0948 -0.8612 -0.7794 
 (1.1926) (1.0609) (1.1827) (1.0663) 
Foreign pretax income 6.0444* 7.0329** 6.9118** 7.5811*** 
 (3.3844) (2.7699) (3.4241) (2.7503) 
Intangibles -2.5616*** -1.8516*** -2.5904*** -1.7823*** 
 (0.6665) (0.6315) (0.6777) (0.6296) 
Multinational 0.7201*** 0.6321** 0.7877*** 0.7235*** 
 (0.2351) (0.2487) (0.2443) (0.2619) 
Turnover -1.6058** -1.4511** -1.4119** -1.3135* 
 (0.7207) (0.6808) (0.7108) (0.6754) 
Analysts following -0.0222 -0.0352* -0.0321* -0.0373** 
 (0.0170) (0.0182) (0.0167) (0.0184) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0019 0.0113 -0.0053 0.0075 
 (0.0109) (0.0096) (0.0124) (0.0107) 
Forecast diversity -0.0036 0.0124 0.0007 0.0144 
 (0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0170) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0265 0.0213 0.0327 0.0295 
 (0.0230) (0.0214) (0.0230) (0.0214) 
Big 5 auditor -0.3943 0.1517 -0.4060 0.0918 
 (0.5021) (0.4785) (0.4896) (0.4776) 
     
Observations 938 938 783 783 
Pseudo-R2 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.29 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Margins: Treated × Post × Haven 
countries 





Table 3.5. IV Probit: Indexed Ownership and Geographic Segment Disclosure 
Regressions of geographic segment disclosure on indexed ownership using longitudinal data 
on US non-financial and non-utility firms in the years 1998-2016. The dependent variable, 
Country disclosure, equals one if a firm reports the name of at least one foreign country in 
which it leads its operations and zero otherwise. Index IO represents the sum of the holdings 
by either 13F indexed institutions as flagged in Factset LionShares (Panel A) or S12 indexed 
mutual funds as reported in Thomson Reuters (Panel B) divided by the stock’s market 
capitalization. IV regressions use Russell 2000, Rank adjusted and Russell 2000 × Rank 
adjusted as instrumental variables for indexed ownership over ±300 ranks from the threshold. 
Bandwidth controls include Band and Band × Russell 2000t-1. Band indicates stocks that after 
the banding policy introduced by Russell in 2007 do not switch index despite a change in their 
market capitalization ranking and Russell 2000t-1 identifies stocks that Ire included in the index 
in the previous year. Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. All the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity 
and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical 





Panel A. 13F - Indexed Institutional Ownership 













     
Index IO -2.0680***  -13.2758*** -15.8126*** 
 (0.5429)  (4.7071) (4.4062) 
Hedge IO -0.3873 -0.0275 -1.6212** -1.3562** 
 (0.3392) (0.0196) (0.7037) (0.6707) 
Ln (market value) 0.1275*** 0.0038 -0.0667 -0.0023 
 (0.0233) (0.0024) (0.0909) (0.0831) 
Leverage 0.0474 0.0006 0.1397 -0.1521 
 (0.1233) (0.0067) (0.2875) (0.2547) 
Market-to-book -0.0057 -0.0002 -0.0030 -0.0008 
 (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.0098) (0.0085) 
Domestic pretax income -0.1616 0.0119 0.1625 -0.1041 
 (0.2920) (0.0156) (0.6395) (0.5913) 
Foreign pretax income 3.1517*** 0.0334 5.0905*** 6.2944*** 
 (0.7736) (0.0426) (1.6995) (1.5099) 
Intangibles -0.5462*** 0.0162* -0.0834 0.1634 
 (0.1599) (0.0088) (0.3410) (0.3124) 
Multinational 1.0046*** -0.0047 0.7429*** 0.4643*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0039) (0.2026) (0.1747) 
Turnover -0.4325** 0.0556*** 1.3844*** 1.5435*** 
 (0.1917) (0.0105) (0.3994) (0.3712) 
Analysts following -0.0087 0.0001 -0.0299*** -0.0329*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0003) (0.0100) (0.0099) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0117*** 0.0005*** 0.0183*** 0.0161*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0064) (0.0062) 
Forecast diversity 0.0047 0.0001 0.0061 0.0108 
 (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.0093) (0.0094) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0087* 0.0014*** 0.0341*** 0.0203 
 (0.0052) (0.0003) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Big 5 auditor -0.0533 0.0195** 0.6075* 0.6435** 
 (0.0820) (0.0094) (0.3522) (0.3273) 
Russell 2000  0.0046**   
  (0.0022)   
Rank adjusted  0.0000   
  (0.0000)   
Russell 2000×Rank adjusted  0.0000***   
  (0.0000)   
     
Observations 17,996 2,693 2,693 2,693 
Pseudo-R2 0.22 0.54 0.31 0.25 
First-stage F-statistics  17.80***   
Bandwidth ALL 300 300 300 
Banding controls NO YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 






Panel B. S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership 













     
Index IO -3.0509***  -21.6177*** -25.5968*** 
 (0.9048)  (7.7193) (7.0093) 
Hedge IO -0.2189 -0.0205* -1.6560** -1.4767** 
 (0.3413) (0.0108) (0.7013) (0.6690) 
Ln (market value) 0.1472*** -0.0014 -0.2082** -0.1498* 
 (0.0230) (0.0013) (0.0883) (0.0864) 
Leverage 0.0313 -0.0038 0.0304 -0.2593 
 (0.1262) (0.0037) (0.3122) (0.2704) 
Market-to-book -0.0058 -0.0001 -0.0044 -0.0007 
 (0.0041) (0.0001) (0.0106) (0.0092) 
Domestic pretax income -0.2001 0.0119 0.3107 -0.0186 
 (0.3032) (0.0085) (0.6669) (0.6131) 
Foreign pretax income 2.9867*** 0.0179 5.6732*** 6.9678*** 
 (0.7815) (0.0246) (1.7359) (1.5251) 
Intangibles -0.5646*** 0.0121*** -0.0271 0.1969 
 (0.1579) (0.0044) (0.3388) (0.3113) 
Multinational 1.0151*** -0.0027 0.7948*** 0.4864*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0019) (0.1839) (0.1652) 
Turnover -0.4131** 0.0263*** 1.1425*** 1.2926*** 
 (0.1875) (0.0055) (0.3830) (0.3586) 
Analysts following -0.0113** 0.0001 -0.0263*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0002) (0.0100) (0.0099) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0111*** 0.0002*** 0.0191*** 0.0137** 
 (0.0024) (0.0001) (0.0061) (0.0058) 
Forecast diversity 0.0024 0.0002 0.0061 0.0158* 
 (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.0097) (0.0091) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0064 0.0006*** 0.0291** 0.0138 
 (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0121) (0.0114) 
Big 5 auditor -0.0711 0.0071 0.5113 0.5301* 
 (0.0846) (0.0054) (0.3515) (0.3216) 
Russell 2000  0.0032***   
  (0.0011)   
Rank adjusted  0.0000***   
  (0.0000)   
Russell 2000×Rank adjusted  0.0000**   
  (0.0000)   
     
Observations 18,395 2,843 2,843 2,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.23 0.72 0.29 0.24 
First-stage F-statistics  26.43***   
Bandwidth ALL 300 300 300 
Banding controls NO YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 






Table 3.6. IV Probit: The Role of Tax Haven Operations 
Regressions of geographic segment disclosure on indexed ownership using longitudinal data 
on US non-financial and non-utility firms in the years 1998-2016. Index IO represents the sum 
of the holdings by either 13F indexed institutions as flagged in Factset LionShares or S12 
indexed mutual funds as reported in Thomson Reuters divided by the stock’s market 
capitalization. Russell 2000, Rank adjusted and Russell 2000 × Rank adjusted are instrumental 
variables for indexed ownership over ±300 ranks from the threshold. Haven countries is an 
indicator equal to one if the majority of the countries in which a firm leads its operations are 
tax havens; and zero otherwise (Panel A). Haven subsidiaries is an indicator equal to one if the 
majority of foreign subsidiaries are domiciled in tax haven countries; and zero otherwise (Panel 
B). Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters 






Panel A. 13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership 















     
Index IO -14.0326** -17.3276*** -14.1436** -16.9531*** 
 (6.0898) (5.7784) (6.0834) (5.7787) 
Haven countries -1.2437* -1.0206   
 (0.6814) (0.6971)   
Index IO × Haven countries 12.4698** 9.5749   
 (6.2590) (6.1581)   
Haven subsidiaries   -1.0418 -0.4361 
   (0.6682) (0.6404) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   11.6913** 6.5143 
   (5.9173) (5.5993) 
Hedge IO -1.1816* -1.4359** -1.1735* -1.4460** 
 (0.6511) (0.6166) (0.6540) (0.6174) 
Ln (market value) 0.1477 0.2599** 0.1493 0.2575** 
 (0.1223) (0.1062) (0.1221) (0.1060) 
Leverage 0.0723 -0.2332 0.0804 -0.2267 
 (0.1896) (0.1877) (0.1879) (0.1851) 
Market-to-book -0.0064 -0.0135 -0.0062 -0.0132 
 (0.0095) (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0086) 
Domestic pretax income -0.8722 -0.7268 -0.8665 -0.7224 
 (0.5366) (0.5280) (0.5378) (0.5293) 
Foreign pretax income 4.5564*** 6.0537*** 4.5222*** 6.0381*** 
 (1.2873) (1.2314) (1.2886) (1.2299) 
Intangibles -0.8110*** -0.4085** -0.7942*** -0.3931** 
 (0.1982) (0.1914) (0.1985) (0.1916) 
Multinational 0.6208*** 0.3176*** 0.6203*** 0.3294*** 
 (0.1194) (0.1206) (0.1223) (0.1217) 
Turnover 1.4329*** 1.7095*** 1.4349*** 1.6875*** 
 (0.4249) (0.4006) (0.4233) (0.3991) 
Analysts following -0.0464*** -0.0532*** -0.0463*** -0.0531*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0084) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0039 0.0099 0.0039 0.0096 
 (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0081) 
Forecast diversity -0.0140 -0.0073 -0.0144 -0.0074 
 (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0100) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0365** 0.0090 0.0373*** 0.0098 
 (0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0128) 
Big 5 auditor 0.6838*** 0.5514*** 0.6892*** 0.5592*** 
 (0.2047) (0.1835) (0.2041) (0.1825) 
     
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 
Pseudo-R2 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.16 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 




Panel B. S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership 















     
Index IO -13.5346* -16.9505** -14.0794* -16.6821** 
 (7.5813) (6.9132) (7.5523) (6.8668) 
Haven countries -0.4372 -0.4512   
 (0.4168) (0.4110)   
Index IO × Haven countries 14.8968* 9.4509   
 (8.7482) (7.7549)   
Haven subsidiaries   -0.5648 -0.2649 
   (0.4005) (0.3651) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   18.0703** 10.0275 
   (7.9156) (6.8849) 
Hedge IO -1.2831** -1.4659** -1.2613** -1.4401** 
 (0.6285) (0.5925) (0.6314) (0.5957) 
Ln (market value) -0.0471 0.0507 -0.0435 0.0533 
 (0.1176) (0.1073) (0.1176) (0.1075) 
Leverage -0.0328 -0.2850 -0.0276 -0.2868 
 (0.1811) (0.1786) (0.1804) (0.1768) 
Market-to-book -0.0091 -0.0127 -0.0091 -0.0126 
 (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0081) 
Domestic pretax income -0.9890* -0.9409* -0.9971** -0.9494* 
 (0.5058) (0.4904) (0.5072) (0.4917) 
Foreign pretax income 5.4072*** 6.8116*** 5.3370*** 6.8066*** 
 (1.2589) (1.1876) (1.2648) (1.1898) 
Intangibles -0.8046*** -0.4604** -0.7878*** -0.4432** 
 (0.1865) (0.1822) (0.1873) (0.1824) 
Multinational 0.6251*** 0.2853** 0.6200*** 0.2967*** 
 (0.1156) (0.1145) (0.1177) (0.1144) 
Turnover 0.9081** 1.1501*** 0.9034** 1.1241*** 
 (0.3571) (0.3265) (0.3585) (0.3271) 
Analysts following -0.0327*** -0.0386*** -0.0324*** -0.0384*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0077) 
Forecast accuracy 0.0029 0.0038 0.0030 0.0037 
 (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0081) (0.0070) 
Forecast diversity -0.0164* -0.0032 -0.0169* -0.0034 
 (0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0099) (0.0095) 
Discretionary smoothing 0.0243* -0.0019 0.0246* -0.0010 
 (0.0127) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0111) 
Big 5 auditor 0.5646*** 0.4430** 0.5792*** 0.4504** 
 (0.1989) (0.1785) (0.1984) (0.1788) 
     
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,839 1,839 
Pseudo-R2 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.15 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 






Table 3.7. Indexed Ownership, Corporate Governance and Geographic Segment Disclosure 
Regressions of geographic segment disclosure on indexed ownership using longitudinal data on US non-financial and non-utility firms in the years 1998-
2016. Index IO represents the sum of the holdings by either 13F indexed institutions as flagged in Factset LionShares or S12 indexed mutual funds as 
reported in Thomson Reuters divided by the stock’s market capitalization. Russell 2000, Rank adjusted and Russell 2000 × Rank adjusted are instrumental 
variables for indexed ownership over ±300 ranks from the threshold. Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. All the explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * 



























       
Panel A. 13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership       
Index IO -19.8936*** -24.8440*** -20.2798*** -27.5706*** -22.8068*** -27.9712*** 
 (5.4791) (5.4744) (5.5187) (5.5969) (8.3492) (7.7056) 
CEO-Chairman -0.6255* -0.3150     
 (0.3297) (0.3280)     
Index IO × CEO-Chairman 4.5885* 3.9237     
 (2.5496) (2.4737)     
CEO-President   -0.6772* -1.2355***   
   (0.4093) (0.4063)   
Index IO × CEO-President   5.1514* 8.0766***   
   (3.0451) (2.9842)   
E-index     -1.0114* -1.2584** 
     (0.5400) (0.5219) 
Index IO × E-index     6.7448* 8.0472** 
     (3.6162) (3.4181) 
       
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,519 1,613 1,613 
Pseudo-R2 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.28 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 






Panel B. S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership       
Index IO -25.2481*** -32.8544*** -25.5785*** -35.1229*** -23.8991*** -32.0047*** 
 (7.2980) (7.0224) (7.2861) (6.9625) (9.1155) (8.7133) 
CEO-Chairman -0.1550 -0.0942     
 (0.1871) (0.1894)     
Index IO × CEO-Chairman 2.4123 4.5253*     
 (2.7993) (2.7169)     
CEO-President   -0.1963 -0.6618***   
   (0.2173) (0.2232)   
Index IO × CEO-President   2.5653 6.8558**   
   (3.1421) (3.0632)   
E-index     -0.2058 -0.1780 
     (0.3015) (0.2954) 
Index IO × E-index     3.6155 1.8145 
     (3.9951) (3.7218) 
       
Observations 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,641 1,641 
Pseudo-R2 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.27 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 






Table 3.8. Indexed Ownership and Geographic Disclosure with Different Bandwidth 
RDD regressions to identify the effect of indexed ownership on firms’ geographic segment disclosure using longitudinal data on US non-financial and 
non-utility firms in the years 1998-2016. I estimate: 
Yit = α + βRussell 2000it
n + ∑ θnRank adjustedit
nN
n=1 + ∑ μnRussell 2000it
N
n=1 × Rank adjustedit
n + εit, 
where Yit equals one if a firm reports the name of at least one foreign country in which it leads its operations and zero otherwise. Russell 2000it is an 
indicator variable for firms in the Russell 2000 index and Rank adjustedit indicates, for each year, the distance from the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff centred 
at zero, with positive (negative) values associated with the Russell 2000 (1000) firms. β represents the bias-corrected RDD treatment coefficient estimated 
by fitting a local third-order polynomial estimate using a triangular kernel to the left and right hand sides of the Russell 1000/2000 threshold using the 
bias-correction methodology proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2015). Table A.3.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. 13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership 
















       
Russell 2000 -0.2292*** -0.2594*** -0.2606*** -0.2940*** -0.1599** -0.1941*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0794) (0.0966) (0.0933) (0.0668) (0.0645) 
       
Order of polynomial (N) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bandwidth 300 300 200 200 400 400 







Panel B. S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership 
















       
Russell 2000 -0.2042*** -0.0638 -0.2337** -0.0207 -0.1508** -0.0635 
 (0.0749) (0.0605) (0.0931) (0.0738) (0.0646) (0.0526) 
       
Order of polynomial (N) 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bandwidth 300 300 200 200 400 400 




Table 3.9. The Role of Tax Haven Operations with Different Bandwidth 
Regressions of geographic segment disclosure on indexed ownership using longitudinal data 
on US non-financial and non-utility firms in the years 1998-2016. Index IO represents the sum 
of the holdings by either 13F indexed institutions as flagged in Factset LionShares or S12 
indexed mutual funds as reported in Thomson Reuters divided by the stock’s market 
capitalization. Russell 2000, Rank adjusted and Russell 2000 × Rank adjusted are instrumental 
variables for indexed ownership over ±200 and ±400 ranks from the threshold. Table A.3.1 
in the Appendix reports variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in 
parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A. Bandwidth: ±200 















13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership     
Index IO -17.8916** -17.9733*** -18.4248** -18.0366*** 
 (7.6195) (6.9710) (7.6278) (6.9558) 
Haven countries -1.6723** -0.6496   
 (0.7589) (0.7811)   
Index IO × Haven countries 16.2065** 7.4397   
 (6.8646) (6.6500)   
Haven subsidiaries   -1.9083*** -0.5357 
   (0.7080) (0.7450) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   18.7919*** 7.9582 
   (6.5941) (6.3209) 
     
Observations 1,096 1,096 1,096 1,096 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
 
S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership     
Index IO -19.4290** -16.8788** -20.6483** -17.0253** 
 (9.3076) (8.4446) (9.3054) (8.4028) 
Haven countries -0.7295 -0.4749   
 (0.4894) (0.4687)   
Index IO × Haven countries 21.3452** 12.3234   
 (10.1582) (8.4576)   
Haven subsidiaries   -1.1669** -0.5255 
   (0.4755) (0.4568) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   28.1390*** 15.7718* 
   (9.3064) (8.1932) 
     
Observations 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 






Panel B. Bandwidth: ±400 















13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership     
Index IO -4.3482 -11.8762** -4.4374 -11.6119** 
 (5.4201) (5.0194) (5.4201) (5.0227) 
Haven countries -1.1707* -1.1714*   
 (0.6152) (0.6210)   
Index IO × Haven countries 12.2197** 12.0058**   
 (5.7234) (5.2788)   
Haven subsidiaries   -0.7589 -0.4658 
   (0.6532) (0.5900) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   9.6260 7.3974 
   (5.9308) (5.1310) 
     
Observations 2,255 2,255 2,255 2,255 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
 
S12 – Indexed Mutual Fund Ownership     
Index IO -6.8090 -13.8460** -7.1210 -13.5938** 
 (6.8479) (6.0325) (6.8332) (6.0130) 
Haven countries -0.3844 -0.4097   
 (0.3555) (0.3492)   
Index IO × Haven countries 14.9223* 11.9538*   
 (7.7747) (6.2242)   
Haven subsidiaries   -0.1960 -0.0010 
   (0.3727) (0.3239) 
Index IO × Haven subsidiaries   12.1998 7.2448 
   (7.7102) (6.1085) 
     
Observations 2,413 2,413 2,413 2,413 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Banding controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 










Figure 3.1. Country-level Geographic Disclosure over Time 
Panel A shows the number of firms per year reporting their operation at country-level 
disclosure. Panel B shows the percentage of firms reporting their operation at country-level 
relative to the total number of firms adopting geographic segment disclosure. Both graphs are 
plotted over time. 
Panel A. Country-level Disclosure Firms: Count Data per Year 
 
 







Figure 3.2. Indexed Ownership over Time 
Panel A shows the time-trend of indexed 13F institutional ownership. Panel B shows the time-
trend of indexed S12 mutual fund ownership. In both graphs, values are year-averages. 
Panel A. 13F – Indexed Institutional Ownership 
 
 






Figure 3.3. ETF Ownership around the Elimination of iShares ETFs’ 
Investing Limits 
 
Annual-average iShares ETF ownership (green-top line) and other ETF ownership (orange-
bottom line) over time. The sample only includes treated and control firms in the period of 








Figure 3.4. Indexed Ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 Cut-Off Point 
Indexed ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 reconstitution threshold for the years 1998-
2016. The x-axis represents the distance from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold using end-of-
May’s market capitalization rankings adjusted for actual inclusions (and exclusion) of stocks at 
the end of June (reconstitution date) and restricted to the bandwidth of the ±300 stocks 
around the threshold. Each dot in the figure represents the local sample mean using 10 non-
overlapping evenly-spaced bins on each side of the cutoff following the approach illustrated 
by Calonico et al. (2015). 
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Tax avoidance and labour investments 
4.1 Introduction and motivation 
How does tax avoidance affect firms’ labour investments? The importance of this 
question stems from the extensive use of tax incentives and tax breaks by policy-
makers to stimulate growth and employment30 and by the specific claims made by firms 
engaging in tax avoidance about their role in creating jobs and fostering local economic 
activity31. Using a sample of 3,062 U.S. firms over the years 1992-2017, I examine the 
effect of corporate tax avoidance, which encompasses statutory tax rates, incentives, 
complexities and enforcements of tax systems and firms’ tax planning preferences, on 
firms’ hiring policies. 
Labour is an important factor of production which requires significant investments 
by firms32. Yet, there is substantial variation in net hiring across U.S. companies. Part 
of this variation can be anticipated by changes in firms’ underlying economic 
fundamentals (such as sales growth, profitability, liquidity and financial constraints) 
and industry-level employment rates and is therefore expected. In chapter 4, I 
investigate whether abnormal variations in labour investments relative to expected 
levels can be explained by firms’ low cash effective tax rates (Low Cash ETR), my 
proxy for corporate tax avoidance. 
From a theoretical standpoint, risks and uncertainties associated with tax avoidance 
can generate an important friction in firms’ investment opportunities (or real options) 
                                                          
30 For example, Mattera,Cafcas, McIlvaine, Seifter, and Tarczynska (2011) calculates that the 238 most 
significant state subsidy programs in force in the U.S. in 2011 (which include job creation income tax 
credits, cash grants, low cost forgivable loans, enterprise zones, reimbursement for worker training 
expenses and other types of company-specific assistance) cost taxpayers more than $11bn per year.  
31 For example, in an article bringing up how little taxes Amazon.com Inc. pays in Europe, a spokesman 
tells the Financial Times (2017): “Amazon pays all the taxes that are required in every country where we 
operate […] We operate a pan-European business from our headquarters in Luxembourg where we 
have over 1,500 employees and growing, including our senior leadership team. We’ve invested over 
€20bn in Europe since 2010, and expect to hire 15,000 new employees this year, bringing our total 
permanent European workforce to over 65,000 people.” 
32 As noticed by Jung, Lee, and Weber (2014), labor costs in the manufacturing sector were about $784bn 




that can make firms more cautious when investing. Firms avoiding taxes are exposed 
to potential reductions of cash flow and investor wealth if, following an investigation, 
tax authorities rule the firm’s tax strategy abusive. For example, tax authorities can 
enforce penalties, additional payments of taxes and interests33 and firms may also 
experience reputational loss due to increased public scrutiny (sometimes referred to as 
“tax shaming”). 
Empirical evidence suggests that tax risks impact firms’ overall risk (Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011; Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams 2017) 
and that firms take action to reduce tax risks (Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde 2016). 
Similarly, tax avoidance can also generate tax uncertainty (proxied by additions to the 
unrecognised tax benefit (UTB) reserve) (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2019) and 
firms are found to increase their cash balances as a way to hedge themselves from 
future tax payments (Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra 2017). 
A number of studies in the real option literature provide evidence that firms 
withhold investments in presence of uncertainty (“wait and see” strategy (Bloom, 
Bond, and Van Reenen 2007)) and Dixit (1997) shows that a similar pattern also applies 
to labour investments34. Investments in human capital matter for firms' retaining 
policies because the adjustment costs of labour are arguably high. For example firms 
incur the costs of searching, selecting, hiring, training and possibly firing (Bentolila and 
Bertola 1990; Dixit 1997) and these costs increase with higher job-specific skills 
(Ghaly, Anh Dang, and Stathopoulos 2017). 
Tax avoidance is a substantial source of uncertainty to firms’ labour investments 
for several reasons. First, tax savings from tax avoidance are generally large. For 
example, Wilson (2009) estimates federal tax savings for the average tax shelter 
transaction to be of about $375.5m and, globally and the OECD (2013) calculates the 
loss from corporate tax revenues attributable to tax evasion and tax avoidance in the 
range of $100bn and $240bn per year. Uncertainty about future payments of unpaid 
taxes, interests and penalties can arguably lead firms to withhold their investments and 
especially those in human capital given their relatively high adjustment costs. 
                                                          
33 For example, the European Union requires payments for previously unpaid taxes of €13bn from 
Apple Inc. and €250m from Amazon.com Inc. (The Guardian 2016). 




Second, uncertainty concerning tax avoidance likely extends over multiple years and 
can generate extra-costs (for example legal costs) that distract resources otherwise 
available for other investments35. Third, tax risks and uncertainty increase if domestic 
and foreign policy-makers and tax authorities implement sudden changes to tax and 
disclosure legislations. For example, the growing international tax co-operation 
between countries can enhance transparency and raise significant risks and 
uncertainties to firms engaging in tax avoidance (OECD 2013). This has in turn 
potential implications for firms’ investments, especially those subject to high 
adjustment cost, such as human capital. 
Fourth, tax uncertainty can also stem from news specifically targeting firms 
engaging in tax avoidance. Empirical evidence from stock market returns show that 
stock price declines following the public revelation of firms engaging in tax sheltering 
activities (Kim et al. 2011), especially for firms in the retail sector (Hanlon and Slemrod 
2009); thereby pointing to a reputational interpretation of tax avoidance. Consistent 
with this argument, Dyreng et al. (2016) find that firms’ tax and disclosure strategies 
respond to public pressure and a survey led by Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 
(2014) shows that a large majority of tax executives in their sample (69%) rank 
reputational concerns as an important factor deterring firms from avoiding taxes. 
All the arguments above suggest that firms are likely to respond to increased 
uncertainty and risks from tax avoidance by withholding their investments and more 
specifically their labour demand. Therefore, I posit that firms with low cash effective 
tax rates (Low Cash ETR) undertake sub-optimal labour investments with respect to 
the level expected based on the firms’ economic fundamentals and industry medians. 
I lead my analysis on a sample of 3,062 publicly listed U.S. firms over the years 
1992-2017. Following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung, Lee, and Weber (2014), I 
compute an inverse measure of labour efficiency as the absolute value of the difference 
between a firm’s net hiring and its expected level. The expected labour investment is 
based on a model of firms’ change in hiring policies as a function of sales growth, 
profitability, liquidity and leverage developed by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). This 
variable, therefore, captures changes in firms’ hiring policies that cannot be explained 
by the firms’ underlying economic fundamentals. In supplemental analysis, I replace 
                                                          
35 For instance, in 2017 the European Union asked Apple Inc. to pay previously unpaid taxes for the 




the expected level of hiring with the industry-median net hiring and average net hiring 
in the previous three years. These variables, therefore, capture deviations of firms’ 
changes in hiring policies from industry and prior years’ human capital investments. 
I find that firms with Low Cash ETR in the current year increase abnormal 
investments in net hiring in the following year. However, my results provide evidence 
that the effect is driven by a sub-sample of firms with net hiring below the expected 
level, which suggests that firms engaging in more aggressive tax avoidance also under-
invest in labour force. I also present evidence that the positive relation between tax 
avoidance and sub-optimal labour investment is stronger for firms that are more 
exposed to tax risks and uncertainties as proxied by the volatility of firms’ cash 
effective tax rates (Cash ETR) over a period of five years and additions to the 
unrecognised tax benefit (UTB) reserve, respectively. 
One source of concern with a causal interpretation of the effect of corporate tax 
policies on labour investments is that results can be biased because of the potential 
endogeneity that such a relation may entail. For example, firms’ net hiring choices may 
reflect firm-specific characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher and that can 
also affect tax avoidance ability and opportunities. To address this issue, I run my 
analysis including several control variables in addition to industry and year fixed 
effects.  
Another source of concern is reverse causality. That is, labour investment decisions 
may affect tax avoidance opportunities available to firms, for example, by providing 
access to governmental grants and tax credits. I address this concern by regressing 
current abnormal net hiring values on prior-year corporate tax avoidance and by 
exploiting a plausibly exogenous source of variation in U.S. firms’ tax avoidance in a 
quasi-natural experiment setting, where firms in the control group are selected using 
propensity score matching (PSM). 
I find a positive and significant association between Low Cash ETR and firms’ 
investments in human capital in the whole sample of U.S. publicly listed firms between 
the years 1992 and 2017. However, after breaking down the sample into firms with net 
hiring above (over-investment) and below (under-investment) the level justified by 
their underlying economic fundamentals, I find that the effect of tax avoidance on 
labour is asymmetric: it is statistically insignificant for firms over-investing in labour 




Overall, this result suggests that firms with Low Cash ETR increase sub-optimal hiring 
policies, by choosing a level of net hiring that is below the one expected based firms’ 
fundamentals and industry medians. 
To provide a causal support to my findings, I then exploit Ireland’s statutory 
corporate tax cut occurred in December 1997 using a difference-in-differences design. 
For this test, my treatment group consists of U.S. multinationals with operations in 
Ireland before and during the phased reduction of the statutory tax rate that began in 
December 1997, whereas my control group includes U.S. multinationals with foreign 
operations in countries other than Ireland. Firms in the control group represent the 
best match (nearest neighbour with replacement) to firms in the treatment group based 
on several lagged (two-year lag) covariates (Cash ETR, Market-to-book, Size, PP&E, 
Global pre-tax income and Foreign-only pre-tax income) and industry fixed effects. 
Overall, results from this tests are consistent with my main findings, in that, following 
the reduction in Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate, firms with Irish operations 
withhold their investments in human capital compared to firms without Irish 
operations. 
Next, I examine whether firms exposed to greater tax risks and uncertainties are 
associated with abnormal net hiring. The rationale of this test lays in the precautionary 
motives that can lead firms to choose a level of net hiring below the expected level 
(Bloom et al. 2007). I first examine a sub-sample of firms with high tax risk (proxied 
by a five-year volatility of Cash ETR above the sample median) and find that the effect 
on abnormal net hiring is stronger for this group of firms. Second, I use firms’ 
uncertain tax positions (proxied by UTB above the sample median) to investigate 
whether firms with higher tax uncertainty undertake abnormal labour investments. 
Consistent with my prediction, I find that firms exposed to tax uncertainties choose a 
level of net hiring that deviates from the expected level based on firms’ fundamentals. 
Finally, I examine whether the effect of tax avoidance is mitigated by higher labour 
adjustment costs. Consistent with the view of labour costs affecting firms’ decision-
making, Ghaly et al. (2017) find that firms hold larger cash balances as a precautionary 
measure against possible future volatility in the supply of skilled workers. To test 
whether labour costs influence my results, I divide the sample between firms operating 




with lower demand of skilled human capital36. I find that the effect of tax avoidance 
on abnormal net hiring is positive and significant only in the sub-sample of firms 
under-investing in labour force. In contrast, the effect is statistically insignificant for 
firms exhibiting labour investments above the expected level based on their economic 
fundamentals. Overall, these results lend support to the view of labour’s large 
adjustment costs playing an important role in the effect of tax avoidance on firms’ sub-
optimal hiring policies.  
Chapter 4 connects several strands of the literature. The first focuses on tax risk 
and uncertainty. One potential consequence of firms avoiding taxes is the risk of 
incurring additional payments of greater taxes, interests and penalties and potential 
reputational loss if the tax strategy is later ruled improper, resulting in reduced cash 
flow and investor wealth. Empirical evidence suggests that tax risks can impact firms’ 
overall risk (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Kim et al. 2011; Guenther et al. 2017) and that 
firms take action to reduce tax risks (Dyreng et al. 2016). Tax avoidance can also 
generate tax uncertainty (Dyreng et al. 2019) and firms are found to increase their cash 
balances as a way hedge themselves from future tax payments (Hanlon et al. 2017). 
Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by presenting evidence that tax risks and 
uncertainties can affect firms’ resource allocation by leading firms to make sub-optimal 
hiring decisions. 
The second strand of the literature focuses on the effect of uncertainty on real 
options. Prior studies suggest that in the presence of uncertainty firms are less likely 
to undertake costly investments or disinvestments (i.e. inaction) (Dixit and Pindyck 
1995; Bloom et al. 2007; Trigeorgis and Reuer 2017) and that uncertainty affects labour 
policies by leading firms to minimize costly adjustments due to hiring and firing (i.e. 
retention policies) (Oi 1962; Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Dixit 1997; Banker, Byzalov, 
and Chen 2013; Ghaly et al. 2017). Chapter 4 adds to this strand of research by studying 
tax avoidance as a source of uncertainty and by providing evidence that tax avoidance 
affects firms’ labour policies leading to sub-optimal hiring decisions relative to the 
expected level based on firms’ fundamentals and industry medians. 
                                                          
36 Following Ghaly et al. (2017), I compute High skill as an indicator variable that equals one if the 





The third strand of literature focuses on the consequences of tax avoidance for 
corporate stakeholders. Overall, evidence from this area of research are consistent with 
the view of tax avoidance affecting different capital providers asymmetrically; with 
equity holders sharing the benefits of greater tax savings (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; 
Wilson 2009; Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin 2016; Rego, Williams, and Wilson 2017)37 
whereas debt holders being exposed to the risks, but not sharing the benefits, of firms’ 
more aggressive tax strategies (Shevlin, Urcan, and Vasvari 2013; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and 
Zhang 2014). Chapter 4 extends this literature by focusing on an important class of 
corporate stakeholders - firms’ workers and employees - and by presenting evidence 
that tax avoidance, involving the risks of future additional tax payments, penalties and 
reputational loss, leads firms to make sub-optimal labour investment decisions. 
Finally, chapter 4 uses a similar setting as prior research on labour investment 
efficiency but asks a substantially different research question. More specifically, while 
Jung et al. (2014), Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016) and Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos 
(2015) study whether information quality and shareholder monitoring affect a firm’s 
labour investment that is justified by the firm’s economic fundamentals, chapter 4 
investigates whether firms exposed to higher tax risks and uncertainties make sub-
optimal hiring decisions. To isolate the effect of tax avoidance from information 
quality and shareholder monitoring, I control for institutional ownership and include 
a measure of accounting quality in supplemental analysis. Overall, results are largely 
unaffected by these additions, consistent with a tax interpretation of my results. 
Findings of chapter 4 can also have important policy implications. First, by showing 
that tax avoidance reduces firms’ investments into labour, my findings can be relevant 
to regulators, legislators and other corporate stakeholders when designing incentive 
mechanisms to foster employment. On this spirit, chapter 4 contributes to Ljungqvist 
and Smolyansky (2016) who find no association between state corporate tax cuts and 
increases in employment in the U.S. and to Shevlin, Shivakumar, and Urcan (2018) 
who find a positive association between an tax avoidance and employment in a multi-
                                                          
37 Within this literature, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Wilson (2009) find that tax avoidance is 
positively associated with firm value in firms with shareholder-centric corporate governance and Hanlon 
and Slemrod (2009), Kim et al. (2011) and Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) present evidence 
of a negative stock market reaction to the news of a firm’s involvement in tax sheltering activities. More 
specifically, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that the negative market reaction is stronger for firms in 
the retail sector, suggesting reputational costs associated with aggressive tax avoidance, whereas 
Gallemore et al. (2014) provide evidence that the decline in abnormal returns that follows the public 




country study by showing that, at least for a sub-set of firms with opportunities to 
avoid taxes, tax avoidance leads firms to make sub-optimal hiring decisions relative to 
the hiring level justified by firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and industry 
medians. 
Second, my finding that contractions in labour demand are stronger for firms with 
greater tax risks and uncertainty can be informative to legislators and other policy-
makers when designing tax incentives to labour. Consistent with Dixit and Pindyck 
(1995), Dixit (1997) and Bloom et al. (2007), results of chapter 4 also suggest that fiscal 
stimuli to labour may be less effective in presence of tax risks and uncertainty. 
Moreover, my findings can be informative to legislators and to labour unions when 
contracting stricter employment protection mechanisms and wage increases (Bentolila 
and Bertola 1990; Banker et al. 2013; Hassett and Mathur 2015) and can provide an 
additional explanation to the fall of the labour share of GDP investigated by Autor, 
Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2017). The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows: section 4.2 presents my data and research design, section 4.3 
shows and discusses my findings and section 4.4 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and research design 
Using a sample that encompasses 3,062 publicly listed U.S. firms over the years 
1992-2017, this study investigates the effect of tax avoidance on firms’ labour 
investments. I start the sample in 1992 to allow enough years in the pre-treatment 
period of Ireland’s statutory corporate tax cut occurred in December 1997 through 
January 2003. Overall, the final sample includes 21,971 firm-year observations. 
I collect the data about labour investment and tax avoidance from Compustat. 
Starting from the whole population of firms in the database over the years 1992-2017, 
I remove utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial services firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999) as these firms are subject to different regulations. Moreover, I drop all firms 
with negative pre-tax income and missing data in any dependent, explanatory or 
control variable. By construction, I require each firm in the sample to report the 
relevant financial information for at least three subsequent years. Finally, I winsorize 
all variables at 1% level to mitigate the influence of extreme values on the analysis. 





4.2.1 Labour investment variables 
The level of labour investments undertaken by firms is, for each year, the absolute 
value of a firm’s abnormal net hiring activity relative to the expected change in labour 
force based on the firm’s underlying economic fundamentals (|Abnormal net hire|). 
Conceptually, deviations from expected levels of hiring indicate sub-optimal labour 
investments undertaken by firms (abnormal net hiring = actual net hiring - expected 
net hiring). In this study, I examine whether firms’ tax aggressiveness leads to sub-
optimal investment decisions in human capital.  
Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) estimate for each firm-year the expected level of net hiring 
by regressing the percentage change in a firm’s labour force on a number of variables 
capturing the firm’s economic fundamentals (such as sales growth, profitability, size, 
liquidity and leverage). Similar to Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), I estimate Model (1) using 
the following equation: 
 
Net hireit = α0 + α1Sales growthit−1 + α2Sales growthit + α3∆ROAit
+ α4∆ROAit−1 + α5ROAit + α6Returnit + α7Size_rit−1
+ α8Quick ratioit−1 + α9∆Quick ratioit−1
+ α10∆Quick ratioit + α11Leverageit−1
+ α12Loss bin1it−1 + α13Loss bin2it−1
+ α14Loss bin3it−1 + α15Loss bin4it−1









where Net hire is the percentage change in employees for firm i at the end of year t, 
Sales growth is the percentage change in revenues from sales, ROA is net income 
divided by total assets at the beginning of the year, Return is the annual stock return, 
Size_r is the percentile rank of the natural logarithm of market value at the beginning 
of the year, Quick ratio is the sum of cash, short term investments and receivables 
divided by current liabilities, Leverage is long term debt divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year and Loss bin variables indicate 0.005 loss intervals between -




Descriptive statistics in panel A of Table 4.1 report a mean (median) Net hire of 
8% (2%) in Model (1), indicating that labour force increased on average in the sample 
of U.S. firms between 1992 and 2017. Net hire is -5% in the 25th percentile and 13% 
in the 75th percentile. Sample averages show a positive Sales growth (18%) and stock 
Return (1%) but a negative return on assets (ROA) (-5%) during the period. Finally, 
on average Quick ratio is 2.07 and Leverage is 24%.  
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the results of Model (1). Coefficient estimates show 
that Net hire is positively associated with sale growth (Sales growthit-1 and Sales 
growthit), profitability (ROAit), stock return (Returnit), firm size (Sizeit-1) and liquidity 
(Quickit-1 and ΔQuickit-1). In contrast, changes in profitability (ΔROAit and ΔROAit-1), 
current liquidity (ΔQuick ratioit), leverage (Leverageit-1) and small reported losses (Loss 
bin variables) are negatively associated with Net hire. Overall, these estimates are 
consistent with those reported by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and Jung, Lee, and Weber 
(2014), thus giving additional support to my analysis. 
The residual estimate from Model (1) provides a measure of labour investment that 
captures deviations from the expected level of hiring based on firms’ economic 
characteristics. My main labour investment variable (|Abnormal net hire|) is, then, the 
absolute value of the residual from Model (1). Descriptive statistics in panel A of Table 
4.2 report an average (median) |Abnormal net hire| of 0.13 (0.07), which is also 
consistent with the average (median) value for this variable found by (Jung et al. 2014). 
Figure 4.1 shows the time trend of Net hire (blue line in the middle) and |Abnormal 
net hire| broken down into its two components: a firm’s net hiring above its expected 
level (red line at the top) and a firm’s net hiring below its expected level (green line at 
the bottom). 
In supplemental analyses, I replace the expected level of net hiring using the 
industry median net hiring (|Abnormal ind. adj. net hire|) and firms’ average net hiring 
in the previous three years (|Abnormal av. net hire|). Therefore, unlike |Abnormal 
net hire| which reflects deviations from expected levels of hiring based on firms’ own 
economic characteristics, |Abnormal ind. adj. net hire| and |Abnormal av. net hire| 
capture deviations from the median labour force employed in the industry and 






4.2.2 Tax avoidance variables 
I use Low Cash ETR as my primary measure of tax avoidance. Low Cash ETR is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the Cash ETR of a firm (computed as Income 
taxes paid / (Pre-tax income – Special items)) is in the first quartile (or twenty-fifth 
percentile) of the Cash ETR distribution. Panel B of Table 4.2 shows that firm-year 
observations in the first quartile have a mean (median) Cash ETR equal to 0.04 (0.03) 
with a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 0.10. In contrast, Cash ETR 
is on average (median) equal to 0.16 (0.17), 0.27 (0.27) and 0.48 (0.41) for firm-year 
observations in the second, third and fourth quartile, respectively. Overall, panel B of 
Table 4.2 indicates that firms in the first quartile of the Cash ETR distribution engage 
in more aggressive tax avoidance as they pay a smaller amount of taxes relative to other 
firms.  
I use Cash ETR for my main analysis because effective tax rates are easy to compute 
and easily observable by corporate shareholders and other stakeholders, such as 
employees, trade unions and media (Chyz et al. 2013). By construction, Cash ETR 
capture all firms engaging in non-conforming (but not conforming) tax avoidance 
activities and strategies that lead to a reduction of corporate tax payments. Relative to 
GAAP ETR (computed as Total income taxes / (Pre-tax income – Special items), Cash 
ETR reflects also tax deferral strategies aimed at postponing current tax payments to 
future fiscal periods as well as current payments of taxes due in previous periods 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
Panel C of Table 4.2 reports the distribution of firms with Low Cash ETR by 
industry using the Fama-French 48 industry classification. The largest number of firms 
with Low Cash ETR in my sample operate in the Electronic Equipment sector (925 
firm-year observations), followed by the Business Services (867 observations) and 
Computers (496 observations) sectors. In line with anecdotal evidence and prior 
studies (for example, Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013)), firms operating in these 
industries have larger opportunities to avoid taxes by taking advantage of intangible 
assets, R&D expenses and their likely global supply chain. Finally, panel C shows that 
firms with the lowest average Cash ETR operate in the Precious Metal (0.01) and 





4.2.3 Control variables 
I include a number of control variables that previous studies have found to affect 
tax avoidance and labour investments. The first set of variables of Model (2) helps 
separate the effect of tax avoidance on firms’ hiring policies from other firm-specific 
characteristics (Size and Leverage). For example, while large firms are potentially 
subject to higher tax payments, leveraged firms can benefit from tax deductions of 
their interest expenses. Controlling for these factors appears particularly important 
because large firms are often also among the largest employers whereas firms 
experiencing financial distress are traditionally associated with large layoffs (Manzon 
and Plesko 2002; Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Berk, Stanton, and Zechner 2010).   
The second set of variables controls for factors that can affect firms’ investments 
in general, such as growth opportunities (Market-to-book), liquidity (Quick ratio), 
dividend payout policies (Dividend), cash flow and sales volatilities (CFO volatility and 
Sales volatility), and tangible capital (PP&E) (McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle, 
Hilary, and Verdi 2009; Jung et al. 2014). In addition, because firms’ investments can 
reflect managerial empire building behaviour, I also control for differences in 
shareholders’ monitoring on corporate management across firms (Institutional 
ownership) (Chen, Harford, and Li 2007; Hall 2016; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and 
Ljungqvist 2015; Ghaly et al. 2015). 
The third set of control variables can directly affect firms’ labour investments. 
Namely, these variables are Labour intensity, Net hire volatility and the percentage of 
union membership per industry (Unionized labour) (Chyz et al. 2013; Bova 2013; Jung 
et al. 2014). Finally, to control for the effect of other (non-labour) investment decisions 
on firms’ labour policies, Model (2) includes the variable |Abnormal other 
investment| computed as the absolute value of the residual of the following model: 
Other investment = β0 + β1Sale growthit-1 + εit, where Other investment is the sum of 
capital, acquisition and R&D expenses minus cash receipts from the sale of PP&E 
divided by one-year lag total assets (Jung et al. 2014). As a result, I estimate Model (2) 






= β0 + β1Low Cash ETRit−1
+ β2Market − to − bookit−1 + β3Sizeit−1
+ β4Quick ratioit−1 + β5Leverageit−1 + β6Dividendit−1
+ β7CFO volatilityit−1 + β8Sales volatilityit−1
+ β9PP&Eit−1 + β11Insitutional ownershipit−1
+ β12Net hire volatilityit−1 + β13Labor intensityit−1
+ β14Unionized laborit−1
+ β15|Abnormal other investment|it−1 + βjIndustry FE













where Market-to-book is the ratio market to book value of common equity at the 
beginning of the year, Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year, Dividend is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm pays 
dividends in the previous year and zero otherwise, CFO volatility is the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations over the years t-5 to t-1, Sales volatility is the 
standard deviation of revenues from sales over the years t-5 to t-1, PP&E is property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets, Institutional ownership is for each firm-
year the sum of the holdings of institutional investors divided by the firm market 
capitalization in the previous year, Net hire volatility is the standard deviation of the 
percentage change in employees over the years t-5 to t-1, Labour intensity is number 
of employees divided by total assets at the beginning of the year, Unionized labour is 
the industry-level rate of labour unionization in the previous year and |Abnormal 
other investment| is the absolute value of the residual from the following model: 
Other investment = β0 + β1Sale growthit-1 + εit, and all other variables are as previously 
defined and described in Table A.4.1. All explanatory and control variables are lagged 
by one year to mitigate simultaneous causality concerns and panel A of Table 4.2 









4.3.1 Univariate and multivariate results 
Table 4.3 reports pairwise correlation coefficients. |Abnormal net hire| is 
positively correlated with Low Cash ETR, suggesting that firms engaging in more 
aggressive tax avoidance undertake sub-optimal labour investments. Similarly, firms 
experiencing growth (for example proxied by Market-to-book and |Abnormal other 
investment|) and uncertainties (for example proxied by CFO volatility, Sale volatility 
and Net hire volatility) are positively associated with |Abnormal net hire|. In contrast, 
larger (Size), leveraged (Leverage) and dividend paying firms (Dividend) are negatively 
associated with |Abnormal net hire|. 
Table 4.4 reports the results of Model (2). Consistent with univariate findings, the 
coefficient estimates on Low Cash ETR in column 1 is positive and significant 
(0.0079), which suggests that firms engaging in tax avoidance undertake sub-optimal 
labour investments. Moreover, |Abnormal net hire| is positively associated with firms 
experiencing growth (Market-to-book and |Abnormal other investment|) and 
uncertainties (Quick ratio, CFO volatility, Sales volatility and Labour volatility). In 
contrast, abnormal hiring is negatively associated with Size, Leverage, Dividend, 
Labour intensity and Unionized labour. 
Column 2 presents the results of Model (2) on a sub-sample of firms with net hiring 
above its expected level based on firms’ fundamentals (over-investment). The 
coefficient estimate on Low Cash ETR is statistically insignificant, which means that 
over-investments in human capital are unrelated to tax avoidance. To mitigate the 
effect of small changes in labour demand, I further divide the over-investment sub-
sample between small and large abnormal net hiring based on the median net hiring. 
In column 3, the dependent variable |Larger abnormal net hire| represents over-
investment in labour above the median. Consistent with column 2, results in column 
3 show a statistically insignificant coefficient on Low Cash ETR on a sample of firms 
whose hiring policies are largely more generous than the level justified by the firms’ 
underlying economic fundamentals.  
In contrast with these results, column 4 presents a positive and significant 
coefficient (0.0055) on Low Cash ETR when the sub-sample consists of firms with 




fewer taxes in the current year under-invest in human capital in the following year. 
Similarly, focusing exclusively on larger reductions in labour investments (under-
investment below the median), results in column 5 suggest that tax avoidance is 
positively associated with lower hiring policies relative to the level justified by firms’ 
economic fundamentals (0.0097). Overall, columns 2-5 provide evidence that 
corporate tax avoidance has an asymmetric effect on firms’ labour investments: it 
affects sub-optimal investments towards a lower level of hiring, whereas it is unrelated 
to over-hiring. 
Table 4.5 presents the results of Model (2) after breaking down over-investment 
into over-hiring (positive expected net hiring) and under-firing (negative expected net 
hiring), and under-investment into under-hiring (positive expected net hiring) and 
over-firing (negative expected net hiring) (Jung et al. 2014). Columns 1 and 2 report 
statistically insignificant coefficients on Low Cash ETR, meaning that tax avoidance is 
unrelated to firms’ over-hiring and under-firing policies relative to the expected labour 
investment based on their economic fundamentals. In contrast, the coefficient 
estimate on Low Cash ETR in column 3 is positive and significant. Consistent with 
my research hypothesis, this result suggests that firms engaging in tax avoidance 
withhold their investments in human capital; thereby resulting in these firms under-
hiring relative to the level justified by the firms’ underlying economic characteristics. 
Finally, results in column 4 indicate that tax avoidance is unrelated to firms under-
investing in labour by means of over-firing relative to the expected labour policy. 
 
4.3.2 Tax risk and uncertainty 
A number of studies provide evidence that risks and uncertainties can lead firms to 
withhold investments (Bloom et al. 2007; Gulen and Ion 2015). In this section, I test 
whether tax risk and uncertainty stemming from potential additional tax payments, 
interests and reputational loss, lead firms to make sub-optimal hiring decisions. Hiring 
policies are especially relevant to this setting because of the likely high adjustment costs 
associated with investments in human capital (Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Dixit 1997; 
Ghaly et al. 2017). In Table 4.6, I examine the effect of tax avoidance on firms’ 
abnormal net hiring for firms exposed to higher tax risks and uncertainties. Following 
(Guenther et al. 2017), I proxy for tax risk using an indicator variable that equals one 




zero otherwise (Tax risk). Similar to Dyreng et al. (2019) and Guenther, Wilson, and 
Wu (2018), my proxy for tax uncertainty is the unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) reserve 
as reported on corporate statements. Tax uncertainty is then an indicator variable 
which equals one if a firm’s UTB is above the sample median and zero otherwise. 
Results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6 show that the effect of tax avoidance on 
over-investments in human capital is statistically insignificant for firms exposed to 
greater tax risks. In contrast, consistent with my research hypothesis, results in 
columns 3 and 4 provide evidence that the positive effect of tax avoidance on firms’ 
sub-optimal labour policies is more pronounced for firms subject to higher tax risks 
and uncertainties. More specifically, the coefficient estimate on Low Cash ETR on a 
sub-sample of high tax risk firms (column 3) is approximately 0.0057. Similarly, column 
4 reports a coefficient estimate of 0.0089 Low Cash ETR suggesting that firms exposed 
to tax risks and uncertainty exhibit a level of net hiring below the expectations based 
on firms’ economic fundamentals.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the view that firms experiencing risks and 
uncertainties are more likely to be cautious when making investment decisions (Bloom 
et al. 2007), thereby leading to sub-optimal investments relative to the level justified 
by their underlying economic characteristics. Firms’ tax avoidance and labour 
investments choices are especially relevant in such a setting because of the high 
adjustment costs associated with hiring and firing (Oi 1962; Bentolila and Bertola 1990) 
and the greater tax risks and uncertainties faced by firms engaging in corporate tax 
avoidance (Guenther et al. 2017; Dyreng et al. 2019). 
 
4.3.3 Labour cost and financial constraints 
Table 4.7, panel A, presents the results of the effect of tax avoidance on labour 
investment after splitting the sample between firms operating in high-skill industries, 
and therefore exposed to higher adjustment costs of labour, and those that rely less on 
skilled human capital. Following Ghaly et al. (2017), I measure job-specific skills using 
the industry-level Labour Skill Index (LSI) and compute High skill as an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firms’ LSI is above the sample median and zero otherwise. 
In robustness tests, I measure labour cost more directly using the staff cost reported 




Columns 1 and 2 of panel A show a statistically insignificant coefficient on Low 
Cash ETR for firms that over-invest in labour force and for both sub-samples of firms 
operating in industries that require a higher percentage of skilled labour and those that 
rely on a less skilled workforce. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on Low Cash ETR 
in column 3 is positive and significant for firms that under-invest in labour and require 
larger skilled human capital to carry on their activity. Consistent with my research 
hypothesis, this result suggests that firms with Low Cash ETR are more likely to 
withhold their hiring policies when adjustment costs of labour are higher. Finally, 
results in column 4 indicate that the positive effect of tax avoidance on firms’ sub-
optimal labour investments vanishes in the sub-sample of firms exhibiting lower 
percentages of skilled human capital. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 reports the results after splitting the sample between financially 
constrained and unconstrained companies based on the median Leverage38. The 
rationale of this test lays on the potential reverse causality issue brought about by 
financial constraints on the relation subject to estimation. That is, firms experiencing 
financially constraints may engage in tax avoidance as a way to increase their cash 
balances and at the same time hire less in response to the adverse financial condition. 
Results in panel B mitigate this concern by presenting evidence that the effect of tax 
avoidance on firms’ under-investment in labour force is positive and significant for 
both constrained and unconstrained firms, at 5 and 10% levels of significance. 
 
4.3.4 Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate cut: Quasi-natural 
experiment 
A cause of concern in estimating the effect of corporate tax avoidance on firms’ 
labour investments is the potential endogeneity that such a relation may entail. For 
example, unobservable firm-specific characteristics (for instance, related to managerial 
preferences) could affect both firms’ (labour) investments and tax policies, thereby 
leading to biased results. To mitigate this concern, I analyse the relation between tax 
avoidance and labour investment around Ireland’s statutory corporate tax cut occurred 
                                                          
38 On this spirit, Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) show that financially constrained firms 
document high leverage levels. Similarly, Whited (1992) suggests that firms with low leverage are 




in December 1997 in a quasi-natural experiment design using difference-in-differences 
regressions.  
Starting in December 1997, indeed, Ireland began a phased reduction of its 
corporate tax rate, taking it down to 12.5% from an original rate of 32% by January 1, 
2003. Anecdotal evidence suggests that following the reduction of Ireland’s statutory 
corporate tax rate, tax planning by North American and European multinationals with 
operations in Ireland substantially increased to take advantage of the lower tax rate. 
One channel traditionally employed by multinational firms to shift profits from a high 
tax country to a lower tax country is transfer pricing. Relevant to my study, 
international transfer pricing transactions are also exposed to a high degree of 
uncertainty (Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall 2017; Towery 2017; Drake, Goldman, and 
Murphy 2018). Therefore, I use the Irish tax cut of December 1997 to provide a causal 
support to my analysis. More specifically, I estimate the following difference-in-
differences equation (3): 
 
|Abnormal net hire|
= γ0 + γ1Treated × Post + γ2Treated + γ3Post 





Where Treated × Post is the interaction term that captures the effect of the Irish 
statutory tax cut on the treated group relative to the unaffected control group. Post is 
an indicator variable that equals one from 1998 (year in which the phased reduction of 
Ireland’s statutory corporate tax began) onward and Treated is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a firm-year is in the treatment group and zero otherwise. 
The treatment group consists of U.S. multinationals with operations in Ireland 
(Treated = 1), whereas the control group includes U.S. multinationals with operations 
in countries other than Ireland (Treated = 0). I identify the location of U.S. 
multinationals’ foreign subsidiaries using Exhibit 21 data available on Scott Dyreng’s 
website (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009). Each firm in the control group is matched with 
one firm in the treatment group (nearest neighbour with replacement) based on several 




(Global) pre-tax income and Foreign pre-tax income) and industry fixed effects. The 
analysis is led on a sample that includes only treated and control firms.  
Figure 4.2 shows the annual Cash ETR averages for treatment (lower blue line) and 
control (upper red line) groups. Before the introduction of the Irish corporate tax cut 
in December 1997 (which entered into force in January 1, 1998), the tax payments of 
treatment and control groups were aligned, as shown by the parallel trend before 
January 1998 (which is represented by the vertical red line). After the introduction of 
the statutory tax cut, the average tax payment of U.S. multinationals with Irish 
operations (Treated = 1) decreases substantially (from about 0.30 to 0.24 in the two 
following years) diverging from the tax payments of U.S. multinationals with foreign 
operations in countries other than Ireland (Treated = 0) which show a rather flat trend. 
Overall, figure 4.2 suggests that the matched control group is a good counterfactual to 
U.S. multinationals with operations in Ireland had not the tax cut been introduced. 
Table 4.8 presents the results of difference-in-differences analysis around (two-year 
window) Ireland’s statutory corporate tax cut. To isolates the impact of tax avoidance 
on firms’ labour investments from other changes in the Irish legislation, and more 
generally from changes in the Irish economy, that may be concurrent and potentially 
correlated with the statutory corporate tax cut, I drop the year 1998 in which the new 
tax regime began. Moreover, to control for industry- and year-specific unobservable 
characteristics that might bias my results (such as periods of economic recession), I 
include industry and year fixed effects. 
The coefficient estimate on Treated × Post in column 1 is statistically insignificant, 
which suggests that firms’ abnormal labour policies are unrelated to tax avoidance. 
Yet, after breaking down |Abnormal net hire| into its components (over- and under-
investment), I find a positive and significant coefficient on Treated × Post for a sub-
sample of firms that under-invest in human capital (0.0278), whereas the coefficient 
on Treated × Post is statistically insignificant for the sub-sample of firms that over-
invest in labour. Overall, in line with my research hypothesis and the above analysis, 
these results indicate that the greater tax avoidance opportunities available to U.S. 
multinationals following the reduction of Ireland’s statutory tax rate lead firms to 
undertake sub-optimal hiring policies by retaining their investments in human capital 





4.3.5 Tax credits and tax grants to labour investments 
Another potential source of endogeneity may stem from tax credits and other 
incentives to labour investment granted by local governments (i.e. at state level) or 
foreign countries to U.S. domestic and multinational firms. For example, firms can 
take advantage of tax incentives aiming at stimulating employment and economic 
growth to lower their tax payments. If regressions pick up this effect, my coefficient 
estimates would be biased towards finding larger over-investments in labour. My 
results above provide evidence that this not the case, with coefficients on Low Cash 
ETR constantly insignificant in the sub-sample of firms over-investing in human 
capital. An interpretation of this finding is that firms engaging in tax avoidance have 
access to similar opportunities to reduce their tax payments, perhaps reflected in tax 
avoiders’ concentration in specific industries (panel C of Table 4.2 shows that 
Electronic Equipment and Business Services industries together account for 33% of 
firm-year observations in the Low Cash ETR sub-sample). 
To further address endogeneity, I follow Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, and 
Larcker (2015) and Shevlin et al. (2018) and construct a proxy for tax avoidance that 
is adjusted for firms’ peers’ tax avoidance positions. More specifically, using a sample 
that includes only U.S. domestic firms without foreign operations, I first compute the 
difference between a firm’s Cash ETR and the average Cash ETR of the firm’s industry 
(based on Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification) and size (based on the 
sample median of total assets) peers. Second, I divide the distribution of the above 
difference into quartiles and define firm-year observations in the first quartile (i.e. the 
one with the lowest difference) as Low peer-adjusted Cash ETR. 
The rationale of this test relies on the assumption that U.S. domestic firms 
operating in similar industries and of similar size should, on average, have access to 
similar tax incentives39 and, ultimately, should show consistent tax outcomes in the 
absence of a more aggressive tax planning approach. That is, while all domestic U.S. 
firms can similarly benefit from tax incentives (to labour, R&D and capital 
investments), firms’ tax aggressiveness can vary substantially across my sample (see 
panel B of Table 4.2). As a results, Low peer-adjusted Cash ETR captures U.S. 
                                                          
39 Chirinko and Wilson (2013) and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) show that almost all states in the U.S. 
use tax incentives, in the form of tax credits or tax grants, to stimulate employment and economic 




domestic firms’ tax avoidance that exceeds government tax incentives (i.e. proxied by 
peer average Cash ETR). 
Table 4.9 reports the results of Model (2) after controlling for tax incentives to 
labour in a sample that includes only U.S. domestic firms. The coefficient estimate on 
Low peer-adjusted Cash ETR is statistically insignificant in column 1, which means 
that tax avoidance is unrelated to abnormal labour investments after taking into 
account tax incentives. However, after breaking down |Abnormal net hire| into its 
two components, I find that the effect is insignificant for a sample of firms with net 
hiring above the expected level whereas it is positive and significant for the sample of 
firms with net hiring below the level justified by their economic fundamentals. Overall, 
these results are consistent with my main findings in Table 4.4, in that they show that 
firms engaging in tax avoidance in the current year undertake sub-optimal labour 
investments in the following year regardless of potential asymmetries in firms’ ability 
to (access to and) benefit from governmental tax incentives. 
 
4.3.6 Robustness tests 
In panels A and B of Table 4.10, I replace |Abnormal net hire| using |Abnormal 
ind. adj. net hire| and |Abnormal av. net hire|, respectively. More specifically, 
|Abnormal ind. adj. net hire| is, for each year, the difference between a firm’s net 
hiring and the industry-median net hiring. Unlike |Abnormal net hire| that reflect 
deviations from expected levels of hiring based on firms’ own economic 
characteristics, |Abnormal ind. adj. net hire| captures deviations from the median 
workforce employed in the industry. Results in panel A are substantially unchanged 
with respect to my main results in Table 4.4. Tax avoidance is associated with firms’ 
sub-optimal hiring policies and, more specifically, firms exhibit labour investments 
below the level justified by their underlying economic fundamentals. 
In panel B of Table 4.10, I replace |Abnormal net hire| using |Abnormal av. net 
hire|. |Abnormal av. net hire| is, for each year, the difference between a firm’s net 
hiring and the firm’s average net hiring in the previous three years. Unlike |Abnormal 
net hire|, |Abnormal av. net hire| captures deviations from previous years’ labour 
policies. Columns 1 and 2 present statistically insignificant coefficient on Low Cash 
ETR for both the whole sample and the sub-sample of firms with net hiring above the 




firms with Low Cash ETR are positively associated with under-investments in human 
capital. Overall, results in panels A and B provide evidence that firms engaging in tax 
avoidance withhold their investments in labour. 
Table 4.11 presents a number of additional robustness checks. First, in panel A, I 
replace Low Cash ETR with Low Cash ETR tercile which extend the number of firm-
year observations falling into my tax avoidance definition. Coefficient estimates show 
that results are substantially unchanged, with firms engaging in tax avoidance in the 
current year making sub-optimal labour investments in the following year. Similarly, 
panel B provides evidence that the effect on reduced net hiring is not driven by firms 
experiencing losses in the previous years and use these losses to minimize Cash ETR. 
In panel C, I report the results of Model (2) after dropping all firms that change 
their labour investments from above to below the level justified by their underlying 
economic characteristics (and vice versa) between two contiguous years. That is, I 
remove all firms that over-invest in human capital in the current year and under-invest 
in the following year and vice versa. After applying this screen, I find that results in 
Table 4.4 still hold. Similarly, in panel D, I find consistent results with the above 
analysis on a sample that excludes the financial crisis period (2007-2009). Lastly, in 
panel E, I run Model (2) on a sub-sample of firms with high staff cost. Similar to results 
in Table 4.7, I find that the effect of tax avoidance on lower human capital investments 
is more pronounced in firms that exhibit higher labour costs; consistent with the view 
of adjustment costs of labour playing an important role in firms’ retaining policies. 
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
Chapter 4 addresses the important research question of how tax avoidance affects 
firms’ labour investments. Using a sample of 3,062 U.S. publicly listed firms over the 
years 1992-2017, I find that firms with low cash effective tax rates (Low Cash ETR), 
my proxy for tax avoidance, make sub-optimal labour investment decisions and more 
specifically under-invest in human capital relative to the level justified by their 
underlying economic fundamentals and industry medians. This result is consistent with 
tax avoidance generating a withholding effect to firms’ hiring opportunities through 
increased tax risks and uncertainties.  
To test this prediction, I then focus on sub-samples of firms exposed to high tax 




uncertainty (proxied by additions to UTB reserves above the median) in separate 
regressions. I find the positive effect of tax avoidance on firms’ sub-optimal hiring 
policies to be stronger for firms with high tax risks and uncertainties. In an additional 
analysis, I also test whether the effect on reduced net hiring is mediated the adjustment 
cost of labour. To this end, I isolate the impact of labour cost using sub-samples of 
firms operating in industries with larger percentages of skilled labour and by using a 
more direct proxy of labour cost (i.e. staff cost). After this test, I continue to find 
evidence of a positive association between tax avoidance and sub-optimal hiring 
policies. More importantly, I provide evidence that the effect is more pronounced in 
presence of high labour costs. 
Overall, my results suggest that tax avoidance affects firms’ human capital policies 
by reducing labour investments, consistent with the view of firms withholding their 
labour demand in response to increased tax risks and uncertainty. These results are 
also robust to a number of additional tests and to a plausibly exogenous event affecting 
U.S. firms’ tax avoidance opportunities. Finally, these findings can inform policy-
makers and other corporate stakeholders (such as labour unions) when designing, 







Table A.4.1. Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Model (1):  
Net hireit Percentage change in labour investment (Compustat: (emp-L.emp)/L.emp) 
Sales growthit Percentage change in revenues from sales (Compustat: (revt-L.revt)/L.revt) 
ROAit Net income divided by one-year lag total assets (Compustat: ni/L.at) 
ΔROAit Percentage change in ROA  
Returnit Total stock return (CRSP: retx) 
Sizeit-1 Natural logarithm of market value (Compustat: (csho*prcc_f)) 
Size_rit-1 Percentile rank of Sizeit-1 
Quick ratioit-1 Quick ratio (Compustat: ((che+rect)/lct) 
ΔQuick ratioit-1 Percentage change in Quickit-1 
Leverageit-1 Sum of total debt in current and long-term liabilities divided by total assets 
(Compustat: (dlc+dltt)/at) 
Loss binsit-1 Negative ROA values separate five bins every 0.005 intervals. Loss bin1=1 
if ROA ranges between -0.005 and 0. Loss bin2=1 if ROA ranges between -
0.005 and -0.010. Loss bin3=1 if ROA ranges between -0.010 and -0.015. 
Loss bin4=1 if ROA ranges between -0.015 and -0.020. Loss bin5=1 if ROA 
ranges between -0.020 and -0.025. 
Model (2):  
|Abnormal net hire|it Absolute value of the difference between actual and expected net hire, 
computed following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) from Model (1) 
Low Cash ETRit-1 Indicator variable equal to one if a firm-year observation is in the first quartile 
of the Cash ETR (Compustat: txtpd/(pi-spi)) distribution, and zero 
otherwise 
Market-to-bookit-1 Market price at the end of the period times common shares outstanding at 
the end of the period divided by total assets (Compustat: (csho*prcc_f)/ceq) 
Dividendit-1 Indicator variable equal one if a firm’s paid dividend at the end of the 
previous period and zero otherwise (Compustat: dvpsp_f) 
CFO volatilityit-1 Standard deviation of cash flow from operation from t-5 to t-1 (Compustat: 
oancf) 
Sales volatilityit-1 Standard deviation of revenues from sales from t-5 to t-1 (Compustat: revt) 
PP&Eit-1 Net property plant and equipment divided by total assets (Compustat: 
ppent/at) 
Loss firmsit-1 Indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s has negative ROA and zero 
otherwise 
Institutional ownershipit-1 Percentage of ownership held by institutional investors (Thomson Reuters) 
Net hire volatilityit-1 Standard deviation of net hire from t-5 to t-1 
Labour intensityit-1 Number of employees divided by total assets (Compustat: emp/at) 
Unionized laborit-1 Percentage of union membership per year at industry-level (Union 





|Abnormal other inv.|it Absolute value of the residual from the following model: Other 
investmentit=β0 + β1Sale growthit-1 + εit. Where Other investment is the sum 
of capital, acquisition and R&D expenses minus cash receipts from the sale 
of PP&E divided by one-year lag total assets (Compustat: 
((capxit+aqcit+xrdit-sppeit)/atit-1) 
Additional variables:  
Over-investment Net hiring above the expected level (i.e. positive Abnormal net hiring) 
Under-investment Net hiring below the expected level (i.e. negative Abnormal net hiring) 
|Larger abnormal net hire| Above the median over- or under-investment 
Over-hire Over-investment when expected net hiring is positive 
Under-fire Over-investment when expected net hiring is negative 
Under-hire Under-investment when expected net hiring is positive 
Over-fire Under-investment when expected net hiring is negative 
Tax risk Indicator variable equal to one if the standard deviation of Cash ETR over a 
five-year period is above the median and zero otherwise 
Tax uncertainty Indicator variable equal to one if uncertain tax benefit (UTB) reserve divided 
by total assets (Compustat: txtubend/at) is above the median and zero 
otherwise 
High skill Indicator variable equal to one if the Labour Skill Index (LSI) is above the 
median and zero otherwise. LSI measures the reliance of industries on skilled 
labour and is computed using OES employment data from the Bureau of 
Labour statistics and labour skill data from the U.S. Department of Labour’s 
O*NET 
Low peer-adjusted Cash ETR Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is in the first quartile of the peer-
adjusted Cash ETR difference distribution. Peer-adjusted Cash ETR is the 
difference of a firm’s Cash ETR and the average Cash ETR of the firm’s 
industry (Fama-French 48) and size (total assets) peers 
|Abnormal ind. adj. net hire| Absolute value of industry-adjusted net hiring, computed as the difference 
between a firm’s net hiring and the industry and year median net hiring 
|Abnormal av. net hire| Absolute value of the difference between a firm’s net hiring and the average 
net hiring of the previous three years 
High staff cost Indicator variable equal to one if staff cost (Compustat: xlr/at) is above the 








Table 4.1. Model (1): Summary Statistics and Regression Results 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 25th 75th 
Net hireit 83,453 0.0831 0.0205 0.3836 -0.0500 0.1333 
Sales growthit-1 83,453 0.2481 0.0840 0.9440 -0.0303 0.2514 
Sales growthit 83,453 0.1769 0.0702 0.7729 -0.0431 0.2165 
ΔROAit 83,453 0.0070 -0.0009 0.5287 -0.0521 0.0407 
ΔROAit-1 83,453 0.0306 -0.0001 0.7159 -0.0519 0.0435 
ROAit 83,453 -0.0532 0.0314 0.4710 -0.0652 0.0854 
Returnit 83,453 0.0101 0.0045 0.1667 -0.0695 0.0803 
Sizeit-1 83,453 5.6795 5.6604 2.3246 4.0171 7.2603 
Quick ratioit-1 83,453 2.2005 1.2888 3.0692 0.7881 2.3587 
ΔQuick ratioit-1 83,453 -0.0523 -0.0071 2.2927 -0.3015 0.2523 
ΔQuick ratioit 83,453 0.1589 -0.0143 1.3035 -0.2206 0.2083 







Panel B. Regression results: Expected and actual net hiring 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Net hire 
  
Sales growthit-1 0.0297*** 
 (0.0039) 












Quick ratioit-1 0.0054*** 
 (0.0009) 
ΔQuick ratioit-1 0.0130*** 
 (0.0022) 




Loss bin1it-1 -0.0360*** 
 (0.0077) 
Loss bin2it-1 -0.0363*** 
 (0.0071) 
Loss bin3it-1 -0.0312*** 
 (0.0116) 
Loss bin4it-1 -0.0070 
 (0.0109) 












Table 4.2. Model (2): Summary Statistics 
Table 4.4.2 presents descriptive statistics of Cash ETR by quartiles (Panel A) and by industry 
defined using Fama-French 48 industry classification (Panel B). Panel C reports descriptive 
statistics of all Model (2)’s variables. 
Panel C. Descriptive statistics 
 
N Mean Median Std. dev. 25th 75th 
|Abnormal net hire| 21,971 0.1225 0.0657 0.1890 0.0256 0.1443 
Low Cash ETR 21,971 0.2500 0.0000 0.4330 0.0000 1.0000 
Market-to-book 21,971 3.0894 2.2907 5.8166 1.4327 3.6865 
Size 21,971 6.6885 6.7433 2.2087 5.2125 8.2286 
Quick ratio 21,971 1.9626 1.3521 2.1978 0.8584 2.2595 
Leverage 21,971 0.4612 0.4465 0.3164 0.2827 0.6003 
Dividend 21,971 0.4607 0.0000 0.4985 0.0000 1.0000 
CFO volatility 21,971 0.5147 0.3826 0.4416 0.2217 0.6672 
Sales volatility 21,971 0.2025 0.1595 0.1766 0.0944 0.2591 
PP&E 21,971 0.2276 0.1758 0.1840 0.0875 0.3173 
Institutional ownership 21,971 0.2151 0.2134 0.1545 0.0673 0.3409 
Net hire volatility 21,971 0.1601 0.1083 0.1676 0.0590 0.1920 
Labour intensity 21,971 0.0067 0.0039 0.0084 0.0022 0.0074 
Unionized labour 21,971 0.1050 0.1025 0.0367 0.0880 0.1285 







Panel B. Quartile distribution of Cash ETR 
Variable Quartile N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Low Cash ETR 1 5,493 0.0351 0.0290 0.0319 0.0000 0.0982 
- 2 5,493 0.1639 0.1662 0.0354 0.0982 0.2220 
- 3 5,493 0.2743 0.2741 0.0300 0.2220 0.3274 
High Cash ETR 4 5,492 0.4818 0.4051 0.1877 0.3274 1.0000 
Total  21,971 0.2388 0.2220 0.1909 0.0000 1.0000 
 
 
Panel C. Low Cash ETR by industry 
Industry N Mean Industry N Mean 
Unclassified 18 0.04 Automobiles & Trucks 81 0.04 
Agriculture 13 0.05 Aircrafts 43 0.04 
Food Products 62 0.03 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 11 0.01 
Candy & Soda 6 0.02 Defence 25 0.03 
Beer & Liquor 10 0.04 Precious Metals 22 0.01 
Recreation 37 0.03 Non-Metallic & Metallic Mining 26 0.05 
Printing & Publishing 18 0.04 Coal 5 0.05 
Consumer Goods 57 0.04 Petroleum & Natural Gas 81 0.03 
Apparel 22 0.03 Communication 117 0.03 
Medical Equipment 285 0.04 Personal Services 277 0.03 
Pharmaceutical Products 298 0.03 Business Services 867 0.04 
Chemicals 163 0.03 Computers 496 0.04 
Rubber & Plastic Products 46 0.03 Electronic Equipment 925 0.03 
Textiles 10 0.02 Measuring & Control Equipment 232 0.04 
Construction Materials 94 0.04 Business Supplies 87 0.04 
Construction 7 0.02 Shipping Containers 30 0.04 
Steel Works etc. 63 0.03 Transportation 22 0.03 
Fabricated Products 19 0.03 Wholesale 169 0.03 
Machinery 269 0.04 Retail 271 0.03 







Table 4.3. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
(1) |Abnormal net hire| 1.00                
                  
(2) Low Cash ETR 0.07 1.00               
  (0.00)                
(3) Market-to-book 0.03 -0.01 1.00              
  (0.00) (0.08)               
(4) Size -0.07 -0.20 0.15 1.00             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
(5) Quick ratio 0.04 0.09 -0.00 -0.14 1.00            
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00)             
(6) Leverage -0.03 -0.00 0.02 0.11 -0.37 1.00           
  (0.00) (0.50) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)            
(7) Dividend -0.14 -0.23 0.03 0.39 -0.16 0.10 1.00          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
(8) CFO volatility 0.09 0.17 -0.05 -0.32 0.10 -0.05 -0.25 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
(9) Sales volatility 0.17 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.15 -0.05 -0.23 0.26 1.00        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
(10) PP&E -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.26 0.10 0.16 -0.18 -0.09 1.00       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
(11) Institutional ownership -0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.35 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 1.00      
  (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)       
(12) Net hire volatility 0.15 0.13 -0.03 -0.16 0.04 -0.01 -0.22 0.20 0.46 -0.10 -0.05 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
(13) Labour intensity 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.28 -0.17 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 0.31 -0.10 -0.02 1.00    
  (0.81) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)     
(14) Unionized labour 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.06 -0.27 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.20) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
(15) |Abnormal other inv.| 0.29 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 1.00  





Table 4.4. Tax Avoidance and Labour Investment 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 1992-2017. Table A.4.1 in the Appendix reports 
variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Whole-sample Over-investment  Under-investment  













      
Low Cash ETR 0.0079** 0.0080 0.0027 0.0055*** 0.0097*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0104) (0.0020) (0.0033) 
Market-to-book 0.0015*** 0.0021*** 0.0018 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Size -0.0035*** -0.0058*** -0.0101*** -0.0017*** -0.0012 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
Quick ratio 0.0030** 0.0168*** 0.0111*** 0.0012*** 0.0003 
 (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Leverage -0.0254 -0.0264** -0.0027 0.0074** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0132) (0.0085) (0.0029) (0.0025) 
Dividend -0.0200*** -0.0069 0.0182 -0.0031* -0.0014 
 (0.0037) (0.0067) (0.0122) (0.0018) (0.0029) 
CFO volatility 0.0086** 0.0125 0.0117 0.0043** 0.0035 
 (0.0042) (0.0078) (0.0116) (0.0021) (0.0034) 
Sales volatility 0.0674*** 0.0827*** 0.0395 0.0052 -0.0081 
 (0.0158) (0.0249) (0.0298) (0.0062) (0.0087) 
PP&E -0.0231* -0.0067 -0.0133 -0.0209*** -0.0213** 
 (0.0118) (0.0220) (0.0368) (0.0062) (0.0099) 
Institutional ownership 0.0658*** 0.0223 -0.0490 0.0083 -0.0242** 
 (0.0119) (0.0217) (0.0363) (0.0058) (0.0098) 
Net hire volatility 0.0644*** 0.0873*** 0.1028*** 0.0363*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0233) (0.0303) (0.0075) (0.0118) 
Labour intensity -0.7295*** -2.0756*** -4.4076*** 0.4412** 0.2206 
 (0.2491) (0.4528) (0.7862) (0.1821) (0.2685) 
Unionized labour -0.3021** -0.1960 0.3678 0.0609 0.0749 
 (0.1494) (0.2590) (0.4124) (0.0867) (0.1346) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.4957*** 0.6286*** 0.6022*** -0.0263*** -0.0209 
 (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0413) (0.0095) (0.0173) 
      
Observations 17,277 7,054 3,460 10,223 4,893 
R-squared 0.1521 0.2327 0.2020 0.0529 0.0530 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES 






Table 4.5. Tax Avoidance and Over- and Under- Labour Investment 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 1992-2017. Table A.4.1 in the Appendix reports 
variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Over-investment  Under-investment  
 Over-hiring Under-firing Under-hiring Over-firing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Low Cash ETR 0.0093 0.0028 0.0046*** 0.0308 
 (0.0060) (0.0849) (0.0018) (0.0190) 
Market-to-book 0.0019*** 0.0047 0.0002 -0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0035) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
Size -0.0046*** 0.0208 -0.0016*** -0.0016 
 (0.0015) (0.0132) (0.0004) (0.0038) 
Quick ratio 0.0144*** 0.1056** 0.0012*** 0.0070 
 (0.0027) (0.0417) (0.0004) (0.0099) 
Leverage -0.0338** -0.0604** -0.0097*** -0.0008 
 (0.0137) (0.0263) (0.0035) (0.0045) 
Dividend -0.0047 -0.1226** -0.0043*** 0.0375** 
 (0.0057) (0.0600) (0.0016) (0.0173) 
CFO volatility 0.0104 0.1094 0.0033* -0.0005 
 (0.0068) (0.0714) (0.0019) (0.0189) 
Sales volatility 0.0699*** -0.0700 0.0085 -0.1123** 
 (0.0215) (0.2172) (0.0062) (0.0481) 
PP&E -0.0053 0.0479 -0.0174*** -0.0786 
 (0.0197) (0.1772) (0.0057) (0.0501) 
Institutional ownership 0.0173 0.2681 0.0126** 0.0989** 
 (0.0187) (0.1993) (0.0051) (0.0432) 
Net hire volatility 0.0979*** -0.0054 0.0354*** 0.0028 
 (0.0198) (0.1764) (0.0073) (0.0675) 
Labour intensity -1.3774*** -10.4266** 0.4647** -0.3861 
 (0.4090) (4.3664) (0.1815) (1.6137) 
Unionized labour -0.1170 -2.8784 0.0692 0.1851 
 (0.2258) (3.7010) (0.0783) (0.8535) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.5581*** 0.6899*** -0.0186** -0.0080 
 (0.0322) (0.2236) (0.0089) (0.0775) 
     
Observations 6,742 312 9,732 491 
R-squared 0.2302 0.6221 0.0660 0.2655 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 







Table 4.6. The Role of Tax Risk and Uncertainty 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 1992-2017. Table A.4.1 in the Appendix reports 
variable definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Over-investment  Under-investment  
 Tax risk=1 Tax uncertainty=1 Tax risk=1 Tax uncertainty =1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Low Cash ETR 0.0121 0.0076 0.0057* 0.0089** 
 (0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0031) (0.0043) 
Market-to-book 0.0012 0.0004 0.0005* 0.0002 
 (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Size -0.0069** -0.0066* -0.0020*** -0.0009 
 (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
Quick ratio 0.0161*** 0.0066* 0.0013** 0.0017 
 (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Leverage -0.0619** -0.0580* 0.0099 0.0075 
 (0.0303) (0.0320) (0.0061) (0.0089) 
Dividend -0.0056 -0.0171 -0.0011 -0.0013 
 (0.0085) (0.0126) (0.0024) (0.0037) 
CFO volatility -0.0043 -0.0137 0.0013 0.0022 
 (0.0101) (0.0184) (0.0028) (0.0052) 
Sales volatility 0.0723* 0.0603** 0.0170* -0.0017 
 (0.0400) (0.0241) (0.0089) (0.0091) 
PP&E -0.0196 -0.0870* -0.0202** -0.0188 
 (0.0276) (0.0448) (0.0081) (0.0143) 
Institutional ownership 0.0557 0.0329 0.0062 -0.0241 
 (0.0340) (0.0441) (0.0080) (0.0152) 
Net hire volatility 0.1290*** 0.0370 0.0283*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0466) (0.0095) (0.0203) 
Labour intensity -2.0636** -4.4245** 0.4651** 0.2434 
 (0.8076) (1.8727) (0.2170) (0.3351) 
Unionized labour -0.3834 -0.7434 -0.0615 -0.3643 
 (0.3814) (1.1894) (0.1324) (0.2557) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.5865*** 0.5928*** -0.0181 -0.0290 
 (0.0600) (0.0830) (0.0132) (0.0288) 
     
Observations 3,066 1,429 4,937 2,371 
R-squared 0.2482 0.2428 0.0517 0.0797 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 




Table 4.7. The Role of Skilled Labour and Financial Constraints 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 2003-2017. Subsamples by labour skills (panel A) 
and financial constraints (panel B). Regressions in panel B exclude Leverage from the control 
variables. Table A.4.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. All the explanatory variables 
are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at 
industry-year level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Subsamples by labour skills 
 Over-investment  Under-investment 
 High skills Low skills High skills Low skills 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Low Cash ETR -0.0061 -0.0054 0.0144* 0.0011 
 (0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0082) (0.0058) 
     
Observations 729 680 1,107 1,070 
R-squared 0.3946 0.2549 0.0783 0.0791 
Controls     
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Panel B. Subsamples by financial constraints 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








     
Low Cash ETR 0.0014 0.0093 0.0053* 0.0071** 
 (0.0080) (0.0110) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
     
Observations 3,737 3,317 5,031 5,192 
R-squared 0.2155 0.2746 0.0582 0.0597 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 







Table 4.8. DID Regressions around Ireland’s Statutory Corporate Tax Cut 
Difference-in-differences around Ireland’s statutory corporate tax cut occurred in December 1997 
(two-year window). The treatment group includes U.S. multinationals with operations in Ireland 
whereas the control group consists of U.S. multinationals without operations in Ireland. Table 
A.4.1 in the Appendix reports variable definitions. Firms in the control group are selected using 
propensity score matching with replacement that best matches each firm in the treatment group 
based on several lagged (two-year) variables (Cash ETR, Market-to-book value, Size, PP&E, 
Global pre-tax income and Foreign-only pre-tax income) and industry characteristics. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Whole sample Over-investment Under-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| 
    
Treated × Post 0.0211 0.0620 0.0278** 
 (0.0252) (0.0403) (0.0123) 
Treated 0.0085 0.0045 -0.0163** 
 (0.0234) (0.0343) (0.0075) 
Post 0.0305 0.0958** -0.0179 
 (0.0251) (0.0411) (0.0118) 
    
Observations 1,876 1,105 771 
R-squared 0.0944 0.1725 0.0695 
Industry FE YES YES YES 






Table 4.9. Controlling for Tax Incentives to Labour in U.S. Domestic Firms Only 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. 
domestic firms only. The sample excludes utility and financial firms and covers the years 1992-
2017. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level 
(in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Whole sample Over-investment Under-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| 
    
Low peer-adjusted Cash ETR 0.0047 -0.0014 0.0073** 
 (0.0069) (0.0124) (0.0035) 
Market-to-book 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0001 
 (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0003) 
Size -0.0028 -0.0062* -0.0013 
 (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0009) 
Quick ratio 0.0027* 0.0199*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0005) 
Leverage -0.0136 -0.0187 0.0081*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0117) (0.0029) 
Dividend -0.0154** 0.0102 -0.0040 
 (0.0071) (0.0139) (0.0032) 
Cash flow volatility 0.0171** 0.0277* 0.0090*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0148) (0.0032) 
Sales volatility 0.0684*** 0.1004** -0.0053 
 (0.0260) (0.0464) (0.0108) 
PP&E -0.0186 -0.0023 -0.0126 
 (0.0193) (0.0344) (0.0093) 
Institutional ownership 0.0770*** 0.0165 0.0210* 
 (0.0234) (0.0435) (0.0110) 
Net hire volatility 0.0620** 0.0992** 0.0335** 
 (0.0282) (0.0447) (0.0141) 
Labour intensity -0.6655* -2.0233*** 0.4820* 
 (0.3438) (0.5593) (0.2670) 
Unionized labour -0.4272 -0.5372 0.0964 
 (0.2639) (0.4856) (0.1548) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.4527*** 0.6671*** -0.0542*** 
 (0.0695) (0.0730) (0.0151) 
    
Observations 5,310 2,136 3,174 
R-squared 0.1438 0.2630 0.0930 
Industry FE YES YES YES 




Table 4.10. Alternative Proxies for Expected Net Hiring 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 1992-2017. All the explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Industry-median net hiring  
 Whole-sample Over-investment Under-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES |Abnormal ind. 
adj. net hire| 
|Abnormal ind. 
adj. net hire| 
|Abnormal ind. 
adj. net hire| 
    
Low Cash ETR 0.0071* 0.0061 0.0061** 
 (0.0037) (0.0056) (0.0029) 
Market-to-book 0.0012*** 0.0017*** -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Size -0.0035*** -0.0049*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0006) 
Quick ratio 0.0031** 0.0040** 0.0007 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0005) 
Leverage -0.0184 -0.0291** 0.0100*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0028) 
Dividend -0.0143*** -0.0139*** -0.0001 
 (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0026) 
CFO volatility 0.0077* 0.0079 0.0026 
 (0.0041) (0.0064) (0.0031) 
Sales volatility 0.0576*** 0.0731*** 0.0022 
 (0.0144) (0.0195) (0.0087) 
PP&E -0.0244** -0.0211 -0.0266*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0172) (0.0086) 
Institutional ownership 0.0411*** 0.0203 -0.0149* 
 (0.0111) (0.0162) (0.0079) 
Net hire volatility 0.0622*** 0.0682*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0194) (0.0103) 
Labour intensity -0.6966*** -1.7073*** 0.5124** 
 (0.2400) (0.3437) (0.2578) 
Unionized labour -0.2148 -0.2176 -0.0185 
 (0.1408) (0.2159) (0.1146) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.4833*** 0.6162*** -0.0210* 
 (0.0382) (0.0375) (0.0114) 
    
Observations 17,277 9,680 7,106 
R-squared 0.1416 0.1883 0.0523 
Industry FE YES YES YES 




Panel B. Three-year average net hiring 
 Whole-sample Over-investment Under-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 




|Abnormal av.  
net hire| 
    
Low Cash ETR 0.0063 0.0060 0.0127*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0046) 
Market-to-book 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Size -0.0034*** -0.0069*** -0.0015 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0011) 
Quick ratio -0.0002 0.0028 -0.0025*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0008) 
Leverage -0.0099 -0.0291** 0.0251** 
 (0.0086) (0.0119) (0.0103) 
Dividend -0.0030 0.0004 -0.0104*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0039) 
CFO volatility 0.0025 0.0073 -0.0050 
 (0.0051) (0.0081) (0.0057) 
Sales volatility 0.0555** 0.0278 0.1175*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0285) (0.0276) 
PP&E -0.0336*** -0.0245 -0.0318** 
 (0.0129) (0.0201) (0.0137) 
Institutional ownership 0.0376*** 0.0018 0.0039 
 (0.0122) (0.0176) (0.0119) 
Net hire volatility 0.2478*** 0.1243*** 0.3234*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0315) (0.0210) 
Labour intensity -0.5157* -2.4728*** 0.6894* 
 (0.3084) (0.4593) (0.3689) 
Unionized labour -0.5564*** -0.0738 0.5523** 
 (0.2035) (0.2651) (0.2181) 
|Abnormal other inv.| 0.3721*** 0.6184*** 0.0412 
 (0.0407) (0.0437) (0.0275) 
    
Observations 17,065 7,125 8,770 
R-squared 0.1443 0.1954 0.2129 
Industry FE YES YES YES 






Table 4.11. Other Robustness Tests 
Regressions of labour investment on corporate tax avoidance using longitudinal data on U.S. non-
financial and non-utility firms covering the years 1992-2017. All regressions include model (2)’ 
control variables and industry and year fixed effects. Table A.4.1 in the Appendix reports variable 
definitions. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and adjusted for clusters at firm-level (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Whole sample Over-investment Under-investment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| |Abnormal net hire| 
    
Panel A. Tercile distribution of Cash ETR    
Low Cash ETR tercile 0.0079** 0.0080 0.0055*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0067) (0.0020) 
    
Observations 17,277 7,054 10,223 
R-squared 0.1521 0.2327 0.0529 
    
Panel B. Controlling for net operating loss carry-forward    
Low Cash ETR 0.0084** 0.0065 0.0058*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0066) (0.0021) 
NOL 0.0007 -0.0042 0.0021 
 (0.0033) (0.0059) (0.0017) 
Δ NOL -0.0024 0.0078 0.0037** 
 (0.0037) (0.0177) (0.0017) 
    
Observations 16,390 6,647 9,743 
R-squared 0.1529 0.2319 0.0520 
    
Panel C. Excluding labour policy changes in contiguous years    
Low Cash ETR 0.0096** 0.0080 0.0079*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0027) 
    
Observations 13,610 7,054 6,556 
R-squared 0.1803 0.2327 0.0553 
    
Panel D. Excluding financial crisis period (2007-2009)    
Low Cash ETR 0.0076* 0.0072 0.0064*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0072) (0.0022) 
    
Observations 14,706 6,179 8,527 
R-squared 0.1546 0.2330 0.0528 
    
Panel E. Sub-sample of firms with high staff cost    
Low Cash ETR 0.0057 0.0056 0.0048** 
 (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0022) 
    
Observations 15,856 6,566 9,290 





Figure 4.1. Net Hiring and Abnormal Net Hiring 
Figure A shows net hiring and abnormal net hiring based on economic fundamentals. The 
blue line in the middle of the graph represents the annual average Net hire. The red (green) 
line at the top (bottom) represents net hiring above (below) its expected level. All variables are 










Figure 4.2. Ireland’s Statutory Corporate Tax Cut: Treatment and Control 
Groups 
Figure 4.2 shows the annual average Cash ETR for U.S. multinationals with operations in 
Ireland (Treated = 1) represented by the blue lower line and the annual average Cash ETR for 
U.S. multinationals with foreign operations in countries other than Ireland (Treated = 0) 
represented by the red top line. The phased reduction of Ireland’s statutory corporate tax rate 
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5.1 Concluding remarks 
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial increase in equity holdings by 
institutional investors. Institutions, such as pensions and insurance companies, 
investment advisors and banks, hedge funds and mutual funds, represent an important 
source of capital and are among the largest shareholders of publicly listed companies 
around the world. Most importantly, institutional investors play a central role in 
corporate governance. Their active monitoring and the threat of their exit can 
discipline corporate management to act in a way that maximizes shareholders’ value. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this doctoral thesis investigate the effect of different types of 
institutional investors on corporate decision-making.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the monitoring impact of foreign institutional investors, as 
opposed to their domestic counterparts, on corporate tax planning. If foreign 
institutions are profit-maximizers, they would forego the risks of reputational loss, 
payments of additional taxes, penalties and interests if the tax strategy is later 
considered abusive and adopt a more aggressive tax avoidance approach to boost 
short-term after-tax earnings. The proponents of this view argue that foreign 
institutional investors could prompt corporate managers to prioritize short-term 
earnings over long-term growth, thereby leading companies to short-terminist 
strategies.  
Foreign institutional investors may, however, favour a more balanced tax planning 
approach that trades-off costs and benefits of tax avoidance. Foreign institutions are 
better positioned to act as effective monitors of managerial decisions in their investee 
firms. They can undertake a more independent monitoring activity because their ties 
with local business actors, such as managers, governmental authorities and 
communities, are likely lower relative to their domestic counterparts. Results of chapter 
2 are consistent with the latter hypothesis. They provide evidence that foreign 




avoidance level that is similar to the tax position of a company’s peers and is less likely 
attract regulatory and public scrutiny because it does not stand out from peer levels. 
Results also show that this effect is more pronounced for larger companies, pointing 
to a political cost interpretation of my findings. 
Chapter 3 investigates the role played by passive, index-tracking institutional 
investors on transparency and information production of firms’ geographic operations. 
Some studies claim that this class of investors exert limited monitoring over corporate 
management because their portfolios include a large number of companies and their 
resources available for monitoring are scarce. In contrast, other studies consider 
indexed institutions as active owners. According to this latter stance, indexed 
institutional investors have the incentive to undertake active monitoring over 
managerial decisions due to their long-term investment horizons, which is linked to 
index reconstitutions. Results in chapter 3 indicate that institutional ownership is 
associated with greater transparency and information production of companies’ 
geographic operations. Most importantly, chapter 3 shows that larger shares of 
ownership by indexed institutions are associated with greater geographic transparency 
only in companies that lead the majority of their operations in tax haven countries and 
have more entrenched corporate managers. This result is consistent with a view of 
indexed investors trading off costs and benefits of monitoring by acting as effective 
monitors, selectively, in those companies that are more exposed to information 
asymmetries and governance problems. 
Besides external sources of financing, companies can use internally generated funds 
to finance their activities. One way companies can generate capital internally is by 
taking advantage of tax planning opportunities. Reducing tax payments leads to higher 
tax savings and, presumably, to larger cash balances. Yet, companies engaging in tax 
avoidance incur the risks of reputational loss, additional payments of taxes, interests 
and penalties if the chosen tax strategy is later ruled improper. On this spirit, chapter 
4 examines the relation between tax avoidance and firms’ labour investments. 
Consistent with risks and uncertainties from tax avoidance making firms more cautious 
in their investments, chapter 4 provides evidence that firms with low effective tax rates, 
my proxy for tax avoidance, undertake sub-optimal labour investments relative to the 
level justified by the firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and industry medians. 




greater tax risks and uncertainties, which is consistent with the view of firms 
withholding their hiring decisions in response to potential reductions in cash flows and 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
5.2 Avenues for future research 
There are several potential avenues for future research in the intersection between 
corporate finance and accounting literatures. A first, relatively unexpected area of 
research concerns the effect of taxes on investors’ portfolio composition. For example, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that many asset managers domicile funds in low-tax 
countries, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, but manage them from financial centres, 
such as New York or London. From an academic perspective, such a study could 
increase our understanding of the agency relation between institutional investors and 
their clients. From a more practice-oriented perspective, this study could shade lights 
on one specific determinant of international money flows and could be also of interest 
for policy makers and regulators when designing tax incentives to financial 
investments.  
A second research study could examine whether institutions, such as mutual funds 
and pension funds, make tax-efficient investment decisions by taking advantage of tax-
favoured ETFs (Exchange-Traded-Funds) and fixed income securities. This study 
could focus on tax as one of the causes of the fast growing ETF and fixed income 
markets and explore the wealth effects of such investments for institutional investors’ 
clienteles. The tax benefits of ETF and fixed income investing have not been 
investigated by the accounting and finance literatures. Yet, this area of research could 
increase understanding of the mechanisms that lead institutions to buy ETFs and fixed 
income securities and allow an investigation of the agency relationship between 
institutional investors and their clientele. 
Finally, a third research study could examine the consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance on firms’ decision-making and focus, in particular, on investing and 
financing decisions. On this spirit, an empirical question that needs to be addressed is 
how tax aggressive companies make use of the extra cash generated by tax avoidance 
activities. A study providing insights into the investing and financing behaviour of 
companies engaging in tax avoidance could address an important gap in the extant 




there are several avenues for research in the intersection between tax, corporate 
governance and finance which can be explored to increase our understanding of the 
world and improve decision-making. 
 
